THE DECLARATION OF LONDON.
IN spite of the eloquence and the dogged firmness— excellent qualities per se in a statesman—with which Sir Edward Grey has pushed and pressed the Declaration of London upon the country, and anxious as we are not to exaggerate or to fall into the error of opposing a scheme merely because it is proposed by the party to which we are politically opposed, we cannot but feel the gravest anxiety in regard to the action the nation is about to take. The more we study the question on both sides, the more con- vinced we are that in the words of Sir Robert Finlay— than whom no sounder authority exists either in the matter of private or of international law—that the ratification of the Declaration of London will be a national calamity. The general and, indeed, the particular arguments against the Declaration have been so fully stated in the Unionist Press that we do not propose to restate them here. There is, however, an aspect of the question which has been somewhat neglected in the course of the controversy. Let us say, by way of preface, that the essential thing for us to consider is, not whether the Declaration of London will make things pleasanter and easier for us when other nations are at war by sea. That is a matter of very second-rate importance, though we can understand the Foreign Office being eager to shelve its worries in this respect. What we must chiefly concern ourselves with is asking what will happen when conditions arise which have not been known in the last 110 years, that is, when we are engaged in a life-and-death struggle with powerful hostile fleets, and when we have added to the difficulties which we used to encounter in old days the extra and momentous embarrassment that the people of this country will starve to death unless we can make sure that all the ships which bring our corn and meat and other food supplies shall have free access to our ports. That is the vital question—security of access. No doubt there is some truth in Mr. McKinnon Wood's reminder that the greater part of our food supplies now comes in British ships, and that these will not be affected by the Declaration of London, since without its ratification the enemy is perfectly free to attack them if it can. But though this is true it is also true that present conditions are peace conditions, and that there will be a tendency on the part of shippers and merchants during war not to use British ships in order to minimize the risk of capture.
We must expect, then, that under war conditions a very great increase in the amount of our food supplies will be sent in neutral bottoms. Now if these are the conditions to be expected in war time it is surely to our interests not to shackle neutral shipping, i.e., not to make any admissions as to an enemy's right to interfere with such neutral shipping. If the price of foodstuffs of all kinds rises very sharply in these islands on a declaration of war, there will be a tremendous incentive to foreign merchants to rush cargoes of food here, for there will be vast fortunes to be made by doing so—a most useful and enlightening example of how a rise in price may be the best form of victualling bounty. As things are now the Governments of neutral Powers will be very much inclined to help their citizens to make the high profits and great fortunes of which we have spoken. Under pressure from their merchants they will be inclined to warn any Power that is at war with us not to interfere with their peaceful merchants who are bringing in food for the people and not goods intended for the support of the warlike forces of Britain. Further, they will be inclined to send their warships to our waters to support their views on the question of contraband and neutral rights. If two or three powerful neutral States do that in unison—as is by no means impossible—the belligerent Power would not like to risk putting those States against him by a harsh interpretation of the law of contraband. The risk would be too great. Here we see how elasticity in the law can help us. Neutral Governments will in existing circumstances be forced by the pressure of their traders and shippers to help to victual England. If, however, the Declara- tion of London becomes the law of the world, neutral Powers who might help us so long as each Power is its own interpreter of the law will have their hands tied. When their ships are seized or sunk because they are alleged to be carrying conditional contraband, i.e., food supplies to a port which the captain of a foreign cruiser states is in his opinion a base of supplies for the armed forces of Britain—that is all that is necessary to give him a prima facie right to seize and sink—the Govern- ment at war with Britain will have a perfect answer. It will say : " You are one of the Powers that consented to the Declaration of London, and under that Declaration you have your remedy. Bring the matter into Court and let it be decided there after a full and free hearing of the evidence and after proper arguments by trained lawyers on both sides. If the International Appeal Court on. a hearing of the case decides that our naval officer in any particular case acted illegally in sinking your ship because your ship was not in fact taking foodstuffs to a base of supplies for our enemies, we will, of course, gladly make you such monetary reparation as the Court shall decide to be due to you." How are neutral Powers, provided the Declaration of Londcn has been signed by them and become part of international law, to meet such an answer? They cannot meet it. All they can do is to sit with their hands folded and wait for the decision of a Court which must consider each case on its merits, and cannot possibly refuse to give full and patient hearing to all the facts and all the arguments. But it will be obviously to the interest of the Power whose naval officers have seized and sunk ships, and a most important part of whose policy it is to continue to do so, to delay the decisions for as long as possible. That they will be able to produce such delay cannot be doubted for a moment. Possibly it will be said that the International Court will do its best to prevent delay and to expedite decisions. Of course it will ; but its good intentions in this respect will unfortunately count for very little. By the very nature of the case, the Power which has sunk the ships will also be able to create delays which it will be impossible to challenge. Courts of law within a State, which have behind them the whole power of a State over its subjects, often find it exceedingly difficult to prevent dilatory pro-.
cedure, and these difficulties are multiplied by ten in the case of an International Court. Remember that when vast political interests are at stake the fear that a.
