THE ULTIMATUM TO ATHENS.
THE popular English explanation of the present attitude of Greece is that the Greek Premier, M. Delyannis, is a fool. That is an easy, and, of course, a sufficient explanation of any unintelligible course of conduct ; but as fools rarely rule States, as M. Delyannis has the support of two-thirds of ' the Greek representative body, and as Europe is evidently half-frightened by his action, it is not, perhaps, the most satis- factory one. We venture, therefore, to submit another one, which is that M. Delyannis, a bold and patriotic, though not far-sighted man, has got himself into a most difficult, perhaps an unmanageable position, by a mistake of the simplest order. He fancied that Servia would beat Bulgaria. We take it the excitement in Greece was originally caused by a belief that the junction of the Bulgarias would reopen the Eastern Question, by confidence that King Milan would crush the Bulgarians, and by a knowledge that if he did, Servia and Greece together could impose terms on Turkey. The existence of an alliance of this kind between the two little Powers was almost openly acknowledged from the first, and had things gone as they were expected to go, the calculation might have proved a sound one. When, however, Prince Alexander suddenly revealed his qualities as a General, and the Bulgarians showed their exceptional readiness for hand-to-hand fighting, the excitement in Greece rose to fever-heat. The whole population felt that a reversionary heir had arisen to Constantinople, that Macedonia would ultimately become Bulgarian, and that unless Greece fought for her claims, her whole future as a leading Power in the Balkan Peninsula might be destroyed. M. Delyannis, who in- terpreted, and perhaps shared, this feeling, made, there- fore, frantic efforts to place a strong force upon the frontier, called out all young men under twenty-five, manned the fleet, raised a war loan, collected arms, and urged the Servian King to renew the conflict. For weeks King Milan hesitated, and it was clearly understood, during all that time, that if he decided for action, Greece would instantly invade Epirus, and make an effort with her fleet to rouse Candia to insurrection. We incline to believe that for some time the Servian Government actually intended a renewal of the war ; but the Austrian Emperor, pressed, it is thought, from Berlin, at last reluctantly interfered, and his re- presentations to Belgrade were aided by the reports received by King Milan of a certain unwillingness among the Servian reserves. With a bitter explosion of sullen anger— actually recorded in official minutes, in the form of a final refusal to sign a treaty declaring himself " friendly " to Bulgaria—the King made peace, and Greece was left alone to face Turkey, strengthened by her alliance with the Bulgarians and her levies in Anatolia. M. Delyannis should then have drawn back, and have waited for the next opportunity ; but he had called out the population, thus disorganising all house- holds, he had spent more than his poor Treasury could afford, and he had roused a passion of patriotism which he feared might be fatal to the dynasty. It seemed to him, and even to less interested men, almost safer to go on alone, and fight at least one great battle, in which victory would give him Epirus, while defeat would compel Europe to interfere in order to prevent Turkey from playing the role of a victorious Power, and perhaps demanding terms from the Greeks which would rouse the millions of the Orthodox to a fury such as the Czar, who is the head of their Church, could not resist. The Greek Premier therefore held on, risked bankruptcy, called out further reserves, and even sent the Greek fleet into Candian waters to be ready.
The calculation, though somewhat unscrupulous, was not foolish, and might have succeeded, but that " Europe," that is, all the Powers, except perhaps Russia, greatly dreaded war. The British Government, in particular, believed that if war broke out, Russia and Austria would either fight each other —which would be the letting-out of waters—or would agree to a partition, fatal, among other things, to the British idea of a free and federated Balkan Peninsula. Strong pres- sure was therefore placed upon the Powers to secure peace, and upon Greece to give way, and when M. Delyannis proved obstinate, the pressure took an active form. A British fleet off Candia warned the Greek fleet to retire, and at last a combined squadron of nine ironclads appeared off the
Piraeus. The Greek Premier still held out, though he knew resistance was hopeless, and he found an unexpected ally. M.
de Freycinet, knowing that England and Germany were the
Powers really desirous of peace, enjoying the idea of giving them trouble, and willing to make himself acceptable to Russia, suddenly proposed a third course, which would secure peace, yet leave M. Delyannis master of the position. He proposed to mediate, offering pledges that if Greece would disarm, her claims should be favourably considered. This promise, which appears in M. de Moiiy's published letter to the Athenian Premier, and was probably repeated in much stronger terms in confidential documents, was
eagerly accepted by M. Delyannis, who, adroitly accentuating its meaning, promised to disarm, on condition that the Greek claim should speedily be satisfied. This would, however, have meant a new Conference, and severe pressure to Turkey ; and the Powers—England and Germany at all events—were not inclined to undertake any such tasks. The ultimatum was therefore presented, and M. Delyannis was called upon to disarm, without receiving any pledge whatever. His decision, as we write, is unknown, but he must by May 3rd either dis- arm or declare war on Turkey, with the certainty of seeing his ports blockaded.
The attitude of the Powers is a harsh one, and it is painful to all Liberals to see Greece constrained in the apparent interest of Turkey ; but it is difficult to see what alternative remained. If "Europe " has no right to prevent a war breaking out at an inopportune moment, and with immeasurable con- sequences, it has no rights at all, is not a tribunal, and must resolve itself into a collection of States, whose peace is at the mercy of any petty Power. Europe, however, does act as a tribunal, does from time to time insist on peace, and does claim to distribute territories, more especially Turkish territories, by its absolute fiat. In assuming that attitude, it acts by the consent of all men for the general good of the world, and it cannot assume it without occasionally making its decrees effective by the application of force. The best Court of Justice ever made is useless if it has no policemen at its back, and if it cannot imprison or fine those who resist its orders. It was deemed essential to make Greece give way, and as Greece would not give way to mere advice, the ultimatum and the ironclads followed as mere matters of course. Whether the order was essential is, of course, matter for argument, and depends probably upon facts not yet revealed ; but it is quite clear that Mr. Gladstone thought so, and quite certain that his thought was influenced by friendliness for Greece. He has certainly not humiliated Athens from any dislike of Athens, and his conduct, therefore, pending explanations, deserves only approval. He has once more induced the six Powers—the only tribunal the world has—to act together ; and if that is right, to make their decree effective is obviously right also. Europe cannot order, and then retire, as if her order were ultra tires.
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