TOPICS OF THE DAY.
GREAT BRITAIN AND SOUTH AFRICA.
WE do not wonder at the irritation, or even at the sort of despair, with which political society in England regards the crisis in South Africa. It is not merely the war which is annoying, inopportune as it is, and foolishly rash, if not radi- cally unjust, as the policy has been which brought it on ; for the war is sure to be won, and its expense, both in treasure and in life, will be only too soon forgotten. There is a difficulty beyond the war, and that is the difficulty of governing South Africa at all, without undertaking a burden too heavy for a country without conscription. We have never possessed a dependency with which our relations were so complicated and so unfortunate. British South Africa presents all the difficulties of a tropical dominion, except indeed climate, without the usual advantage of tropical dominion, namely, a sufficient revenue ; and all the difficulties of a European colony without its usual advantage, namely, that the inhabitants are as fit for self-government as we are. It is impossible to govern it as we govern Canada, by leaving it to itself ; and impossible to govern it as we govern India, through a Department of the State armed with despotic powers. The country requires to be garrisoned like India, yet produces no revenue to pay the garrison ; and the ruling class is as impatient of Imperial con- trol as if it paid its own way, and needed no defence. The present system, involving as it does a war every few years for objects of no interest to Great Britain, which does not need or wish for a great South-African Empire, is almost intolerable, and no alternative as yet suggested seems to promise much hope of relief. The British Government, to begin with, could not quit South Africa, or reduce its dominion there to the Cape Colony alone, without long notice to the colonists tempted to Natal and the Diamond Fields by promises of protection, without surrendering enormous regions to barbarism, or without a bitter sense that in one important division of her work Great Britain had failed,—a sense .which would diminish energy for every similar enterprise. Whether the British Government could entrust their task, or any portion of it, to other Powers is extremely doubtful. We do not absolutely reject that plan, holding that we might, under cer- tain circumstances, secure valuable alliances with States like Holland or Sweden, which need room to expand, yet are not powerful enough to obtain colonies by force. Holland stationed behind us at the Cape, with Port Natal as her entrance, might be an invaluable ally, making our civilising task far easier, and interposing a final barrier to our greatest danger, indefinite extension northwards. That idea, however, has never yet been seriously considered, and might be repulsive to the British people ; while the idea which has been considered and almost adopted, Confederation, has become since this last outbreak less attractive. Could the Dominion of South Africa defend itself? That is doubtful, even if it would give its strength to the task ; but it is quite certain that if it did, it would be by shaking off the Northern Provinces, the Transvaal and Natal, and by settling the Native question in a style which this country is bound not to endure. The Colonists would war down the Natives, then disarm them, and then place them under labour laws indistinguishable from slavery. The Colonists would, of course, agree to British policy, if Britain paid for their military defence ; but left to their own devices, they would organise their Army in their own way, and carry out their own ideas of the easiest method of ending a campaign, which ideas would be those of the American Far West. Is it possible' again, to make of South Africa an India, tax whites and blacks alike to support an army, introduce a conscription in the form of a compulsory Militia for defence, and content ourselves with ensuring justice and security to all? That would be, perhaps, the best probation for a mixed community ; but it would involve, first, an insurrection of the whites, who would not bear the taxation, and who have a distrust and dislike of English policy not met with in any other colony ; and secondly, the expense of a heavy garrison, to be maintained for many years. It is only when supported by irresistible power that a Government can be just to whites and natives alike, or at all events, to natives who have not, like the Maoris, acquired a certain amount of white respect. South Africa is but a poor land, and the Indian experiment, even if possible, would be too costly. The problem, if these are all the alternatives, would seem to be hopeless ; but there is another plan, not yet tried by Englishmen, which seems to offer some possible chance of success, and that is to abandon for the present the idea of federation in its accepted form, and place above all the Pro- vinces of South Africa a Viceroy, with the control of foreign policy, military Organisation, and all native affairs, whenever- natives were subjected to exceptional laws. Such a Viceroy would not interfere with local self-government at all, but. would receive from each province and each native district a fixed grant or a special revenue, such as a land-tax, and with this would organise a local force, not necessarily all European, for the defence of the colony and the control of the native tribes. He would also be entitled to call out, for defensive purposes only, the Militia of the Dominion, would command, all artillery, and would control the Colonial Staff, that is, the necessary body of Militia instructors. He would make all alliances with native tribes—a most important function—would_ arrange all native disputes, would protect the natives against unjust laws, being armed with her Majesty's veto now exer- cised by the Colonial Office, and would be the only authority entitled to call upon Great Britain for military aid. We are by no means certain that when the Zulu power is once des- troyed, such an officer might not make a small and cheap. force, chiefly of cavalry, very efficient, become arbiter-general in Native affairs, and in ten years organise a system which would make Native rebellion at once difficult and improbable. Thereare men both in India and New Zealand who could be trusted to work such a scheme ; and immense as the original difficulties would be, from Colonial jealousy, Boer intractable- ness, and Native suspicion, we do not feel that the task would. be beyond human capacity. There are no one-legged races,. Zulus are as sensible to justice and kindness as any other of the childish tribes, and a single warrior tribe, once thoroughly conciliated, and so to speak, disciplined, till it could be trusted in an emergency, to put it at the lowest, like our Australian black police or the Houssas on the West Coast of Africa, would remove the most serious of all our difficulties. A man of the General John Jacob kind could have succeeded in such a posi- tion, and though it would be folly to rely on a supply of men of genius, almost any needed quality of man is to be found among our endless Services, for careful searching. Sir Henry Bulwer, for example, seems from his despatches fully competent to such an office; and so undoubtedly is the officer to whom Sir Bartle Frere has turned for counsel, the highly experienced and successful Sir Arthur Phayre. There seems to us hope in such a plan, the essential point of which is that the nexus between the Colonies should be not an elected Parliament or Council, but an English officer of high grade, with complete powers over a. very limited range of subjects ; a Royal Commissioner, without local work or local responsibility, and with the special function of defending the colony and civilising the natives without war.
We are quite aware of the many difficulties which would_ impede this plan, and especially the difficulty of finding a_ sufficient revenue ; but what other is there which will recon- cile local self-government with our obligations towards her Majesty's dark subjects? We cannot as yet give them votes. Wecannot allow them to defend themselves by massacre. We cannot permit them to be reduced to slavery. The alterna- tives are to govern them directly through an officer responsible to the Home Government alone, or to abandon them, or to keep on the present system, with its ruinous incident of war in every few years. There is a popular impression that when Cetewayo is once defeated, Native troubles will be over, but it rests upon no visible foundation. We know literally nothing of the numbers which may pour down upon us as immigrants from the North, while we do know that every tribe as. soon as it submits and becomes peaceful begins to increase in numbers, partly by births and partly by immigration, until its "reservations" become insufficient. No tribe is likely again to be organised like Cetewayo's, but insurrection is nearly as formidable as war, and quite as destructive to pro- sperity and civilisation. There is no guarantee whatever that as soon as we begin to succeed in quieting Zululand, it wilt not begin to swarm with tribes from the far North, whose pressure is already perceptible, it is said, on the so-called northern frontier of the Transvaal. The task we have commenced is endless, and unless we can conciliate the Natives, impossible ; while all experience shows that the first condition of conciliation is that power shall not be trusted to men trained upon the spot. That is true everywhere where dark races exist strong enough to excite fear in the white races among them, and is specially true in a land where the blacks are exceptionally fierce, and the whites inherit on exceptionally stern tradition of hostility.
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