THE BIRTH OF THE RUSSIAN HEIR.
IT is right that the Czar should be congratulated both by diplomatists and the Press upon the birth of his long-expected heir. That the nations have grievances against Russia is no reason for omitting the courtesies which soften friction among civilised Powers, or for forgetting the ordinary claims of pity for suffering humanity. The Emperor of Russia, for all his grandeur in the eyes of the unthinking, has been hitherto one of the most miserable of mankind. He has been a most luckless man, conscious of inadequacy in a position in which no one is or can be fully adequate, defeated by an enemy whom he still thinks inferior in power as well as devoid of moral right, and denied by Providence the heir whose existence would assure the succession to his own descendants, and terminate all those cabals and vague ambitions which always spring up in a reigning family when the succession to a throne seems not to be indisputable. With the birth of an heir to the throne the life of the Czar becomes much more secure ; the Czarina recovers the beneficial influence over the Court which her persistent ill-fortune had decreased ; the Grand Dukes sink back to their positions as cadets of the Imperial house ; and the Russian people, who are superstitious, are relieved in part of their impression that Providence regards Nicholas II. with less than the favour it usually cherishes for the Sovereign of the Orthodox. It is no wonder that the Emperor is greatly pleased, and though a shower of military commands granted to an unconscious baby seems to Englishmen an odd method of displaying pleasure, it is but little more absurd than the shower of dukedoms, earldoms, and titles of honour to which we ourselves have become accustomed. As father, as husband, and as head of a dynasty which, like that of Austria, has rather too many collaterals in the succession, Nicholas II. is to be heartily congratulated.
We are not so sure that the world is, or even Russia. The Czar may see in the birth of his son a reason for still more jealously guarding his autocratic power. His readiness to make pilgrimages in order to pray before special shrines for the gift of a son suggests a mind prone to superstition as well as faith ; and he is said to believe, with a convic- tion unusual even in Kings, that he stands between God and his subjects, and is responsible in some special way alike for their destiny and the safety of the Orthodox Church. He cannot in his own judgment shake off that responsibility, cannot share it with counsellors, cannot part with any portion of it to a Parliament, and must, there- fore, if he is resisted or his action so freely criticised as to be hampered by opinion, continue, and even intensify, the policy of repression which the bureaucracy so strongly adjures him to pursue. It is not, he thinks, to his people that God has confided absolutism as a trust, but to him alone. That is always the ground-thought of a theocracy, and the Russian Monarchy always wishes to be thought a theocracy, and in many respects is one,—that is, it places in theory the supremacy of certain religious or dogmatic ideas above even its direct interests. Add that much of the prevailing repression is intended to preserve the Emperor's life, and that every Emperor with a baby heir must earnestly wish to live until that heir is competent to govern, and we have conditions in Russia which we fear will prohibit the smallest movement in the direction of liberty, even such liberty as exists in Germany or Austria. Men will still be liable to be sent to Siberia without trial. Criticism will still be forbidden under terrible penalties. The legislative power will still be denied to any but committees of bureaucrats appointed and removable by the Sovereign's will. That policy means anarchy in the end should great disasters occur, or should the springs of power dry up as they dried up in France for want of money ; and anarchy in Russia, though so many Liberals write as if they wished for it, might produce grave disasters for Europe. It would, to begin with, leave the German Emperor master of the Continental world, with an indefinitely lessened dread of war. It might encourage the Turk to make one more stroke for ascendancy throughout his old dominion. Or—and, if history is to be trusted, this is the most probable consequence—it might evolve a soldier who could keep his place only by conquest, or by enriching a soldiery which could not for the sake of its own reputation remain inactive. That was what happened, as we all know, in France. Many abuses exist in Russia which the fall of the autocracy would correct ; but the West does not desire as a result of that correction either German dominance, or a Turkish revival, or a grand struggle between the fully civilised States and the millions of soldiers whom a con- quering Russian general could induce to follow him to the plunder of the world. It is the interest of civilisation that Russia should be liberalised, and the special genius of her great people let loose,—not that she should be driven by repression into anarchy.
And, finally, we fear the birth of an heir to the Russian throne will be most unfavourable to peace. We have never been able to feel so confident as some of our contemporaries are that peace would be a necessary con- sequence of Japanese victories. The Mikado is too far from the centres of Russian power to be able to compel a complete surrender; and if the Russian people will bear the necessary suffering, the Government may call a halt at Kharbin, which is almost too far for an invader from the East to reach, collect a new and probably more mobile army, and fight a second campaign with these points in their favour,—that they will form a just esti- mate of the strength of their foes, and that the Japanese will be more weary than themselves. It is almost certain that this is the idea of the governing classes. We are accustomed in this country to deride their views as the result either of obstinacy or ignorance, and to describe them as foolish boasters, but, like all other people, they take their opinions from their chiefs, and we imagine that with many of their chiefs, including probably the Czar himself, over-confidence is a serious faith. They intend to preserve the autocracy, and they cannot see how, if the autocracy is humiliated, as it would be, especially by any Treaty including an indemnity, it could continue to assert the plenitude of its prerogatives. No doubt if the Treasury were empty peace would have to be made, but the Treasury is not filled from the Asiatic provinces, and Russia is not approaching the end of her pecuniary resources. She has many things to sell in the way of concessions, she can still borrow though on hard terms, and she alone in Europe can issue and will take inconvertible paper money. A depressed Czar without an heir, doubtful of the favour of Heaven, and aware of enormous discontent among his people, might have made peace as Nicholas I. did, and. perhaps passed away like him; but a Czar with his spirits raised by the answer to his prayers for a sou, and full of. the idea which underlies his manifesto on the birth, that the child ought to inherit the power entrusted by God to Russian Sovereigns, will be unlikely to risk that Dower by making what he would consider a shameful peace. The lofty pride which would re- ject such a loss of prestige will be strengthened by paternal hopes, and by the feeling common to all dynasts that it is his duty to hand down the sceptre undimmed. There are ways out, no doubt, which would diminish the loss of prestige, but they are ways of war, which would disturb the world even more than the war with Japan. We are afraid the strife will continue, with even in- creased expense caused by the desire to reorganise the Russian Army and improve the military railways, with the gradual using up of Russian resources, and with tho check placed by the neutrality laws upon all commerce, and more especially upon British. On any given day an outrage to a British ship might produce an explosion of national feeling which would render war inevitable. The Russians dislike us as friends of the Japanese, and are as pleased as children to find that they can inflict on us annoyance and loss without suffering anything themselves. It is always useless to prophesy, especially when one condition of calculation is the duration of special lives ; but it would not surprise us if historians had to record that with the birth of the Czarevitch Alexis the war between Russia and Japan took on a lingering and more or less futile character, which was the source of protracted suffering in both Einpires, and diminished for a time the prosperity of Europe.
"LITTLE JAPAN."
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