BRITAIN LEADS EUROPE
R. EDEN'S Lancaster House statement on Tuesday has given a tremendous new impetus towards the effective defence and unity of Europe. The step of committing a British armed force permanently to the con- tinent is so important, and so closely in line with the known wishes of the West European countries and the United States, that the advance which it has begun cannot easily be stopped. Unsolved problems remain, of course. At the time these words are written • the full French and German reactions to Mr. Eden's statement are not known. Reassurance and goodwill must be part of that reaction, tut, of course, the problems of German rearmament and internal French politics remain areas of great technical difficulty. The American reaction was, as it were, known in advance, since Mr. Eden's speech followed Mr. Dulles's and amounted in effect to an acceptance of a challenge to take the lead. It is not possible at this stage to define exactly what Mr. Dulles meant when he said that American pledges to Europe would be renewed ' if the hopes that were tied into the European Defence Community Treaty can reasonably be transferred into the arrangements which will be the outcome of this meeting.' The meeting is not over. The hopes of the United States Government can only be defined in diplomatic terms by that Government. But the chance of complete success all round—a renewal of the strength and unity of Western Europe and a renewal of American promises—are now so good that the remaining problems can be tackled with zest.
The future of Western Germany must now be settled. If the West does not settle it in favour of Dr. Adenauer, Russia will ultimately settle it in favour of Communism. If the West is to settle it, Western Germany must be rearmed as an ally of the United States. Mr. Eden disposed of any other possibility with a few rhetorical questions : ' Is Germany to be neutral and disarmed? If so, who will keep Germany disarmed? Or is Germany to be neutral and armed? If so, who will keep Germany neutral ? ' The alternatives are therefore quite clear. Either the French and the Germans can agree, this week in London, with Britain and America on the main framework of German rearmament; or they cannot agree and Germany must be rearmed without French consent.
A solution to the problem would not seem to be quite beyond the reach of diplomacy. Any realist must now regard the ' European Idea' as one which has suffered some damage in recent months so that it can only be revived by the exercise of great care. This faced, he will find that the minimum requirements which must be met by any plan for German rearmament are fairly simple. They must on the one hand throw as many difficulties as possible in Germany's way if it should subsequently wish to leave the alliance either to wage an aggressive war or to come to terms With the Russians. They must on the other hand provide Dr. Adenauer with West German sovereignty on terms sufficiently better than those offered by the Bonn Conventions to com- pensate for the loss of the EDC.
General Gruenther, who as a realist must rank as high as anyone, is convinced that both these requirements would be met if German sovereignty were restored with three minor re- strictions, at the same time as Germany was made a full member of NATO. The restrictions on sovereignty would have to include Four Power control of Berlin and of all problems connected with the reunification of the two parts of Germany—in deference to Potsdam. They would also include some formula which would permit the allies to maintain their armies on sovereign German territory. . Entry into NATO would be without special restrictions but Germany, together with parts of France, Scandinavia and possibly Italy, would be declared a strategically exposed area and unsuitable for the manufacture of certain types of atomic weapons. Given these conditions, General Gruenther believes that it would be virtually impossible for Germany to go to war for more than a few days without running out of vital supplies and logistic support. Given greater standardisation and integration in NATO, he could do better still. For the General, this is good enough, and he appears to be much more frightened by a super-police state' in which perambulator factories would be subject to constant inspection in case they were producing guided missiles. Mr. Eden, on the othe,r hand, has offered one further safe- guard which may or may not be worth very much—the sug- gestion that Germany should be brought into the Brussels Treaty pact and to use the existing machinery in Brussels to set an upper limit on the forces in Europe of the member countries. In the case of Germany, this would initially be the twelve divisions prescribed in the EDC.
Here, then, is a plan. It sounds as though it might be service- able; it is uncomplicated; it need not take long to bring into action; and it has the one overwhelming merit that it appears to satisfy Dr. Adenauer. If the problem was no more difficult than this, agreement would be within comparatively easy reach at Lancaster House. No Western statesman could rearm Germany without more than a twinge of uneasiness—no Western statesman, including Dr. Adenauer. And, when it comes to the point, no safeguards can prevent the Germans at some time in the future from demanding that the allies with- draw their troops. But in so far as safeguards can make it difficult and dangerous for Germans to contemplate such a course, there would seem to be no option but to believe General Gruenther when he says that NATO could do that particular job at least as efficiently as EDC.
This is to ignore, however, the problem of France. The French delegation to London is primarily concerned not with Germany but with the French Assembly. The difficulties as they existed before Mr. Eden's statement were not, superficially at any rate, of completely insoluble appearance. And after that statement they do not appear serious. The French wanted the Brussels Treaty to handle more of the business than NATO: they want a system of inspection and control of armaments under the Brussels Treaty in which Britain would participate as a controller but not be subject to control. They wanted Britain to guarantee to keep whatever forces may be thought necessary by the Brussels Treaty Powers on the continent of Europe (which would mean an extension of the guarantee to keep forces in Europe as long as may be necessary ' which Britain offered to the EDC). That guarantee has been given. They wanted a comparable guarantee from the United States. They seem likely to get it. Finally they wanted a settlement for the Saar. Then, said M. Mendes-France, the French Assembly would probably agree to the entry of Germany into NATO. Have we now a reasonable expectation that that will happen ?
In the first place, the issue is being heavily obscured by the personal unpopularity of M. Mendes-France in governing circles inside and'outside France. Nobody can say for certain whether the French Prime Minister can carry the day. But the ultimate decision to trust him or not to trust him must be taken on rational grounds. Unpopularity in itself is often one of the better reasons for trusting a statesman. The important doubts must be not about the French Prime Minister but about the capacity of France to take and to sustain any final decision.
Two factors must weigh in favour of going some way toward the French position. The first is that there is no reason to suppose that if M. Mendes-France fails, anybody else in France will succeed. He may be unpopular in the Palais Bourbon but even French parliamentarians have some respect for' the support he still commands in the country. The second, and perhaps the more solid, factor is that if it is true that France is an unreliable ally, is it not by the same token true that Britain's presence on the continent is needed the more ? There may not be much substance in the proposal to control and inspect armaments through the Brussels Treaty, but there is real substance in the proposal that Britain should irrevocably commit those troops that may be necessary for the defence of Europe to the defence of Europe; and there is real substance in the argument that British diplomats, British soldiers, and British industrialists could and should take a more active part in the affairs of the continent. The military lead has been taken by Britain at Lancaster House this week. The rest should follow.
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