THE INVESTMENT OF PARIS.
WITH the fall of Strasburg the war enters distinctly on a new phase. So long as that stronghold held out, the advance of the Prussian armies far into the interior of France appeared somewhat daring to the popular imagination. To leave two great places like Metz and Strasburg in the rear, one of them held by a still powerful French army, besides a number of minor fortresses blocking up the lines of communi- cation, and to occupy the field army in attacking from such a base a great capital and fortress with the whole invaded country rising in arms,—was a course of action which had a superficial aspect of imprudence. Of course, the Prussian Generals must have known what they were doing ; that the hostile fortresses behind them were sufficiently accounted for, and some of them would soon fall ; that their communications were safe enough ; but outside spectators, unless those who observed carefully, could hardly have the same conviction. Now, how- ever, the aspect of the war must change even to the popular imagination. First the minor fortress of Toul, which was the most troublesome to the lines of communication, blocking the only railway on which the advanced armies depended, was obliged to capitulate, and now the fall of Strasburg has left only one great fortress in the Prussian rear. It is apparent to every one now that the attack on Paris has no very special hazards ; that it is made from a secure and not very distant base, for Alsace itself is now the base ; and that the invading force has nothing immediately to fear from an insurgent country. Germany, it is obvious, must have thousands of men to spare for a field force to cover its sieges ; so that the besiegers of Paris, as of Metz, have nothing to reckon on but the force within the walls. On Paris, then, every attention must be concentrated. Afterwards, if a field army can be raised to attempt its relief, the operations in the field will compete with the interest of the siege, but for the present there is no hope except in what Paris itself can do.
What is the nature of the attack on Paris ? Only a few weeks ago it was a common enough impression that a siege of Paris in any strict sense of the word was impossible. The popular mind refused to entertain the impression that the surrounding of so great a circle was possible to any army, however large. The attack, it was said, must be made on some particular front, leaving the city some communication with the outer world ; or if an investment were attempted, the besiegers' lines would be so long as to invite successful sorties, ending in the separation of the attacking force. That some such notion was entertained when the fortifications were built appears to be pretty well established. But as it is actually being conducted, there is nothing peculiar in kind in this siege of Paris. In degree it differs from every siege recorded, and is truly an operation of unparalleled magnitude ; but all the expectations of some peculiarity in its nature, on account of the size of the fortress, have as yet been disappointed. The Prussians have sat down before it in regular form, have invested it as completely as fortresses are usually invested, and evidently mean to attack it as they have attacked Strasburg if the resistance is long enough continued. It will help the imagination if we state in detail how close the lines of investment have been drawn. There are some points in the later news which are a little dubious, but on the 19th and 20th of September, according to both French and Ger- man official sources, a very distinct position had been taken up. Paris within the enceinte is situated on the Seine, just below its confluence with the Marne, the river as it runs front east to west and south-west dividing it very nearly into two equal parts, and after leaving the city making a quick turn to the north, so as to face the entire western front of the enceinte at the distance of about a mile. This curving of the river, which has had great influence in determining the sites of the forts, has also affected the lines of investment. Both forts and investing lines are in two great divisions. On the north and east the forts extend in a convex form from St. Denis, at the extreme northern point which the Seine touches, to Nogent, on the Marne, almost due east of the city, forming the first great division of the forts ; and on the south the forts extend, almost in a straight line, between the Seine on the east just before its confluence with the Marne to the Seine on the west at Issy, near the extreme southern point of its course after leaving the city before it bends to the northward, forming the second great division of the forts. There is another fort on the western side—Mont Valerien—just beyond the Seine and in a loop which it forms, supported by another fort at Genneviliers recently constructed ; but the curves of the river, while impeding attack, also facilitate a mere invest- ment, the river interposing an obvious obstacle to the move- ments of small parties. Hence, on the one side, the lines are drawn from Pierrefitte, just a little north of St. Denis, to Pont Brie-sur-Marne, a little to the east of Nogent, forming a con- cave line round the convex one of the forts ; and on the other from the Seine on the east to Sevres and Bougival, the two southerly points of the Seine's course after leaving the city. On the east a tongue of land between the Seine and Marne must also be strongly held by the besiegers, to maintain communications ; but roughly speaking, the above lines, with a less display of force to observe the passage of the Seine on the west between Bougival and Pierrefitte, ensure the perfect blockade of Paris. All the way the distance kept from the forts is very little more than a mile, as may easily be found by observing the distance from the forts of Pierrefitte, Le Bourget, Bondy, Brie-sur-Marne, Joinville-le-Pont, Creteil, Villejuif, Bagneux, Meudon, and Sevres, which are all places mentioned in the official accounts as in Prussian possession. The investment of Paris is thus complete, and in the fashion of a force which not only blockades, but means to press the siege closely by every agency that is known to the military art.
