THE PROBLEM OF JAPAN
By STRATEGICUS Perhaps it is more merciful to suppress the name of the American author, though it is one which the critic would not ordinarily ignore. These " emaciated bodies " are now facing those incomparable fighters the Australian and New Zealand troops ; for, in fact, they have conquered their environment and are now fighting in New Guinea and Bougainville as grimly as ever. It is very necessary to grasp this fact. These Japanese troops have been cut off from Japan for over a year. They were left to the tender mercies of some of the most inhospitable country in the world ; and still they fight on, apparently reduced very little in numbers. They fight to the death. Asking very little of life, living under conditions that are almost incredible when the occasion calls, they form the kernel of the problem of Japan.
It is here that the " pocket " dominates the situation. There are numbers of these small footholds. It might be little exaggeration to say there are hundreds ; and in each of them the Allies have to face an invisible foe who recognises the value of ground and takes cover with a genius that has never been equalled. In thirty months or fighting the greatest number of prisoners taken at one time was only 29 ; that gives the measure of their resistance. There have been more captured since ; but this figure is one that cannot be challenged, and it remains true that they have to be killed if they are to be disposed of at all. What will the Japanese accept as defeat? Will their leaders be able to command a general surrender if they should decide on it? Must every Japanese fighting man be killed before this challenge is overcome? These are some of the questions which demand the answer that only time can disclose.
The foundation of Allied victory has already been well and truly laid. It is the dominance of Allied Sea Power ; and now the Allies dispose of such naval might that the Japanese fleets can almost be ignored. They cannot be ignored altogether, because there does not seem to be much prospect of the ruling .class in Japan abandoning one of the richest empires the world has ever seen while a single chance remains of snatching victory from defeat. But it is true to say that the safety of Allied shipping in the Pacific is very much less a matter of concern than the amount of shipping available. With the single exception of the Burma-Siam block the campaign against Japan entails amphibious operations. It is this that makes shipping of such importance in the Far East. The Allies have resources of overwhelming strength ; but the difficulty is to deploy them with the full equipment they need and then maintain them.
It has been officially stated that the United States intend to reduce their Army to about seven millions. There may be about a million British and Imperial troops in Burma and there will be, presumably, hundreds of thousands more to reinforce them. The troops of Australia and New Zealand swell the number still more. There are Air Forces of immense strength, too ; and the material equipment and organisation of the Allied armies make up a complex of force that should be sufficient to solve this very intractable problem. But the Japanese have already mobilised between four and five millions of men, and they have several classes not yet called up that may increase the total mobilisable force to eight millions or more. If this were not a campaign of " pockets," one would say that the Japanese must know they have no chance. From the standpoint of sheer realism, their only chance is to drag out the struggle ; and their ability to fight on such terms has already been indicated.
Until recently the replacement rate of aircraft was keeping pace with the destruction. That has probably now ceased to be the case ; and this means that the greatest single element of Allied power will before long begin to govern the development of the cam- paign. Already it is sowing destruction in Japan ; and when that destruction is complete it will begin the fragmentation of the larger groups of Japanese troops in the same way that Eisenhower split up the Germans. These larger groups are in China, Burma, Siam, Indo-China, Malaya and in Japan itself. In Burma the British and Imperial troops have met and destroyed the largest body of Japanese troops anywhere encountered in the field ; and no doubt, when the monsoon season is over, they will clear Siam. Malaya will be mainly dependent on amphibious operations, and probably the earliest of these will be the attack on Singapore ; for the East Indies fleet of Sir Arthur Power must open the South China Sea from its southern door in order to intervene in the campaign against Siam and Indc-China.
It is perhaps China itself that will come next in the order of attack because, before the Chinese Army can take its proper part in the redemption of the country it must be adequately supplied. The Ledo road has been opened and is adding its quota of material ; but this is hardly relevant to the needs of the campaign that will be necessary to defeat the Japanese armies. There are probably about half the mobilised troops in China, and the force maintained on the Russian frontier suggests the fears of the Japanese war-lords. At present, however, the interest centres in the port of Foochow, which the Chinese have recently recaptured. The adjacent island of Formosa has been bombed and shelled for many months, and it is obvious that this area would offer a suitable place for the landing of troops and supplies. This important fact has not been ignored.
Long ago it was observed that in the great Russian campaigns the Staff always kept open a number of alternative thrusts. They rarely struck at adjacent sectors ; but, striking here and there when the occasion offered, they skilfully articulated a tremendous offen- sive. In the China Sea the Allies are operating on the same plan. They are obviously threatening Formosa and the adjacent main- land ; and sooner or later they will land there. At the same time, they threaten to move up the Ryukyu Island chain, the stepping- stones to Japan proper. This advance is being covered by the Super-Fortress raids from. the Marianas and by Mustangs from Iwo- jima. They are gradually overrunning the Philippines and control the communications through the South China Sea from•them. Their various thrusts look north towards Japan, and west towards For- mosa, from the Philippines towards Indo-China and also to the south. Everywhere they effect a lodgement they establish landing- strips for bombers, and farther ahead for fighters to cover them.
In the question of priorities we can at least see certain indications. The Americans will land in Japan. For such a project they will need ample air-cover, preferably from a number of points. It would only be a natural preparation to seize and use Chinese territory facing Japan. They might reach such positions through Foochow and its hinterland. It is not, indeed, the campaign against the large bodies of troops which hold this territory that seems so formidable. The Allies, once they have overcome the problem of supply, should be able to mobilise armies that will match any the Japanese can place in the field ; and they can now provide commanders who have secured experience against the very Army which taught the Japanese their tactics. These facts suggest that there should be little difficulty beyond the admittedly obstinate matter of supply. It is the multi- plication of campaigns in a great number of islands that opens up a distant vista. But, presumably, the Allies will take the great concentrations of troops first. Their defeat may possibly entail mass surrender ; but if it fails to do that, it will at least release sufficient numbers to round up the separate island garrisons more rapidly. We need have no doubt of the versatility and brilliant handling of the British and Imperial troops. We are represented in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans in the fleets, in the air and on land. If only ten times the number of troops could be supplied the Allies might confidently look forward to a winding-up of the war in some reasonable period.
Short of one development, that seems scarcely likely. If the Russians should join the attack against Japan it is hardly possible that the campaign could last long. Apart from the admirable air- bases north of Japan, Russia would be able to engage and defeat the Manchurian and Korean armies. At one stroke the industrial potential would receive a death-blow. Apart from this the campaign may drag on for years.
Previous page
