TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE STRASBURG INCIDENT. UT Englishmen reckon up the chances of war and peace, they are often too sensible to be keen- sighted. They do not allow enough for human folly. They forget that Continental nations are duelling nations, and that they regard certain slights or affronts as insults which, whatever the hazard or the consequences, it would be unmanly not to avenge. The French did not regard the reported design of the Emperor of Germany and the King of Italy to hold a great parade in Strasburg as the English would have done, as an instance of want of judgment, or even of bad manners, but as an intentional insult, a fillip in the face, and were ready at once to chal- lenge the aggressors. Policy, prudence, self-interest, were all swept to the winds by the mere rumour ; and French- men of all degrees were ready to run an almost incon- ceivable hazard rather than tolerate for a moment a scene which to them suggested that the Emperor was exulting in their humiliation, and that the King, whom they hate far more than the Kaiser, because they expected his support, was a willing and amused stander-by. Englishmen would have thought that the greater included the less, that the wrong done them lay in the annexation of unwilling provinces, and not in any possible ceremonial of defiance ; but the French felt, and the Germans would have felt, had the situation been reversed, that the defiance was worse than the wrong. As a matter of fact, the Emperor, we suppose, did give the invitation to his guest, and the guest did accept it, without either of them thinking of the meaning it would convey to Frenchmen ; but they intended no insult, or even discourtesy, and the moment French feeling was perceived, they abandoned the design, and permitted their agents to deny that it had ever been entertained. The denial, however, though Frenchmen might have accepted it as an acknowledgment of their strength, in no way soothed away French wrath, and it may be taken as certain that the incident has definitely in- creased the deep French dislike of Italy, and consequently, the chance that the elections may go in favour of General Boulanger, whose real hold upon the people, such as it is, is the belief that he will re-establish in some way the military prestige of France. The incident, as it seems to us, is by itself a justifica- tion of the rather alarmist tone adopted by Lord Salisbury on Monday, of which Lord Granville complained. It shows that the French have in no way forgiven the annexation of their provinces, that they regard them still as theirs of right, and that they look upon German military ceremonials within the limits of Alsace-Lorraine as acts of deliberate affront. They were vexed by the visit of King Humbert to Berlin, so vexed that their Ambassador did not illuminate ; but they took no offence at his presence, and exhibited no alarm. It was only a rivetting of the alliance to which, though directed against themselves, they had become accustomed. It was the idea of a parade of the alliance in Strasburg, in a city which ought to be their own, that threw them off their guard, and produced an explosion of bitterness all the more menacing because it was so little reasonable and so entirely instinctive. Their anger, too, was expressed in a form which made it more formidable yet. It was all directed against the King of Italy, who was of necessity innocent of originating the idea, and who at worst was guilty only of an injudicious complaisance to a rather overbearing host. The French, however, commented on his assent, or rather, the rumour of his assent, as if he had been in- solent, and revealed a smouldering bitterness of feeling towards both him and his Kingdom which threatens the peace of Europe as much as the subjection of Alsace- Lorraine. Entirely forgetting that Napoleon III. extin- guished the Italian sense of gratitude for his great services by exacting heavy pay for them in the shape of Savoy and Nice, they accuse the Italian King of the basest ingratitude, and are ready in their anger to break up his Kingdom without restoring the provinces which were the price of their consent to its unity. If it were only safe, they would invade Italy to-morrow, nominally to restore the Papacy to its dominion, really to punish the "upstart House," which, being Latin in language and. under obligations to the French Empire, still allies itself with Germans to resist the French Republic. The rulers of France, in fact, for the time being, hate Italy ; they will not endure from her the most ordinary sign of independence—for example, they regard the failure of the commercial negotiations as an affront, instead of an incident in a bargain—and they study, as Italians believe, methods of avenging them- selves without bringing on a general war. As an invasion of Italy by sea would be far easier than an invasion of Germany, this temper forces the Italians to rely with a. certain obsequiousness on their great ally, and compels them to think whether the risks of a great war would not be better than the hazards, and mortifications, and crushing expenses of such a peace. We regard the bitterness between Italy and France as the gravest danger in the whole situation, and any one who thinks that it has not been deepened by the incident of the week fails to realise the Southern temperament, or to see the difference between the position of enemies who have cut each other, and enemies who are shaking their fists in each other's faces. If anything should suddenly exasperate the quarrel, any- thing, that is, which roused the amour propre of the French or the Italian fear for the safety of their coasts, there would be war, war as sudden as an explosion, be the consequences what they might.
