THE VOLUNTEER REGULATIONS. • E are delighted to see that
the Government has V V taken the wise step of appointing a Committee of Volunteer commanding officers to examine into the new Regulations, and to make recommendations thereon. That is a most sensible and statesmanlike course, and the military authorities need not be in the least moved by the childish and ill-tempered sneers of those who, like Captain Norton, try to prejudice the whole case by declaring that Mr. Brodrick's announcement of the appointment of the Committee means that " his scheme as far as the Volun- teers are concerned has completely broken down." The announcement means nothing of the kind, though we may point out that Captain Norton's statement seems to show that he is anxious to keep the War Office on a wrong tack by jeering at the Secretary of State for not persisting in a course once adopted even when it is possible to produce an improvement by change and develop- ment. We do not, of course, suppose that such cheap attempts to work on Mr. Brodrick's amour propre will, in fact, have the effect of making him persist in a faulty policy in spite of his having recognised the need for a change of plan, but that it will in reality prove innocuous is no excuse for such criticism. If the attempt to obtain a new and reformed Army is to be conducted in such a spirit as that shown in Captain Norton's remark, we may certainly say farewell to all chance of improvement. If those responsible for carrying out a scheme of reform cannot improve their scheme as they go along, not because they do not think the suggestions wise, but because they are afraid of being denounced as unwilling to stand to their guns, and as admitting that their proposals have hopelessly broken down, the idea of a national military system based on broad and statesmanlike lines, and acquiesced in by the nation as a whole, will have to be abandoned. But though we protest, and shall continue to protest, against the task of the Secretary of State for War and the Com- mander-in-Chief being hampered by such unfair criticism, we are personally of opinion, as our readers know, that the new Volunteer Regulations are capable of great im- provement. That they can and will be improved after the whole matter has been carefully discussed between a representative Committee of Volunteer commanding officers and the Commander-in-Chief we do not doubt for a moment. That the final decision will be a wise one we have strong assurance in the fact that the Commander-in-Chief is thoroughly imbued with the value and importance of the Volunteer Force. He is not, and never has been, one of those hidebound and prejudiced soldiers who could see no value or importance in any military force but a battalion of Regulars. On the contrary, Lord Roberts has always been able to appreciate the Volunteers and whit they have done for the national life, and if he can be shown, first, that the new Regulations, if rigidly enforced as now, would greatly injure and reduce the force, and next, that by certain reasonable modifications they can be made far less onerons to the Volunteers, we feel con: fident that a compromise satisfactory from all points of view will be arrived at.
The Volunteers have two functions in the State, both of great importance, but liable under certain conditions to come into conflict. It is, indeed, owing to this conflict that the present difficulties have arisen. One function of the Volunteers is to provide certain definite and organised units in an army of home defence. The other function is to provide a voluntary school of arms for the nation, to give the foundations of a military training to as large a portion of the population as is possible, and so to create a reservoir of men trained to arms out of which trustworthy recruits can be quickly drawn, as in the case of the present war. Counting the Service companies, the C.I.V.' and the Yeomen, who had first learned their work in the Volunteers, the Volunteers have, -we believe, provided for this war close on fifty thousand soldiers, and soldiers of excellent quality. But though the Volunteers have this double function, it is very natural that, on the one hand, the soldiers directly re- sponsible for a scheme of home defence, and on the other, the civilians concerned with the supply of men in the abstract, and the problem of producing a population ready to under- take the duty of bearing arms in the national need, should each think somewhat too exclusively of the function that specially concerns them. The Commander-in-Chief is interested above all things in making the Volunteer battalion a thoroughly sound military unit which can be relied on to take the field at a moment's notice and as it stands, and he naturally wants to do everything that will tend to the immediate efficiency of the unit. He is in- clined, that is, to ask for a small number of compact and efficient units rather than for a large number of good men, maybe, but less well organised. He thinks of efficient regiments rather than of so many thousand men. The civilian concerned with the less technical side of the question, on the other hand—and, from his point of view, rightly—thinks rather of the number of men. He is anxious, naturally enough, to see efficient units, but his first thought is to train and keep a hold on the maximum number of riflemen. He cannot endure the thought of reducing the reservoir of trained and willing men provided by the Volunteers. This being so, when the soldiers suggest regulations which, though securing, no doubt, a greater efficiency in the battalions, tend to reduce the total numbers, they come into contact with civilians who, like ourselves, have their attention fixed specially on the second but equally important function of the Volunteers which we have named.