Of course, though complete in appearance, the investment may be really defective, and the military authorities prove right after all, in consequence of some accident happening through the over-extension of the besiegers' lines ; but as yet, to all appearance, the besiegers have employed ample means. Altogether, in the operations round Paris, seven corps, which would give a force of 250,000 men, are mentioned, apart from any supports that may be coming up. Opposite St. Denis and on that side are the 4th and 12th Saxon Corps, under the Crown Prince of Saxony ; on the east the Prussian Guard, in advance, we may suppose, of the Royal Head-Quarters at Ferrieres ; and the Crown Prince has under him on the south and south-west the 5th, 6th, and 11th Prussian Corps and the 2nd Bavarian Corps. As the lines we have described are little more than thirty miles in length, such a force should almost be sufficient to hold them against any enemy, though the Prussians, no doubt, calculate at first on the rawness of the troops opposed to them. The truth is, that when mili- tary authorities predicted the impossibility of investing Paris, the conception of armies so large and so easily handled as those of the Prussians did not exist. Relatively to the armies called out, Paris, with all its size, is no bigger than many a large town which has stood a siege in other days and occupied the whole, or nearly the whole, of an invading force—as Mantua did in the Napoleonic invasion of Italy. In point of fact besides, the besiegers have not yet been shaken in their grip of the city, which is so far a proof of the sufficiency of their means. There have been a great many confusing reports from the French side, by balloon and carrier-pigeon, since the 20th, but we can only come to the conclusion that the siege has not been interrupted or checked. The German official accounts distinctly say that there has been nothing but affairs of outposts of no importance ; and, carefully scrutinized, the confused French accounts show very little real success. They all relate to alleged fight- ing on the 23rd, on which day three important reconnais- sances were made,—one at Pierrefitte, another at Le Bourget, in the same neighbourhood, and a third at Villejuif on the south of Paris, where the most conspicuous success is claimed. According to a despatch alleged to have been received at Lille by a carrier-pigeon, but emanating from an authority in Paris not described, the heights of Villejuif were carried and occupied by the division of General Mandlay, and the enemy suffered considerably. In all the three affairs the enemy had the worst of it. All this seems a great success for one day, but then come the doubts. An aeronaut who left Paris on the morning of the 23rd at 8 o'clock speaks of the affair at Le Bourget as having already occurred, so that the Lille despatch cannot be very accurate. More than this, a balloon which arrived near Rouen, having left Paris on the 24th, contains copies of alleged official despatches which are inconsistent with the Lille account. According to these, the affair at Le Bourget may have occurred on the 22nd,—we believe it really occurred in the night between the 22nd and 23rd, as the electric light is stated to have been used—and it ended in a retreat, as was also the case with the reconnaissance at Pierre- fitte. In the affair at Villejuif, again, all that is claimed is that General Mandlay's division had definitively established itself on the heights of Villejuif, and that works which the enemy was trying to erect were demolished ; but this is a very different thing from saying that the heights were carried and occupied, which would mean that the Prussian line had been driven in at this point. The report, moreover, speaks of the Prussians as occupying L'Hay, Chevilly, and Bagneux, which are quite close to Villejuif, and as news from Paris, vied Tours, a day later, speaks of Villejuif as still Prussian, we are bound to infer that the success, whatever it was, was of the most meagre description. Most probably, as Villejuif is close to Fort Bicetre, some French troops were enabled to post themselves somewhere on the heights, but still under the guns of their own forts, and still leaving the heights themselves in Prussian hands. But these are all the alleged French successes, exclusive, perhaps, of some damage to Prussian outposts, which were too auda- ciously pushed near the forts, such as the outpost of St. Cloud, towards Mont VaWrien. Looking at the great extent of the investing lines, and the strong positions occupied, we see at once how little these reconnaissances effected, or could ever be intended to effect.
The prospects of the besieged, to say the least of it, look- ing at the question in its military aspect only, are very gloomy. Not only is the investment complete, with little hope of speedy relief, but the siege itself began with a great disaster. The defenders did not calculate on being driven so speedily into the city. They occupied strong ground on the heights of Sceaux to the south, extending from Meudon to Villejuif, and if they had been able to hold this ground, the investment would both have been retarded and have required to be made on a much longer line. The defeat of this attempt on the 19th was, therefore, a great misfortune, and in point of fact, as we learn from the diarist of the Daily News with the besieged, produced no small depression. All day while the action was going on, the citizens were anxious for news from Clamart and Meudon, and it was not inspiriting to learn from the runaways that the strong position had been captured, and every avenue to the city closed. Besides, the possession of this corner uncovers to the besieging army a weak part of the fortifications. At Sevres the besiegers are close up, not only to the forts, but to the enceinte, and we can hardly wonder that Parisians, on the gloomy day of the 20th, were beginning to measure the distances of their respective houses from the sites for batteries which the Prussians had seized. In a purely military view, then, the besieging force cannot be considered to have before it an unusually formidable task. They have not to attack a fortress of the impregnable sort, with strong outworks at all points, and which is hardly acces- sible at all. They have got very near, and may soon enough force an entrance—a part of the city attacked being already under their guns. Such a position of the besieging force at the very beginning of the defence was certainly not contem- plated when the works were planned.
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