THE INCOMPLETE PEACE.
IllHE comfortable belief that little nations are less bellicose than great nations has been sorely shaken since the Armistice. Optimists thought that the recog- nition as separate States of the small peoples formerly ruled by the Hapsburgs, the Tsars, and the Sultans would make for peace, and that the admission of most of them into the League of Nations would ensure us a long period of calm. It is now obvious that such optimism was ill-founded. The first impulse of a liberated nationality is, it would seem, to insist upon the very last fraction of its territorial claims and to attack the neighbours who venture to question its pretensions. The idea that the peoples which have been freed owe any sort of gratitude or even respect to the great Powers which have liberated them is scouted as an absurd sentiment. Each new State considers its own selfish interests and is inclined to resent as an impertinence the advice or the warnings of more experienced governments. It is far too soon to despair of the little nations, but we are bound to say that their conduct inspires us with grave misgiving. The most recent and most flagrant case of nationalism run mad is that of Serbia and Albania. Whether the Serbs attacked the Albanians or the Albanians attacked the Serbs is by no means clear. But it is at any rate certain that these two peoples, who are both members of the League of Nations, became involved in warlike operations last week along the frontier near Scutari and that the fighting continues. Serbia and Albania are both repre- sented in the Assembly of the League, which is still sitting at Geneva. Their governments have solemnly agreed " that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council," and, further, that they " will in no case resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the Council." This is the fundamental claase of the Covenant, but it has been violated by Serbia and Albania. Technically speaking, both countries are in fault. But we fear that the greater responsibility rests on Serbia. Albania is recognized as a State but it is not a nation. The Roman Catholic Mirdites of -the northern hills are actually fighting the Moslem Albanians who-have set up a government in the centre, at Tirana, and the Orthodox -Albanians of .the south are absorbed in their own local troubles, with the Greeks. It would be unfair to put the whole blame for the :rontier fighting on this disorderly and disunited little country, which in all does not number a million and a-half inhabitants. The Serbians, on the other hand, might have been expected to show patience and generosity in dealing with their troublesome neighbours. Their most ambitious fireams have been realized through the sacrifices of the Allies. The Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs have been reunited in one kingdom. Almost all their territorial claims have been admitted. Greater Serbia is more than twice as large and as populous as the Serbia of 1914. We might have thought that a. nation which has gained so much by the war would acorn to covet any more territory, and that it would certainly not want to annex land belonging to another race. Yet we find Serbia coveting Scutari and the relatively fertile valleys in the neighbourhood, although they are admittedly Albanian. It is a sad reminder that politicians are much the same at Belgrade as they used to be at Vienna.
The dispute over Vilna between Poland and Lithuania, which has occupied the attention of the League Assembly in the past week as well as of the Council, is another lamentable case of nationalism carried to excess. It would be impossible to draw a frontier line separating all Poles from all Lithuanians, as the two races have been inter- mixed for centuries. The Allies, after careful inquiry, laid down a frontier representing a fair compromise, and adjudged Vilna, a partly Polish town in a Lithuanian district, to Lithuania. The Poles thereupon caused a Polish general to occupy the town, where he still remains in defiance of the Allies and of the League. They have alternately admitted and denied that this General Zeli- gowski acts under orders from Warsaw, and they stubbornly refuse to accept the new compromise devised by M. Hyman for the League. To the Western observer it seems obvious that Poland, placed between Red Russia and Germany, who both detest her, should seek by all means to acquire the goodwill of Western Europe and should strive to set a good example of moderation to Eastern Europe. Yet the Poles, obsessed by the nationalist idea which in Ireland is expressed in the words " Sinn Fein," are prepared at once to flout their friends and defy their enemies rather than abate by a jot their historical and sentimental claims to Vilna. They would, it appears, risk the whole existence of Poland as a separate State rather than abate their territorial demands, although the Vilna district is very small in comparison with the whole area of the restored Poland. We are in no way surprised to find sober