In view of these facts, the wise thing is surely to find, if possible, some compromise which, while securing to the soldiers what they ask, shall also prevent what is to be so greatly deplored from the civilian's point of view,—the reduction in the reservoir of trained soldiers. It is, of course, always easier to talk about a compromise in the abstract than to suggest one in the concrete. There are, we also readily admit, cases in which' a compromise cannot be found, and where one or other course must be adopted in its entirety. Happily, we do not believe that this is so in the present case. We do not, for example, see why the very excellent proposal made by the Morning Post in a leading article on Tuesday could not be adopted. The proposal had better be given verbatim. After pointing out that the insistence of camp at- tendance as the essential test of efficiency in many corps would serve to deplete the regiments, the Horning Post continues by pointing out that "it would be possible to draw up the conditions of - efficiency in two alternative forms, one for those corps in which the difficulty of attending camp touches too few men to make it worth considering, the other for corps in which for any large proportion of the men a definite week in camp is impracticable. For corps of this second category the scheme might dispense with camp and require for efficiency twenty attendances at company training and ten at battalion training. The commanding officer would then announce in each year thirty or forty training meetings for each company, to be followed by fifteen or twenty for the whole battalion. He would arrange for progressive company courses and for a progressive battalion course. The corps would thou have an average attendance of twenty-five or thirty company trainings and twelve or fifteen battalion drills. We believe that such a. corps would attain a far higher level of real' effeetiy eness than any Volunteer carps 'has yet reached, and would not fall short of the standard attained by the corps worked under the other system of ten com- pany attendances and a week in camp. The option between the two schemes might safely be left to command- ing officers, and the result would be a valuable experi- ment on the comparative utility of camps and of regular attendances at the drill-shed or exercising ground."
Without pinning ourselves down to all the details of this scheme, we cannot but think that it contains a solu- tion of the problem. Its great advantage is that it offers the Volunteer corps an alternative, does not tie them down to one course of action, and allows a reasonable elasticity. But elasticity is an essential condition for successfully dealing with the Volunteers. If you pay men to give up their whole time to military service, it is reason- able enough to fetter them with rigid regulations. When you are dealing with Volunteers it is of immense importance to give a choice, and to make men feel that if they cannot meet the requirements in one way they can meet them in another. If that is done it will still always remain pos- sible for the War Office, if they consider one of the alter- natives very much better than the other, to offer special inducements in regard to the favoured alternative. For example, they could by the expenditure of a little extra Money, and still more of attention, make the week in camp so popular with the men that they would personally be inclined to adopt it. We realise, of course, that the War Office does nor want to spend more money on the Volunteers ; but if the authorities are convinced that the week in camp is of such great importance, the nation will not, we are certain, grudge some small extra allowance for the purpose of making the week in camp popular. For ourselves, while adopting the main lines of the Morning .Post scheme for offering, an alternative as regards the corps as a whole, we would go further, and in addition offer an alternative even in those cases in which a corps as a whole decided to take the came attendance as the teat of efficiency. We would, that is, let any individual private, even in a camping regiment, become efficient -without camp attendance, provided that he reached a specially high standard of marksmanship. Thus a man Who for some special reason could not get into camp might still be able to remain in the Volunteers if he were able to show a high standard of marksmanship. We do not, however, wish on the present occasion to insist upon the details of this or any scheme. We merely desire to urge upon the military authorities the immense im- portance of establishing an alternative scheme to that in the new Regulations. If that can be done—and we feel certain that such an alternative can be devised by the Committee of commanding officers—we may obtain the increased efficiency which the War Office desires, and yet save the best Metropolitan corps from being gravely injured by a great loss of numbers. If only it is borne in mind that the Volunteers are a voluntary force, and that as far as is possible, and consistent with the objects of the force, they must be given great latitude of choice, we do not doubt that the problem which now seems so difficult may be solved. Of one thing we are certain, there is no desire in the mind either of the Secretary of State or the Commander-in-Chief to do any- thing but deal sympathetically with the Volunteer Force, and to recognise fully the great public services that they have rendered in the past, and are willing to render in the future.
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