THE LAST ELECTION IN FRANCE. T HE importance of defeats such
as that sustain y the French Government in the election for the Puy e Dame may be exaggerated, but it is very great. Those who con- sider it trilling make the mistake, which is not made by Bona- partists, of confounding the Imperial dynasty with the Imperial system of governing France. The Napoleonic dynasty is, it is true, independent of the elections, but the Napoleonic regime is not. Supposing the whole of the mem- bers returned to the Chamber to belong to the Opposition, they would still be without the power to unseat the Emperor, unless they had either the army or all France at their back, for he could always appeal either to force or to a popular vote, which overrides that of the representatives. The Opposition, moreover, would not be Republican, and foreseeing the frightful con- sequences of any struggle between themselves and the army, might consent to place the dynastic question, as it is in Eng- land, outside the region of political strife, to carry their objects without attempting any attack on the throne. But should the country return a clear majority of persons opposed to the Administration, the very foundation of the existing regime would at once be swept away. A Frenchman is always logical, and the Opposition once supreme would insist on being obeyed, and in the event of refusal would exert its constitutional power, which power is in theory complete. The French Constitution, it must not be forgotten, is not like that of Prussia. The functions and duties and immunities of the Legislative Body are very strictly restricted, but they still possess what the Prussians have not—the full control of the national purse. They can paralyze any department which disobeys by refusing its budget, and being Frenchmen are exceedingly likely to para- lyze it. They might demand, for instance, as the successful candidate for the Puy de Dame demands, a lower tariff for substitutes, and if the Ministry at War refused would refuse the next credit demanded on his behalf. Greater freedom of thetight, wider liberties for the commune, less reckless ex- peeslituie upon buildings, would all be secured in the same Way,.for though the ultima ratio is hard to apply, the dread of provoking it by incessant refusals would be always before the Government. The instant such an event occurs the Emperor will be compelled to make his election, either to appoint Ministers whose heads can be thrown to the crowd instead of his own, which is parliamentary government, or to strike a second coup d'etat. The latter alternative. would involve a terrible risk, for the army, however devoted, cannot be surely relied on to attack the nation, and the appeal to the people might be answered by a hostile vote, which would be the signal t'or dethronement. So long as the situation was possible the Emperor would, we conceive, avoid parliamen- tarism as far as possible, but nevertheless give way, dismiss Ministers instead of Cabinets, suggest compromises, and in short do what he has done this week in the matter of the forests—recede from a position from which he might possibly be driven. He had asked for permission to sell the national forests to the value of 4,000,000/. instead of raising a loan, and the request in its modera- tion almost escaped foreign notice. The French, however, who look upon the State as eternal and the dynasty only temporary, are not willing to waste resources which cannot be replaced, are besides afraid lest the denudation of the country, already excessive, should be carried too far, and are above all anxious to place some check on Napoleonic ex- travagance. It became manifest accordingly, by signs which the Government well understands, that the Bill would be rejected, like the Bill for the foundation of majorats, and like that measure, the least wise Napoleon ever sanctioned, it was at once withdrawn. M. 011ivier was informed that he need not draw up his report, the Government not in- tending even to take a vote. The same flexibility may be shown upon much more serious points, and the regime con- verted slowly but visibly into one controlled by constitutional laws. The election of a majority of Opposition members therefore involves the whole future of France.
The possibility of such an election is very considerably in- creased by the incident which has occurred in the Puy de Dome. The great cities have long been lost to the Govern- ment, but so long as the country districts remained faithful the votes of the great cities were of comparatively little moment. The Bonapartists have discovered the truth which we are so constantly trying to press upon the advocates of Reform,—that a transfer of power can only be effected by alterations in the proportion among representatives. So long as the member returned belongs to the " devoted " class, it matters very little whether he sits for Lyons or the Basses Pyrenees, for a majority of five thousand or a majority of one. Paris returned only men belonging to the Opposition, but that only proved the hostile feeling in Paris, and did not of itself diminish the .devotion of the Chamber. The majority was still secure, though twenty less in number, and the Bona- partists calculated that the country districts would always yield them a majority. But now a district distinctively of the "country," known to be specially devoted, carefully organized by the Duke de Moray, and devoid of any local prepossessions for this or that regime, has rejected the Im- perial candidate. It has rejected him, too, by an overwhelm- ing majority. Fourteen thousand against twelve is not, it is true, a very amazing disproportion, but then the sub.prefect remembers that at the last election the numbers were 21,421 to 499. The district was in fact unanimously devoted, and a clear majority has in the interval of little more than two years seceded from the Empire. Moreover, as the same official remembers, the minority includes the whole array of officials, all who hope to become officials, all within his personal in- fluence, and all within the influence of his subordinates of every grade. Deduct all these from the list, and the district, provincial, Napoleonist, and strictly organized, must be held to have announced in unmistakable terms that it is not content. What, think Bonapartists with dismay, must be the force of the irritations at work beneath the surface when they can defeat organization so irresistible as ours? If the feeling thus manifested in Puy de Dame is universal, or even very general in the departments, the next elections will see the end of the existing regime. For it must be remembered that the theory of "fraud and force," so widely believed in England, has when the constituencies are excited a very slender founda- tion. The Government which could not restrain the peasants of a section of a department certainly could not coerce them over the whole of France, and the Emperor, if still determined to secure a Chamber in perfect accord with himself, must obtain one by a decree which would be fatal to universal suffrage, that is to the moral basis of his own position and power. The discontent, it is clear, is spreading, and the first object of observers now should be to discover the cause. What do these fourteen thousand electors really want ? Not the Republic, it is clear, for they have elected a strict Conserva- tive, and not Orleanism, for their candidate takes the oath, and they only two years ago were eagerly Napoleonic. Nor can we quite believe that they are so eager for decentralization and freedom of the Press as the Timm sees fit to assume, for they recently allowed both to be destroyed, and ratified the de- struction. Are the priests at work? But their candidate would never be one who pleaded for gratuitous education. Or are they really thirsting for the education itself ? We believe that the proximate though not the ultimate cause of the change, is the weariness, stronger in the departments than the cities, of over-government. The Emperor has made the mistake of strengthening official hands in districts where the checks still existing in great cities cannot be brought to operate, and the result is a bitter hatred to the administrative service, which reflects itself back upon the administration itself. The people begin to hate the regime, not because a Napoleon is at its head, but because it enables sub-pre- fecta, and mayors, and gendarmes and guardians of roads and bridges, and the whole array of people in uniform, to be too insolent and oppressive. They do not care particularly about the freedom of the Press, but they would like to abuse their beadles without being prosecuted, do not want political freedom, but crave to be able to kick a gendarme without being pronounced rebellious. They want to be let alone more severely, and to secure this end they are willing to send up a member who, applying their principles, will carry them fur- ther than perhaps they have any desire to do. The dislike of the " service" in its lower departments is now so bitter that it affects even elections, and will, should the grasp of the central power ever be weakened for twelve hours, produce some frightful effects. Yet this is precisely the grievance Napoleon cannot remove. He is in the fatal groove of despotism, bound if he will be despotic to make his agents despotic also. Con- sequently they create the unpopularity which at no distant period will be visited on himself and his administration.
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