students of history wondering whether the Partition of Poland was not, after all, the inevitable outcome of Polish folly and incompetence, and whether Poland can be saved despite herself. Such doubts may not be justified, but the Poles are undoubtedly making heavy drafts on the goodwill of the nations to whom they may at any moment have to appeal for help against a Bolshevik invasion. The hostilities in Western Hungary are on a different footing. Here the Allies are in no small degree responsible, because they have not presented a united front to the restless Magyars. When Hungary, having signed and ratified the Peace Treaty, proceeded to violate it by refusing to evacuate the Burgenland, west of the Danube, in favour of Austria, and when Magyars attacked the Austrian police and invaded Austrian territory, the Allies should have acted instantly and decisively. When it was seen that France and Italy differed as to the means to be employed, the Magyars gained confidence and began to think that they could upset the Treaty. The Allies then presented an ultimatum requiring Hungary to evacuate the dis- puted district, but it remains to be seen whether this order will be obeyed. It may be said that Hungary has lost so much territory that she runs no risk of losing more and may conceivably gain something by her obduracy. Yet the Magyar politicians ought to see that their sole chance of recovering quickly from the war lies in gaining the sympathy of the West. In the past Hungary had many admirers in this country, especially among those who did not know how badly she treated her non-Magyar subjects, though these.were actually in the majority. The conduct of the Magyar troops in Serbia and Roumania dispelled a good many illusions, but there was no desire on the part of the British public to be too hard on Hungary in the peace settlement. The deliberate attempt of the Magyars to evade their obligations under the Treaty must, however, influence the attitude of Great Britain towards their country. Hungary has shown that she cannot be trusted at the very time when she needs friends most of all.
The most serious of all these minor wars is the conflict between the Greeks and the Turkish Nationalists, which has just come to a deadlock. Here again the Allies are ultimately responsible, because they could not agree on a definite policy. They made the Treaty of Sevres, settling the affairs of the Near East, and then they declined to enforce it because Mustapha Kemal, supported by the Bolsheviks, refused to take. his orders from the Sultan at Constantinople. The Greeks were asked to occupy the portion of Western Asia Minor assigned to them because the Allies could not or would not spare troops enough, and, as matters developed, the Greek army became the sole defence of the Christian population, against general mass- acres such as have been and are being perpetrated further east. King Constantine's return complicated the situation. France took personal offence and proceeded to negotiate with Mustapha Kemal in the hope of reducing her military commitments in Northern Syria. Italy, always unfriendly to Greece, gave almost open assistance to the Turks. Great Britain found no real support either in Paris or in Rome for the policy of enforcing the. Sevres Treaty. The Greeks were left in an almost untenable position, aban- doned by the Allies because they had restored a pro- .German King, but threatened with attack by the Turks who were bent on regaining Smyrna in defiance of the peace terms. It is easy to see that the Greeks should have remained on the defensive, trusting that the Allies would realize their difficulties. But their decision to. attack Mustapha Kemal was not unnatural. The King wanted to gain military prestige ; furthermore, the Greek troops fight better in attack and are easily disheartened by the dull work of holding trench-lines. There was, too, a chance of breaking up the Nationalist army by a resolute offensive and thus ending the war.. The Greeks, however, now find that their resources were unequal to the task. They defeated the Turks, but they were unable to press them so hard as to complete the victory. The result is that they are no better off from a military standpoint than they were in the spring, and Mustapha Kemal is still able to send boastful messages from Angora. The Allies cannot afford any longer to ignore this war, which is destroying what little remained of civilization in Anatolia and which is having no small effect for ill on other Moslem countries. But in order to intervene .to good purpose they must first of all agree among themselves on a Near Eastern policy. It is useless to blame the Greeks or their Sovereign, whose ambitions should have been checked long since by the Allied Governments. What Anatolia and Armenia really need is a strong mandatory prepared to give those un- happy regions peace, order, and civilized institutions. But to ask for that is, we suppose, like crying for the moon.
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