CORRESPONDENCE.

THE STATE OF THE NAVY. HI.—ADMIRALTY METHODS.

[TO TH8 EurroR THU " SP NOTA.TOR."

Sin,—Admiralty methods, as well as Admiralty organisation, have been greatly changed during the last two years. Some of these changes are open to serious objection; others are of doubtful value; in all cases there is need for inquiry as to their character and effects.

Several Committees have been appointed to deal with questions of great importance, including the Designs of Warships, Naval Training, Dotkyard Reorganisation, and Navy Estimates. Lord Selborne and Lord Cawdor have dwelt at length upon the work of these Committees, the value of their investigations, and the action taken on their recom- mendations. According to precedent, the Admiralty should have made public the terms of reference and the constitution of the Committees, as well as their final recommendations. Strictly confidential matters, of course, would not have been made public. Lord Selborne himself had followed precedent in regard to previous Committees—notably those over which Sir Edward Grey and Lord Goschen had presided—during the earlier period of his service as First Lord. In December, 1904, however, Lord Selborne announced the appointment of a Committee on Designs, but gave no par- ticulars respecting membership or terms of reference. In the following February (Statement Explanatory of the Navy Estimates) the names of the members were given; it was stated also that instructions to the Committee were drawn up by the Board after previous conference and consultation with the Commanders-in-Chief of the Channel and Atlantic Fleets. No information was afforded as to the nature of these instructions ; indeed, Lord Selborne said he could "hold out no hope that it will be consistent with the interests of the public service to publish either the reference to the Committee or its Report." In a later letter "Recent Shipbuilding Policy" will be dealt with : all that need be said at present is that Lord Selborne's procedure in this case contrasted most unfavourably with the action taken by Lord George Hamilton in connexion with the Naval Defence Programme of 1889, and with that of Mr. Goschen when Lord Dufferin's Committee on Designs was appointed (in 1871) after the loss of the 'Captain? On both these occasions the position was more critical than that of 1904; the established policy of publicity was followed without consequent disadvantage of any kind; in both cases national anxiety was allayed, and confidence in Admiralty procedure was re-established.

When a cry is raised that secrecy must be maintained "in the publics interest," there is frequently reason for suspicion that other interests predominate. The same cry (as was shown in the first letter of this series) was raised in con- nexion with the Douglas Committee on Naval Training. Although Lord Cawdor's Statement of Policy made much of its labours and recommendations, publication of the Report was refused in the House of Commons on the well-worn plea that it would be contrary to public interest. When the facts were disclosed, and the terms of reference and the Report were studied, they were found to be of a nature that did not require or justify secrecy. The avoidance of publicity so long maintained became intelligible, since publication demonstrated the inaccuracy of statements previously made respecting the commanding authority of the Committee, the thoroughness of its investigation, and the endorsement of its recommendations by the Naval Service 'generally. Secrecy, in short, was simply a cloak for misrepresentation. Dis- closure in this case has shaken public faith in official and officious assertions. There is good reason for Parliamentary insistence on the publication of similar information bearing on other " reforms " which has also been refused on the plea that it would be prejudicial to the "public interest." No reasonable person claims or suggests that the Admiralty should publish all their information or intentions. Precedent determines fairly well the limits within which publicity should be kept, while the rights of the public to information are maintained. For the last twenty years in the Navy Estimates and in special Parliamentary Papers information has been given freely as to broad lines of policy, important changes made in details of administration, the leading particulars and dimensions of new ships, and other matters of public importance. Official statements of this nature have maintained and quickened national interest in naval affairs, have done much to produce the conviction that expenditure on the Navy has been well bestowed, and must be kept com- mensurate with provision against all contingencies. This frank treatment of the public, proved by long experience to be advantageous, has been abandoned in this country

during the last two years, although our former practice has been copied abroad, and is still operative there. British readers interested in naval matters—and their number is legion—now find themselves furnished with fuller and better official information respecting the French, American, German, Russian, Japanese, and other Navies than they are in regard to the Royal Navy. This condition of things is utterly wrong and indefensible. It must not be allowed to continue.

When the change of Government took place there was reason to hope that the earlier practice would be revived. The present Prime Minister, Mr. E. Robertson (now Financial Secretary to the Admiralty), and others had opposed the tendency to secrecy in regard to naval affairs : it was natural to anticipate, therefore, that effect would be given to this view when they assumed office. Some- thing has been done, but there are strong forces in opposition to publicity, for reasons that are not difficult to understand. This opposition must be broken down ; Parliament and the public must have their right to full information recognised. Admiralty methods in this respect during the last two years have been well described as "professed secrecy tempered by periodic advertisement." The secrecy claimed has been a "bogus" secrecy ; those whose interest it was to obtain information have found no difficulty in getting it, and had facts and figures sufficient for their purposes in their posses- sion long ago. Moreover, it is well known that concurrently with the refusal of official information to Parliament and the people in regard to matters whereon information is greatly desired and could be given without prejudice, it has been customary (since 1904) for officials of high standing in the Admiralty to communicate facts and controversial statements to favoured agents in the Press. In regard to the sources or channels of such information the writer can claim no authority to speak : Mr. Bellain, M.P., has spoken and written freely on the subject ; many others share his know- ledge. "In the public interest" this practice should cease. It is declared to have been extensive and systematic ; it is undesirable and undignified for a Government Department, like the Admiralty, to lie under the reproach of following "Bismarckian" methods and endeavouring to influence public opinion through the Press while it refuses official information.

