THE ALLIES AT SAN REMO.
/THAT the Allied Premiers should have conferred together for ten days at San Remo and parted friends was a foregone conclusion. It cannot be attributed to the "new diplomacy." The quiet health resort on the Riviera has been a violent storm-centre, if we are to believe all that we read in the newspapers. We do not really know what the Premiers said in their private conclaves, but we may take our choice of fifty different versions of their debates, as supplied by rival British, American, French, and Italian correspondents as well as by the Premiers themselves in lengthy reports of interviews. It would tax the skill of the most expert lawyer or historian, accustomed to weighing evidence, to deduce a coherent and accurate narrative from this mass of testimony, coloured by racial rivalries and political animosities. But the task is not worth attempting. All the alarms and excursions at San Remo may have been a concession to the "spirit of the age," but they were entirely superfluous. The Allied Premiers had a very simple question to determine— namely, how best to secure the fulfilment of the Peace Treaty by Germany They were not assisted but hindered in their task by the clamour of the Allied newspaper Press. When President Wilson expressed a liking for "open Covenants openly arrived at," he meant, no doubt, that the public should be allowed to know how a negotiation was progressing, so that the citizens of the nations concerned might be prepared for, and ready to accept, the "open Covenant" that emerged from the discussion. We cannot say that the San Remo Conference has been open in this sense. On the contrary, the Premiers have been mis- represented to such an extent that the uninstructed layman might have expected them to quarrel violently and depart for their several htmes. Possibly Mr. Lloyd George, with his eye for dramatic effect, delighted in the journalistic controversy as a stormy prelude to the message of peace and goodwill which he was preparing to deliver at the close. But we fear that many people took the clamour too seriously, and that the small divergences between the Allies have been unduly exaggerated by the "new diplomacy."
The actual result of the Conference, as expressed in the Allies' declaration issued on Monday, is entirely satis- factory. It was clear from the outset to all sane men that the Allies must continue to stand together, and that the Franco-British Alliance was a permanent bond which both countries were resolute to maintain in their own interests. It was also clear that the Allies must be fully agreed as to the necessity of enforcing the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. Mr. Lloyd George has the Celtic habit of changing his mind with a rapidity that dazzles and alarms the ordinary Englishman, but we are quite sure that there are limits even to his variability. Women have the privilege of changing their minds, but they do not as a rule change their husbands. Mr. Lloyd George may steer an erratic course in domestic politics, but he knows better than to throw over the great international agreement, by the making of which he has gained immense prestige the world over. All that he and his fellow- Premiers had to determine was the best method of making the peace effective. The French showed a preference for military means, believing, as they do, that the German is an animal who can only be brought to reason by a big stick. Mr. Lloyd George and Signor Nitti, on the other hand, thought, as most Englishmen and It ilians do, that the gentler methods of diplomacy might be tried with advantage, even upon such stubborn and unreasonable people as our late enemies. The Allies' declaration shows that Mr. Lloyd George had his way. He devised a formula which satisfied M. Millerand, but which, in effect, pledged the Allies to adjust their differences with Germany in a peaceful manner. The Allies in their declaration laid great stress on Germany's failure to comply with the peace terms in regard to disarmament, or to the supply of coal to the ravaged districts of France, or to reparation in other forms. The Treaty, said the Allies, must be executed ; if not, they would not hesitate to occupy more German territory, though they would not annex any. These announeements were made to reassure French- men, who are not unnaturally nervous and somewhat dispirited, in the reaction after their long and glorious efforts to free their country from the German invader. But the novel and important features of the Allies' declara- tion, as we read it, are the statement that the Allies "do not ignore the difficulties with which the German Govern- ment are faoed, and do not intend to insist upon too literal an interpretation of the Treaty," and the consequent invitation to "the heads of the German Government to confer directly with the heads of the Allied Governments," and to explain their difficulties by word of mouth. Mr. Lloyd George has thus carried his Allies with him over the last obstacle, separating a state of war from a state of peace. By inducing M.. Millerand to meet Herr Muller he has taken a long step towards the re-establishment of normal relations between the countries that must always be neighbours.
