- The Enigma of Hitler
PROFESSOR FELIX GILBERT may perhaps have congratulated himself that the source of this book consisted of no more than the 800 pages recovered out of the 200,000 pages comprising the shorthand record of Hitler's daily military conferences. The task of selection must have been a problem, but the solution will meet with approval, and the annotation is carefully done. What was to be made of a record covering daily reports by military and other officials, and also of the wanderings at large of one who remains one of the generation's great enigmas ? The records represent only a small fragment of the routine reports and are often uninteligible because they carry on some theme which had been referred to before. But the other pail of the record is more self-contained ; and, though Hitler was the central figure of both, in the latter he indulges in monologue. Professor Gilbert takes most of his selections from the second kind of material, though he also gives some of the first as illustrating the routine.
All of it is immensely interesting. No one who is concerned with the conduct of the war can ignore it. There are many points which stand out more clearly through the appraisal of Hitler and his generals ; and, as the last extract is dated March, 1945, one has the chance of discovering for himself that, though Hitler thought even then that he would avoid defeat, he was wearing rather badly and inclining a little to babble. In the appendix is given Hitler's speech to his generals on December 28th, 1944 ; and this, though not entirely irreproachable for its logical coherence, gives a rough indication of his conception of war.
This speech is, of course, coloured by propaganda. It reflects his views of the Ardennes offensive which had resulted " in an imm
' e- diate easing of the situation on the entire front " • and it isdesigned to commend the idea of the new offensive—which few people beyond the ranks of the historians even marked—directed at the Saverne Gap. This was its first objective and it was not reached. " The view thdt under all circumstances an offensive would be more costly in blood than a defensive is wrong. We ourselves have had that
experience. The battles that were most bloody and costly were in all cases our defensive battles. . . Offensive battles have always been favourable to us. . . ThOosses in blood of an enemy offensive will steadily decrease ; ciamitments of material will increase. . . . Consequently, if posgible, we shall abandon these tactics the moment we believe that we- have forces enough for offensive action."
The admission of a stringency in the supply of troops was made in his conferences many times, though7more bluntly and forcibly. Indeed, from the middle of 1943 one mg find references to the vital difference even another " five or six divisions " might have made ; and it is of interest to find him complaining (in March, 1945): " There is too much of a discrepancy between what we are sup- posedly producing and what is actually being committed in battle." Of great interest, too, is it to find him staring, in December, 1943, " If they attack in the west, that attack will decide the war. . . . If this attack is repulsed, the whole business is over." And surely he was logical in thinking it incomprehensible that we should sup- port Russia to the end, when he held that " in case of a German collapse, England would be unable to offer serious resistance to bolshevism anywhere." Incidentally, one may find quite a number of indications of what has been detected before, an inclination to be obsessed by the " English "
But the most important point which emerges from this book is the necessity for reservation in attributing Hitler's judgements to " intuition." He was no mere clairvoyant in uniform. In the long discussions with his generals he appears to be at least as reasonable as they. Professor Gilbert 'finds him " mean " in holding Kluge to a slip in argument ; but surely the real point is that, as Haider admitted before the new " Stab in the Back " legend was launched, Hitler's "gifts for technical details --and for over-all strategy were remarkable." But there is no evidence that he was a strategist of genius, any more than a spoil-sport for generals of genius. Hitler's strength may indeed have lajp in the fact that he was a "terrible simplifier" ; but this beautifully produced book provides evidence that current estirltates of his stature may have
been shaped by similarly dangerous minds. STRATEGICUS.
Previous page
