FRANCE AND THE LEVANT
By EDWARD ATIYAH
THE crisis in the Levant provoked by the landing in the Lebanon of French military replacements and reinforcements, simul- taneously with the presentation by the French Government of proposals to Syria and the Lebanon for a treaty, was not unexpected. When I was in the Lebanon (my own country) about a month ago, I discussed the situation with many competent observers, all of whom predicted more trouble with the French. The reason was that France was insisting on an interpretation of her special position in the Levant which the two States concerned could not accept. It is therefore necessary to explain what, in fact, this alleged " special position " is and how France's " traditional connection " with the Levant arose. In the days of the Ottoman Empire, France, whether from purely religious motives or with an eye on ultimate political advantage, was wont to champion the cause of the Catholic and Maronite communities in the Levant, and particularly in the Lebanon. The presence of these communities also began to draw French missionaries to the country as far back as the seventeenth century. But it was in the nineteenth century that the " special position " and the cultural connection began to take definite shape. On the one hand, missionaries now arrived in large numbers and, through the many schools they founded in the Lebanon, the French languarge and French culture began to spread (particularly among the sects in communion with Rome) on a large scale. On the other hand, the European Powers, anticipating the dissolution of the " Sick Man of Europe," were beginning, mentally, to carve up Turkey's Arab empire, and to stake, each, a tacit claim to its share in the succession. France, basing herself on the " traditional and cultural connection " and determined to acquire a position balancing England's expected share in this heritage (not to mention Egypt), planted her invisible stake in Syria. After the missionaries came a few companies (rail- ways, &c.), and all the time French education was proceeding inten- sively as well as extensively, its aim being (unlike that of the corre- sponding American institutions) not so much to revive Arab culture as to assimilate the Catholic and Maronite sects to France.
By 1912 the pattern of European ambitions in the Arab world had become so clear that France obtained a recognition from Britain of her " special position in Syria " ; and three years later, when the British Government was negotiating with the Arabs the terms on which they were to revolt against Turkey (which had entered the war in 1914 on Germany's side) in return for a recognition by Britain of an independent Arab kingdom, the British negotiator entered a reservation concerning the interests of France in certain regions of Syria, viz., the Lebanon, which on account of its Latin Christian majority France regarded as her stronghold. This reservation was not accepted by the Arab negotiator, who, however, offered to post- pone the issue till after the war in order not to disturb Anglo-French concord at the moment.
A year later (in 1916) Britain concluded with France the Sykes- Picot agreement, which provided for the division of the Arab world east of the Mediterranean into British and French spheres of influence and the placing of the various countries in them under open or disguised tutelage. The French sphere comprised Syria and the Lebanon. In the interior (i.e., the Eastern portion with Damascus as its capital) the French undertook to recognise an
independent Arab kingdom, but in the coastal region (i.e., the Lebanon and its surroundings) they were at liberty to establish a regime of direct French administration. The Sykes-Picot agreement (which fundamentally negatived the promises of unity and inde- pendence made to the Arabs) was later implemented by the decisions of the San Remo Conference (1920) which awarded France a mandate for Syria and the Lebanon. This was a double blow to Arab aspira- tions and expectations in these countries. For not only was the mandatory idea itself something new and offensive to them, but also the choice of the mandatory Power had been made without reference to their wishes, and was utterly unacceptable to the majority. The King-Crane Commission (an official American body sent by President Wilson to ascertain the wishes of the peoples of the countries concerned) reported that the consensus of opinicn in Syria, while repudiating the " mandated " form of tutelage, was overwhelmingly in favour of " assistance " being provided by the United States, or, failing her, by Great Britain, but on no account by France.
In Damascus, which was to be the capital of the independent Arab State France had promised to recognise, Arab aspirations were violently assaulted and Syrian independence suppressed a few months after the meeting of the San Remo Conference (192o). Faisal (the leader of the Arab revolt, who had entered the city at the conclusion of the desert campaign, in which the Arabs had fought side by side with Allenby's troops) was forcibly driven out, his kingdom destroyed and the whole of Syria put under French occupation and direct control. As for the Lebanon, it was from the beginning regarded and ruled almost as a colony. In both countries the French regime became very unpopular and a struggle for independence ensued. After sixteen years of conflict, rebellion and repression, France decided at last, at the time of the Blum Government, to conclude treaties with the two countries, on the analogy of the Anglo-Iraqui treaty of 1930, terminating the mandate, recognising the independence of Syria and the Lebanon and sponsoring their admission to the League of Nations. In return, France asked for the right to use airfields and station garrisons in their territories—of a specified size and for a limited time in the case of Syria, but with no limit as to numbers and for the whole period of the treaty (twenty years) in the case of the Lebanon. The two countries accepted these conditions as a first step towards real independence, but the French Senate, after the fall of the Blum Government, failed to ratify them and they did not come into force.
This was the position when France collapsed in 1940. By that time, it must be frankly stated, the Syrians and Lebanese had reached the last stages of impatience with French rule. They had been told that the mandate was merely to help them reach full independence. After twenty years they found themselves as far from independence as ever, and being treated in many ways as a French possession. A large proportion of the Maronites (the devoted friend, of France in the past, who had voted for her in 1919), including some of their most prominent leaders, had become as bitterly opposed to the French regime as the Moslems and the other Christian sect~ had been from the beginning, and so a large majority of the popula- tion was now determined to terminate the political connection with France completely.
When the British, helped by a small contingent of Free French troops, liberated the Levant from the Vichy regime, General Catrou\ issued, on behalf of General de Gaulle, a declaration, countersigned by Britain, announcing the termination of the mandate and stating that Syria and the Lebanon were from that moment sovereign inde- pendent States. He went on to add, however, that their independ- ence would be " safeguarded " in a treaty to be subsequently cor.- cluded between them and France. This was ominous ; and the Syrians and Lebanese knew what it meant, and prepared to meet They had Britain's guarantee of their independence, and shorty after secured its unconditional recognition by both the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union.
Soon events began to confirm their suspicions. The French we; e reluctant to hand over to them the full powers of an independent
Government, and when two years ago the Lebanese Parliament passed legislation to give unilateral effect to the country's independ- ence in certain respects, the French retaliated by arresting the Pre dent of the Republic and the Cabinet. National sentiment flared up throughout the country, and, supported by intervention from the British (concerned to honour their guarantee and to preserve order along their military lines of communication) and pressure from all the other Arab countries, caused the French to yield over that particular issue.
Now the final phase has been reached. The French have put their cards (with a couple of revolvers) on the table. They want Syria and the Lebanon to accept treaties granting France certain rights to ensure her " special position " in the two countries and " her communications with Indo-China "! The two countries refuse to recognise any " special position " that implies a restriction of their independence. Cultural and financial interests they are willing to consider, but any form of political control or military occupation they reject. The French argue that it is unreasonable of Syria and the Lebanon to refuse conditions which Iraq and Egypt accepted from England in 193o and 1936. The Syrians and Lebanese retort that both local and world conditions have changed considerably since that time ; that France had the same chance as England then but missed it ; and lastly that they are already internationally recognised sovereign, independent States, whereas Iraq and Egypt obtained their independence only through the treaties they concluded with Britain.
The crux of the matter is that the Syrians and Lebanese do not trust the French and are determined to have the substance, and not only the name, of independence. They are strongly supported by the Arab League, of which they are members ; and they consider that they have a right to the support of the United Nations, and particularly of Great Britain.
Previous page
