Political commentary

. . . three weeks later

Ferdinand Mount

Avictory speaks for itself, too. Military success tends to prompt immediate re- consideration of the diplomatic negotiating position. Or, to put it another way, steals on the ear the distant triumph-song, and hearts are brave again and arms are strong. Only three weeks after a debacle which left all concerned looking rather small and hor- ribly embarrassed, Mrs Thatcher had reason to rejoice. A garrison surrendered, a sub crippled and captured, not a scratch on us — you could not ask for much more.

The immediate political effects are benign. The Americans will find it harder not to come in on the side of an ally which is not only in the right but appears, for the moment at least, to be winning. Frustration is released, exasperation defused, par- ticularly on the Conservative back benches. And the opposition has a queasy ride in the wash of the Government, Mr Foot was unluckily in public conver- sation with Mr Brian Walden when the news of the attack on South Georgia came through. He was caught in an agonising moment of anxiety and indecision. For he could not tell whether this was the moment for the Labour Party to nip off sharpish and pretend they had never wanted the task force to fire a shot, or whether to be even more patriotic and resolute than before.

But in the Commons he recouped quite well by fiercely defending our right to recover South Georgia and applauding the skill with which it was done without actual- ly applauding the rough stuff. Indeed, I think he mentioned weapons only once, when he said 'the search for peace must never be torpedoed by us' — a fine example of that pacific warspeak of which Mr Foot is such a master.

The following day, the sheer weight of pacifist artillery in the Shadow Cabinet overcame him, and the all-party harmony was decisively broken. The pretext was not entirely convincing — Mrs Thatcher's in- adequate response to an appeal from the UN Secretary-General. This appeal turned out to be no more than a rather awkwardly worded press release. But it was enough for Mr Foot to break loose and jump up and down five or six times. Uncaged hordes of Winnicks and Meachers roared and squeak- ed and thumped. Mr Malin, Mr Cryer and Mr Price leapt into the classic position of the Labour left-winger: semi-erect, arm ful- ly extended with index finger pointed at the Prime Minister, and emitting loud cries of 'warmonger!' This sight, not properly seen since Suez, caused anxiety all round, amid the growing rumours that the task force was about to invade. Mr Peter Shore, for one, seemed distressed by this breakdown of uni- ty. And many Tory backbenchers do believe that military action cannot be suc- cessful without a unified Commons behind it. That may be true of a sustained conflict, but in any briefer engagement it is military success or failure alone which is likely to prove decisive. The Labour Party was never likely to stick with the operation the whole way.

Of more practical importance is whether the attitude of the Prime Minister herself has changed. Her answers, both in the Commons and on Panorama, were eagerly watched for signs either of increased belligerence or of readiness to settle. In both places , as in other public statements by her and Mr Pym over the past weeks, there seems to be rather less in the occa- sional shift of adjectives or emphasis than meets the anxious eye. Is it the 'wishes' or the 'interests' of the islanders which are to be 'paramount' or only 'important'? Is it only 'administration' or 'sovereignty' that Britain wishes to recover?

In practice, the outline of Britain's ultimate negotiating requirements has been fairly easy to guess from the start and does not seem to have changed much, although they have been a little more unveiled. The real change in the situation is the demonstration that Britain is ready and able to use force.

If these inhospitable rocks are not to become 'Home' in a perpetual game of Rescue, or Prisoner's Base, they will now have to be defended in perpetuity. The strength of the defence required depends on how amicable a final settlement can be reached with Argentina.

The ultras claim that, if Argentina was thoroughly beaten, she would scurry away like a whipped cur to lick her wounds, and would trouble us no more Alas, in the late 20th century curs tend not to stay whipped. Another junta, another martyr (the chap in the submarine who lost his leg would do, just) — and Grytviken might be under siege for the third time.

The recovery of self-confidence and freedom of action is invigorating in itself, but inescapably it leads to larger objectives. After South Georgia, the British govern- ment cannot be satisfied with a third-best solution. Indeed, it is said that even a second-best solution would be hard to sell to some Tory backbenchers.

Yet to retake Port Stanley remains as daunting a proposition as ever. A total military defeat of the Argentinian forces, even if attained, and consequent retention of British sovereignty would mean main- taining, for the foreseeable future, a hugely expensive garrison and flotilla in the Falklands.

Unless the Argentinians speedily revise

their terms to bring them within reach of what Britain could accept, the task force will have to occupy some part of the Falklands proper, presumably the less in- habited West Falkland. Equality of occupa- tion would surely be enough to bring the Argentines to terms. As always, the great difficulty is to advocate restraint in the use of force rather than insistence on uncondi- tional surrender.

According to the Sunday Times, this col- umn is 'cool on monetarism', 'soft on law- and-order', and 'dissents from' Mrs That- cher's Falklands policy — which only shows how difficult it is to make oneself clear. To criticise the Government's economic policy in its early stages for not being monetarist enough is scarcely coolth. Having argued for years that we need more and better trained policemen, I don't think it's beta soft on law-and-order either to point to the effect of increased police strength on the, crime statistics or to voice the universal complaint that there ought to be more policemen on the beat. And as for tile Falklands, from the moment of the irlva" sion I cannot see much wrong with the Government's actions; I was only trying to go back a little further to find out how suc- cessive British governments landed us where we are; we won't try that again in a hurrY.

Perhaps it's best to stick to basics. In a democracy, the use of force is conditional upon what public opinion will tolerate. In the case of the Falklands, the moral princi ple at stake is generally felt to be strong enough to justify the use of force propor- tionate to the morally justifiable object. la other words, it's all right to go on biffing the Argies as far as and only as far as this assists the islanders to go about their business in freedom.

Tony Benn is, I think, wrong as well as mischievous. British public opinion woilkl tolerate casualties, so long as those casualties were limited proportionately with the number of islanders we are there to help. I think it is extremely important to distinguish this concern for human liberties and rights from any supposed obsession with territory and sovereignty; for any 5101 obsession seems to me to be mostly coati'!" ed, now as it has been ever since 1945 if not earlier, to politicians and public persons. It was a post-imperial delusion that left Britain's commitment to the Falklands both undiminished and undefended. But what propels the task force is not a post-imperial delusion nor a neo-colonialist rush of blood to the head. On the contrary, it is an exten- sion of the de-colonising principle of self- determination. That principle is here hedg- ed about with certain practical qualifica- tions — notably the islanders' dependence on Argentina for fuel and transport and the restrictions on immigration and purchase of land on the Falklands by Argentinian, citizens, which have frozen the islands population in their Britishness. But the prinCiple remains plain and inviolate; the islanders are who they are and, within prat' tical limits, must be allowed to live as theY wish to live.