Court will in the last resort punish dilatory tactics by heavier damages does not operate. A Power which wants to starve us into surrender will not care a snap of the fingers whether it has to pay a million or two more in damages. Besides it knows that if it is victorious in a great maritime war with Britain its power will be so tremendous that it will, if penalized by extra damages for delay, be able to take the line that it will not pay such damages. If any Power which has won a great victory at sea takes such a line, who will dare to say it nay ? The only remedy would be for the neutral Power or Powers to say that, Declaration of London or no, they did not intend to have their ships seized and sunk first and adjudicated on afterwards. But this would mean tear- ing up the Declaration of London, and that, we venture to say, is what no neutral Power would ever do, however great the pressure of its merchants. If on -..A3 the Declaration of London becomes a universally admitted part of inter- national law neutrals will be shackled and gagged and quite unable to help us to victual our country and also to make large profits for themselves. In connection with the Declaration of London we desire to call attention once more to a scheme for safe. guarding the food supplies of this country in case of war which in our opinion ought to be adopted even if the Declaration of London is not ratified, but which, if un- happily it is ratified, still more imperatively demands adoption. In peace time, i.e., now and as soon as possible, an Act should be passed declaring that in case of war at sea the British Government will endorse every marine policy of insurance for ships or cargoes, whether British or foreign, with an insurance against war risks, i.e., capture or destruction by the enemy's vessels or by floating mines. The proposal we make was set forth in the evi- dence given by Mr. St. Loe Strachey before the Committee on a National Guarantee for the War Risks of Shipping. In a preliminary Memorandum laid before the Com- mittee the witness in question submitted the following points :—
" (1) That it is of vital importance that during war, as during peace, the freest possible access and exit shall be secured to those who desire to import or export food and other merchandise. " (2) That it is within the power of the Government to assimi- late the conditions under which commerce is carried on during war to those which prevail in peace :— (a) By maintaining command of the sea.
(b) By undertaking to make good any losses which owners of ships and cargoes may sustain by running their ships and embarking their cargoes as freely during war as in peace.
"(3) That it would repay the Government to guarantee immunity from pecuniary loss, because it is the fear of destruction, rather than the actual destruction, of ships and cargoes that has to be dreaded from the public point of view.
" (4) That heavy rates of war insurance on British shipping would result from this fear, and would severely handicap British trade in neutral markets.
" (5) That to prevent fraud the State should only undertake war risks where the owners had insured against ordinary sea risks, and only for the amount insured against sea risks.
" (6) That in case of dispute the policy should be adjudicated upon exactly as it would be in peace time between owners and insurers, the Government being in the position of the de- fendants."
The result of such a scheme would be that for the special and commercial purposes of the trader and shipper war would be abolished. That is, they would be able to carry on their avocations without the terrible handicap of pay- ing extra war insurance premiums or dreading capture by the enemy's vessels. To meet the criticism which has sometimes been raised against this proposal we may quote what we wrote on the same subject on March 25th in this year :— " In criticism of these principles it has been said that a scheme founded on them would lead to fraud, but it seems to us that putting the onus of proof of loss on the shipowners or merchants would secure the Government against fraud as much as Lloyd's is secured to-day. Fraud is sometimes attempted and sometimes succeeds, but it does not make the business of Lloyd's ineffective for its purpose, or a failure in a business sense. When the national interests are at stake we do not believe in surrendering to a morbid fear that the shipowners will get too much out of the bargain. Again, it is said that masters who knew their ships were safely insured would continually run avoidable risks. We do not find, however, that servants are careless in taking precautions against fire in houses which are fully insured. No man likes being captured, just as no man likes being burned, even though i being captured is not so bad as being burned. Moreover, if the risks to shipping are, as the Committee argued, not serious, then the payments which the Government would be required to make would not be great either. The objection answers itself. All we ask is that commercial panic should be made virtually impossible. The State would say, in effect, to shipowners and merchants : You can go ahead in war just as in peace. The Government is behind you—first with the Navy, and secondly by indemnifying you against losses.'
"We want all shippers and traders to feel that, for their pur- poses, war risks have ceased to exist. We can give them this feeling by in effect endorsing every ordinary policy of marine insurance with an extra Government policy against the risks of war. Surely it is worth while to do this. The cost is nothing compared with the national benefits to be secured."
Let us say, in conclusion, that in our opinion it is essential that if our proposal is adopted it should be adopted by an Act passed in peace time and not after war has been -declared. If the thing is done in peace time, and becomes part of the law of the land, there will be practically no commercial panic on the outbreak of war. If we wait to legislate until war has actually been declared the panic which will take place in the weeks preceding the outbreak might cause the loss of many millions, and further might have a very great effect in producing war. Panic conditions always tend towards war and not towards peace. If our traders and shippers know that, whatever happens, their businesses will not be ruined, but that they can carry on with the equanimity of mind which comes from a sense of being fully insured, the risks of this country being left without adequate food supplies and adequate supplies of raw material will be very greatly diminished.
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