What is the remedy for such a situation ? There is no remedy, any more than there is for any of the greater mis- fortunes of life. There might by possibility be a remedy, if Germany would or could take a plebiscite in Alsace- Lorraine and abide by its result ; but even that is not certain, for one-half the danger arises from the French desire to vindicate their military character, and prove that their defeat was only an accident in their military history. They want to win a pitched battle as well as to recover their provinces ; and if they regained Alsace-Lorraine to- morrow, would declare their country throttled by the alliance between Italy and the Teutonic Powers. None of the other great questions between France and Italy, such as the fate of Rome and predominance in Northern Africa, would be settled, and causes of conflict would be envenomed as they are now, by a dislike which seems to increase with the intercommunication of the two peoples. Everybody nowadays believes that intercourse soothes away hatred ; but the Irish have hated us more since they settled in every city of Great Britain, and the French malignity towards Italy deepens with every increase in the Italian population of France, now exceeding half-a-million. There is nothing to be done but wait, and keep armed, that is, precisely what the Continent is doing, and England, under its Unionist Government, is just beginning to do. By far the best hope is that with the world under arms, the peoples will be too much afraid of the mag- nitude of the results any disturbance must involve, to. provoke any collision of the avoidable kind. A great many people also advise the Governments to be very careful ; but the advice is thrown away, for the Govern- ments have accepted it in advance. They are all frightened to death at the idea of a war which they know will be the greatest of the century, and so far from seeking to provoke one, are holding back strong parties which are sick of the delay. As regards this very incident, it is not the rulers who are dangerous. The Emperor of Germany, with all his self-will, gave up his plan at once on ascertaining the feeling it had excited in France. The King of Italy at once changed his route, and directed General Menabrea to explain that he had never intended to wound any French susceptibility. No French Minister has said a word to fan the flame, and, to the public eye at least, all three Governments are anxious to avert any con- sequences from a story which, true or false, they see has pro- duced such mischief. What can they do more than they have done, except remember the lesson in future ?—and that we may be sure they will do. If it depended on the Governments alone, peace would be assured for some years ; but it does not depend only on the Governments. It depends also on the peoples and the armies, and they are in a state of tension and irritation and suspiciousness, which makes every event a cause of quarrel, and every word uttered by a ruler a menace all the worse for its apparent ordinariness. Everybody except the Kings believes everywhere that he is going to be hurt or insulted, and is ready to fight out of pure suspicion that if he does not, he may be taken un- awares. That temper may die away, but there is no sign of its dying ; and while it lasts, every country which can be affected—that is, every great country except China and the United States—is bound to see that it is as ready as circum- stances will allow. The cost of that readiness is, of course, a. most deplorable burden, much of it, though not all, being human labour thrown away; but the burden has to be borne, as the cost is nothing compared with the cost of defeat. Englishmen are positively bewildered by their own pros- perity, which the Irish trouble does not really affect, until they begin to think every burden an oppression which when they have to bear, somebody must be in fault. They are just as much in fault as the farmer is when he insures against fire, which may come though he lights no matches, and sits up all night to watch. The magazines of national temper are all as full as the magazines of powder, and all unroofed, and any sputtering squib aimed with or without . intention may cause a shattering explosion. That is the simple truth, and in presence of that truth no precaution which does not cripple the nation can be unreasonable or excessive.
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