Two or three illustrations of what has been done must suffice. The 'Dreadnought' was long treated as a "ship of mystery"; even her principal dimensions and particulars were refused to Parliament. In the Navy Estimates the phrase "details not published" was used at a period when her construction was far advanced and nearly three-quarters of a million sterling bad been spent upon her. When the launch took place, although a general description was forthcoming, in which the surpassing merits claimed for the vessel were set forth, the veil of official secrecy was not withdrawn. On the day preceding the launch, however, a leading technical journal published a lengthy description, giving the principal particulars of the design, and claimed that it was authentic, if not authorised. In July last, nearly six months later, official Parliamentary Papers appeared, from which it may be seen that the previous account was accurate. It could only have been based on exactinformation, and the question arises : From whom was it obtained ? Subordinates would not have dared to com- municate such facts, even if they possessed knowledge of them.

In regard to naval training, the first and most complete account of details respecting courses and periods of study and Admiralty intentions in regard to specialisation appeared as a series of articles contributed by "A Civil Engineer" to the Times. It was claimed by the author that his information was accurate, and it was clear that very special facilities had been afforded to him. It was not obvious why "A Civil Engineer" had been chosen to convey to the public, through the leading journal, information respecting training in naval gunnery, torpedoes, navigation, or signalling; the nucleus- crew system, and the corps of Royal Marines. One asks : What authority in the Admiralty decided on that course ? If the Admiralty wished to inform the public on these matters— and the public was interested greatly in all of them—it would surely have been preferable to have issued official Papers. A leas controversial tone would have been necessary, no doubt, in official documents, and opponents of the new methods of training would not have been assailed so strongly

as was done by "A Civil Engineer." These differences of style and method, however, do not justify the method pursued, or the employment of an anonymous, but avowedly inspired, writer.

. The last example to be mentioned of this unjustifiable pro- cedure is one of the most recent. When it became known that the ' Dreadnought ' was to be attached to the Home Fleet, instead of the Channel or Atlantic Fleet, the decision

was criticised in these columns and elsewhere. Almost immediately a lengthy communication was made to the

Times by a "Naval Correspondent" setting forth what were alleged to be the reasons of the Admiralty for this decision and their intentions in regard to further trials of the ship. A statement made in this indirect manner can be disavowed;

but it is hard to discover any other reason why so important an explanation was not given officially before criticism com- menced. Recourse to these indirect methods is contrary to the traditions of the Naval Service, and offensive to the national sentiment. It is wise and proper that statements of facts should be communicated to the public through the Press, and that action taken or proposed to be taken by the Admiralty should be described and discussed by writers who are both capable and independent. What is unjustifiable is the issue from the Admiralty of controversial "fly-sheets," printed at the public expense, and circulated widely, with the intention that they shall be used in Press discussions of naval affairs. If this practice is continued now that it has been publicly exposed by Mr. Bellaire, M.P., there must be thorough investigation, and the responsibility of the individuals who have directed operations must be determined. In the cir- cumstances described, and having regard to systematic

attempts made to obtain support in the Press for recent naval "reforms," it is not a little surprising to find apologias declaring that the Press is not the proper place for discussing. Admiralty action. Some go further, and recommend blind

acceptance of Admiralty decisions, whatever they may be, and without reasons being stated for them,—in fact, a naval edition of the "confidence trick." Not long ago an important discussion took place on the value of • high speed in battle- ships, and the desirability or otherwise of obtaining it when coat had to be increased greatly. This was a matter of prin- ciple well worth discussion. Writers of repute, including Captain Mahan, a .gued against very high speed, and gave reasons for disiant from the Admiralty view represented in

the 'Dreadnought' and 'Invincible' classes. To its honour, the Times reproduced these arguments, admitted their cogency, pointed out the fact that hitherto there bad been silence as to the reasons which led the Admiralty to its conclusion, and urged the necessity for an official statement. Whereupon a correspondent ("Jaicus ") wrote as follows to that journal :- "I view with alarm the growing unwillingness of the public to trust its technical advisers, and its insistence on chapter and verse for every new departure. Surely enough harm has already been done by the authorised and unauthorised publication of so many details of the gunnery and other progress that the Navy so painfully makes. Secrets may be vital : and now is the time to ask the public to trust its leaders, in the hope that the nation may enjoy at least the temporary monopoly of the experience which its hard-worked officers have gained."

The writer cannot have been in touch with naval affairs during the last two years, or had much acquaintance with Admiralty methods; otherwise he would not have ventured on this appeal. He ignores the fact that confidence in naval administrators and administration has been disturbed by recent events, and can only be recovered by a return to that straightforward and open procedure which has long been the honourable tradition of the Board of Admiralty, and has

recently been discarded.—I am, Sir, &c., Cms.