TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE NERVOUSNESS OF EUROPE.
EUROPE is growing nervous. The visit of the French fleet to Cronstadt has made even a deeper impres- sion than was intended, and the half-informed public sees in every new incident a forerunner of war, and greedily swallows every rumour which indicates the part that Great Britain, for the moment holder of the balance of power, will ultimately play. Nothing but nervousness will explain the eager attention paid to the recent incident in Constantinople, or the belief that the Sultan, who is absolute master in his own house, changed all his Ministers because he wished to depart from his own scheme of foreign policy. The Czar is known to dread the responsibilities of war, his Foreign Minister and his Minister for Asia are both leaving St. Petersburg for long holidays, a famine of cruel severity is raging in thirteen provinces, it is only by severe exertions that supplies for the great army in Poland are got together at less than ruinous rates, and a loan of £20,000,000 is actually being floated in Paris,—and yet the Continental journals believe that Russia is taking this moment to tear up treaties, and so force on, if not war, a diplomatic contest of the kind from which war springs. Lord. Salisbury, though a watchful and perhaps exacting representative of Great Britain, is one of the most cautious of Foreign Ministers, as witness his patient management of the aggravating quarrel raised by the Portuguese ; and he has a peculiar horror of the expected war, which will, he foresees, modify the map of Europe, and perhaps involve all nations of the world. He is, moreover, perfectly in- capable of far outstripping English public opinion, which would wholly condemn a seizure of territory in time of peace, like that reported this week from Mitylene. All these facts are known, and yet the Continental publicists believed for twenty-four hours that the Mediterranean Squadron had violently seized Mitylene, had landed troops who were not on board, and had " surrounded " the islet of Sign i with torpedoes to meet an attack which, if the occurrence had happened, must have been directed, not against the island, but the Fleet. This eagerness of credulity can only spring from latent apprehension. It is true that more than half the German and Austrian Press is in Jewish hands, and that all Jews, and especially the great financial magnates, in their just indignation at the Russian oppression of their people, are eager to "spoil," if not prevent, the launching of the Russian loan ; but still, there must be a widely diffused sense of alarm before such absurdities can be believed even for a few hours. That they were believed is evident from the fall on all Bourses, from the earlier articles in German, French, Italian, and Greek newspapers, and from the rush made upon all Foreign Offices in Europe to obtain confirmation or denial of the reports. This is not explicable in a time of such quietude by mere general credulity, and we are driven to believe that Continental politicians, even of the graver sort, do believe, in spite of the assurances of Emperors, and of most visible facts, that war is not only inevitable but intended, that it will begin in the East, and that Russia, which was, as she con- siders, cheated out of her price for her neutrality in 1870, will this time see that the price for her alliance with France is secured to her, should. the war be successful, in advance. That impression may be in- accurate—we believe is so, for we cannot imagine Russia, if intent on the great war, provoking Great Britain before it had. been fought, and so indefinitely in- creasing the strength of the Triple Alliance—but it pre- vails, it is shared by an observer as experienced as M. de Blowitz, and it must be reckoned among the bad symptoms of the hour, and the causes which keep opinion on the Con- tinent in a condition of feverish unrest. The great cause, as we pointed out last week, is the new exhilaration of France ; but there are subsidiary causes, and among them is a fresh perception of the Russian eagerness, if ever she gets a chance, to remove the restrictions, now fifty years old, for the first agreement was signed in 1841, which confine her Fleet, alone among the fleets of the world, to certain defined and, for her, most inconvenient waters.
Let us suppose for one moment that the rumours had been true, as one day they will be, and that the Russian Fleet, by treaty with Turkey, were released from its restrictions, and let us see what the probable conduct of the Government of this country would be. It could scarcely be immediate war. There would be no technical ground for the declaration, for the assumption running through all the treaties is that the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles are Turkish waters, and that it shall be illegal for any man-of-war to pass through them without Turkish consent. If, however, Turkish consent is given,. the treaties remain intact in letter, though not of course in spirit ; and the technical ground for war, which in the eyes of the British people would be most important, would be entirely wanting. A broader ground must be sought, and it could only be that, with Russia in the Mediterranean, the safety of the Mediterranean Powers would be menaced. Perhaps it would ; but how is that a reason for England relieving them of the burden of taking care of themselves ? France, Italy, and Austria, the chief Powers of the Medi- terranean, are as much guardians of the treaties as we are ; and if they will not resist, why should England, unless her own interests require it ? But do they ? It does not seem to us that Russia would hurt us much by coming within reach of our shells ; and as for the special case which is pleaded, it rests on a very thin foundation. It is said that Russia and France, by secret agreement, might fill the Eastern Mediterranean with a great fleet, and make a sudden spring at England in Egypt. Well, that is certainly possible if the French peasantry want a great war with no provinces to recover at the end of it ; but in that case, what stops the two Powers from making the secret agreement now ? We have no security, but our own strength, and the understanding with Turkey ; and if Turkey is willing to abandon the understanding, as is assumed by the whole hypothesis, for all time, she could abandon it for the particular occasion. She would have every reason to do it, too, for the allied Powers would act against England in the name of the Sultan, whose rights, they would say, she was wrongfully refusing to restore. We are not defended in Egypt by the treaties closing the Sea of Marmora, but by our own strength, and by our power, if we are dishonoured or robbed, of entering into Leagues which, if we joined them, would, humanly speaking, be irresistible. The British Government, as we believe, would take a much more deliberate and sensible course. It would declare that while, according to the letter of the treaties, the Turks were within their right, the spirit of those treaties bound them to give equal privileges to all nations,—that is, to declare the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles open seas as much as the English Channel or the Sound. It would, therefore, demand of Turkey that all restrictions on navi- gation should. be removed, and that the Black Sea should cease to be closed to all but herself and Russia. If that claim is rejected, there is matter for a conference of Europe, or for war ; but it would be for the general interest that we should fight, not to keep Russia under special bonds wholly inconsistent with her maritime position, abandoned in every other quarter of the world, and. needlessly humiliating to a Power which, when all is said, does not disturb the peace of the world more than France does. Let her get to the open water, with Turkish consent, if the treaties allow it, as they appear to us to do, and let us contend that if all waters are to be open the Black Sea must be open too.
At all events, we do trust, and what is more, believe, that whatever policy the country may adopt in unknown contingencies, it will be a large policy, and not a policy of "strokes." There is no need to act at a moment's notice. England is not going to be extinguished or much hurt by any coup de main whatever, and whenever she is required to gather up her gigantic strength for resistance, it is essential that her people, in whom that strength resides, should know her object, and be as united as modern circum- stances will allow in the effort to secure it. We can keep our interests in the East safe, if need arise, without dramatic little coups which secure nothing not already secured while the Fleet is strong ; and we do not believe that any such coups will be thought of or attempted. The Continent is very anxious on our behalf just now, and keeps on telling us in a dozen ways that we are being threatened. That anxiety is doubtless dictated purely by good-nature ; but all Englishmen have been schoolboys, and remember quite well the feelings with which Tom, Dick, and Harry urged on John to fight. They were not absolutely influenced, far less solely influenced, by eager anxiety for John's honour.
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