We shall not be accused of being pro-German when we say that we welcome the prospect of the Conference between the Allied Premiers and the German Premier which is to take place at Spa on May 25th. We have not changed our opinion of German militarism, nor can we say that the conduct of German polititiane of. late has encouraged the. belief in Germany's repentance for the evil that she has wantonly wrought. But we are no longer at war, and we must face the new problems of peace in a practical and businesslike fashion. The first of these problems is the execution of the Peace Treaty. Germany has signed and ratified the Treaty, but pleads her inability to carry it out literally or punctually. We have therefore to examine her plea, to see how far it is genuine, and to determine the best way of helping her Government to fulfil their pledges. It may or may. not be true that the German Government are unable to demobilize their troops as fast as the Treaty requires. As the delay prevents the Allies from disarming and reducing their military expenditure, it is clearly to our interest to probe this matter, and to devise means of accelerating Germany's demobilization. We may, for instance, strengthen the Muller Ministry by showing a friendly concern in its doings ; we may lessen the industrial unrest in Germany by expediting the supply of raw materials without which many German factories remain idle. Again, there is the problem of the indemnity. So long as the amount is left indefinite, Germany has an excuse for folding her hands and saying that it is hopeless to try to meet her obligations. It is true, of course, that Germany has been accorded the opportunity of suggesting a lump sum, and that she has made no attempt to do so. But the Allies, for their own sake, would be well advised to fix the amount of he indemnity at the earliest possible moment. Germany could then be required to remodel her taxes so as to provide the money, for she is still a wealthy country. We must, in short, deal with Germany as we have dealt with other vanquished enemies in the past. We have never had reason, in the long run, to regret our moderation and generosity. If we have had no serious quarrel with France since Waterloo, the credit is largely due to the temperate poliey of Castlereagh and Wellington. The spirit of Castlereagh's statesmanship is well expressed in his despatch of August, 1815, to Liverpool, in which he argued for a provisional occupation as against annexations such as Prussia desired :— " When I state that the temporary occupation is not incom- patible with- preserving a useful influence in France, I do it from knowing that the King and his Ministers do not wish to see France without foreign troops ; that they admit the Allies cannot leave their troops in France, without the security of a certain number of their fortresses. My belief and hope is, if the arrangement is made with some attention to the feelings and interests of the country, that the King, his Government, and the loyal party in France, will ally themselves with you ; and that, thus sustained, the King will be able gradually to establish his authority, which, if accomplished, is valuable beyond all other securities we can acquire. If he fails, we shall not have to reproach ourselves with having precipitated his fall.... If, on the contrary, we push things now to an extremity, we leave the King no resource in the eyes of his own people but to disavow us ; and, once committed against us in sentiment, he will be obliged soon either to lead the nation into war himself or possibly be set aside for some more bold and enterprising competitor."
It was in the same despatch that he said : "it is not our business to collect trophies, but to try if we can bring back the world to peaceful habits." Wellington showed the same moderation when in 1818 at Aix-la-Chapelle he was asked to say whether the occupation of North-Eastern France might cease, two years before the stipulated time. A less tolerant and honourable man might have prolonged the occupation, especially as it meant very rich emoluments for him as the Allied Commander-in-Chief. But Wellington did not hesitate to declare that the troops might leave France at once. Castlereagh at the same time persuaded the Allies to admit a French Minister to their councils. We have reaped the reward of that moderation in our relations with France. It is conceivable that even Germany hereafter may come to be thankful to the Allies if they treat her as Castlereagh treated France. We have exorcised the Kaiser as Fe exorcised Napoleon. The French people have long since repudiated Napoleon's statecraft. We must now seek to wean the Germans from the Napoleonic ideas which have brought them to disaster.
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