Nun and the West
By M. G. IONIDES
LORD BIRDWOOD had finished Nunes life-story* just before the revolution of July 14, 1958. It forms a valuable introduction to what then be- came, inevitably, the real meat of the book—the story of how and why Nuri's life ended; the cul- mination of the struggle which was joined on July 26, 1956, when Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal Company. Birdwood believes that if only Nuri had understood and exploited the power of propaganda, the story would have followed a different course, leading to Nuri's victory and Nasser's defeat. In this he echoes General Glubb's theory that if only the British Government had explained its objective, all could have been well.
The trouble was that the British objectives were perfectly well known to the Arabs. They were the same as they had been for forty years past—to maintain British influence in the Middle East based upon a military presence, which could serve the double purpose of keeping other Great Powers out, and keeping Arab Governments in line. These objectives were the focus of Arab nationalist antipathy, the ultimate source of Nasser's propaganda and the reason for its suc- cess. Nuri's pro-British policy linked him with them and hence with their odium in Arab eyes. It is curious that Birdwood 'should have missed the point, because he reveals crucial explanatory facts for which his authority as Nuri's biographer can hardly be questioned. He says that (even before the Suez crisis) it had become 'a set policy' in the Foreign Office that Nasser must be 'brought down'; that when Nuri dined with Eden and others on July 26. 1956, and learned of Nasser's nationalisation of the Canal Company, they came to common views on the matter; and that Nuri was thereafter 'kept informed of each develop- ment and intention as it emerged.'
The only conceivable inference is that Nuri was secretly backing Eden's intention to bring Nasser down, if necessary by armed force. But there is more to it than this. According to Bird- wood, Nuri laid down three conditions. The French must have no hand in it, nor the Israelis; and there must be no appearance of any desire to grab the Canal. What Birdwood does not record —and it disposes completely of his theory and Glubb's that propaganda could have saved the dayis that in Iraq certainly, and no doubt in every Arab capital, Nuri's part in this plan was suspected or known.
Nuri's argument for a pro-British and pro-
* NURT AS-SAID: A STUDY IN ARAB By Lord Birdwood. (Cassell, 30s.)
LEIADERSHIP.
Western policy was that if there was to be a settlement of the Palestine question, it must be in co-operation with the West. If the Arab States would join in co-operation through the Baghdad Pact, the value of Arab friendship would be proyed, and then the Western Powers would back his oft-repeated plan (which Birdwood faithfully reports) of going into negotiation with Israel on the basis of the UN resolutions of 1947.
But the Government of Israel was not pre- pared to compromise. It said so firmly in words and in deeds, through planned, prepared military attacks on the neighbouring Arab States, starting in February, 1955. Signs of the Israelis' future secret alliance with the French were already visible in the early months of 1955, if not before. They were firmly opposed to any Western moves which might unify the Arabs and strengthen them. They wanted the West on their side, not on the Arab side. It could hardly have been other- wise. Thus Nuri had Israel against him, as well as Nasser and Russia, each in their different ways and for their different ends.
When Nuri advanced his plan to intervene in Jordan in October, 1956, his only chance was that the British and American Governments would back him. That would bring a stabilising influence to the boundaries of Israel, prevent Jordan falling to Nasser, and help to remove a,pretext for armed action by Israel. Eden gave half-hearted backing to this plan, just as he had given half-hearted backing to Nuri's policy in his"Guildhall speech in November, 1955; but, as in 1955, he retired hastily in face of sharp reaction from, Israel. With Nuri's stabilising influence shut out by Israel herself, the • Jordan elections went in Nasser's favour, the ring round Israel was com- pleted, and the grounds for appeal to Western public sympathy for a beleaguered Israel were firmly laid'. We know now that the Government of Israel was already determined to invade. The rejection of Nuri's stabilising plan must be seen in the light of that fact.
When Egypt was invaded, with Eden in open alliance with France and in apparent collusion with Israel, Nuri's position was fatally under- mined. He was, the man who had urged that friendship with . Britain would strengthen the Arab hand against Israel expansionism. And now, to all appearances, the British had gone over to Israel in her bid for expansion. Nuri stood accused as an accomplice. He was forced to cover himself by gearing his open propaganda to
support of Nasser, just as Eden was forced to cover himself by giving every reason for what he had done except the right one. They had suc- ceeded in dividing themselves against themselves, as well as dividing the Arab world against itself. The means had defeated the end.
Of the subsequent efforts through the Eisen- hower Doctrine, ending with Nuri's plan, which Birdwood reports, to bring down the Government of. Syria in June, 1958; by armed intervention backed by Britain, it need only be said that they were all cut to the same pattern; and they all failed for the same reasons. Time and again, Nuri . urged that the Western Powers must justify his determined friendship in Arab eyes by doing the one thing which, in Arab eyes, could justify it— throwing their weight behind negotiations over Israel on the basis of the United Nations resolu- tions of 1947. But either they would not, or could not. The formidable weight of Israel's influence and propaganda was set firmly against it. The political help Nuri needed was not given; in its absence, military action was worse than useless; the help he needed never came; and he was doomed.
'Surely.' says Lord Birdwood, 'the fair way is to assess not the means, but the end. Of the Pasha it may be said that time and again the end justified the means. For the end was invariably identified with the general welfare of his country; even with its frequent salvation.' As to Nuri's patriotic purpose—no doubt of that. Success, time and again—certainly. But what about the last time of all? If ever there was a case where the means.shaped the end, this was it—the tragic end of Nuri and of forty years of British policy and methods, rigid and unchanging in a world that had changed beyond recognition. They thought up all sorts of fair words to describe the fair end they had in view. It was police action; defence against aggression, against Hitlerism, Stalinism, Fascism, slavery; it was in the name of freedom, democracy and the good way of life. But no fair words to describe the end can re- move the fact that the dictionary word for the means they chose is 'war'; preventive war by the British, French and Iraqi Governments, and war of conquest by Israel. The deadly philosophy of preventive war flows straight from the principle that the end justifies the means. It has crept too far into our thinking in the Western world. We should have done with it.
Previous page
