A FRESH complication, though one which has been long expected, has
arisen in the Far East. In the dispersion of the Russian fleet after its abortive attempt to escape from Port Arthur last week, certain vessels were driven to seek the hospitality of neutral ports. The battle- ship Tsarevitch,' after being severely handled, just managed to make her way to the German port of Kiao- chow. The destroyer Grosovoi ' and the cruiser Askold ' have arrived at Shanghai, and the destroyer Reshitelni ' sought refuge at Chifu. The first three vessels remain in their different asylums, but the adventures of the un- fortunate Reshitelni ' were only beginning, for two Japanese destroyers entered the harbour of Chifu and, after a struggle, towed her out as a. prisoner. The question of the proper usage of neutral ports has therefore arisen in its most acute form. International law on this subject is no better established than any other branch of that anomalous science, but we have at least a fairly consistent practice in recent times. The meaning of neutrality is well agreed upon. A neutral State is the friend of both parties, and owes towards them the ordinary duties of friendship. But such duties are governed by the further principle that no act of friendship shall be done to one side which shall in substance work out as an act of hostility to the other. If a belligerent laud force seeks the shelter of neutral territory, as General Olinchant's army did in Switzerland in 1871, then it must be received and protected ; but it must not be allowed to use the shelter as a base from which, rested and refreshed, it may attack the other belligerent. When it seeks asylum it goes ipso facto out of action. The same principle holds in naval warfare, though modified by the peculiar rules of maritime hospitality. A belligerent vessel driven into a neutral port can stay for twenty-four hours, whatever her condition. After that she is put to her election. If she dares not go out because of the enemy's proximity, then she must suffer herself to be dismantled, and her crew " interned " for the remainder of the war. She must either go out and fight or be put out of action. If, however, she is badly damaged, she has a right to stay for such time as is reasonably necessary for repairs, and to demand sufficient coal and supplies to enable her to reach her own country. But these repairs and supplies must only be such as will allow her to move, not such as will make her again a fighting unit. For a neutral Power to put her in a position to undertake fresh offensive opera- tions would be to assist directly one of the belligerents at the expense of the other. If, therefore, a belligerent vessel is damaged, not in her sailing, but in her fighting, capacity, she may do her best to repair that damage in a neutral port within twenty-four hours. But she cannot claim further time, and must go out or stay in for good. This is the practice which has been accepted by the civilised world during the past half-century, and it is clearly a practice based on a sound view of neutral duties. In the case of Britain it has been summarised in the rules issued by the Foreign Office under the Proclamation of February 10th.
So far as we can learn, Germany seems to be thoroughly awake to the duties which neutrality enjoins. Though certain Russian admirals seem to think that they have the right to take what time they please in repairs to restore a vessel's fighting efficiency, Germany seems prepared to act on the general view. The Tsarevitch ' and the three destroyers at Kis.o-chow have lowered their flags, and, being unable to face the large Japanese force outside the harbour, have submitted to disarmament and retention. An inspired announcement in the Cologne Gazette shows that Germany is prepared to set the world an example of a strict interpretation of neutral obligations, at any rate in this one respect. The Reshitelni' capture is very different matter. A Russian vessel entered a neutral port ; when it had apparently elected to be dismantled, Japanese vessels followed and carried it off as a prisoner. This seems to us a very grave breach of the law, and, the explanations of Japan, whether authoritative or not, do not mend matters. The Japanese excuse themselves on the' ground that the disarmament was a farce, and that the vessel remained in effect a fighting unit. But this does not touch the real question. Once belligerent vessels enter a neutral harbour, they are under the authority of the neutral Power. They cannot take the law into their own hands and decide whether or not dismantling is com- plete. If the Japanese destroyers suspected the reality of the Russian disarmament, their business was to apply to the Chinese authorities. If the Reshitelni ' had. remained armed, she was still subject to neutral orders. As she chose to disarm, she was inviolable, being in the trust of the neutral Power. In any case, it is an established rule that if vessels belonging to two belli- gerents are in port together, there must be twenty-four hours between their different times of departure in order to give the pursued a fair chance. Otherwise, the right of asylum would cease to have any meaning. Japan is per- fectly cognisant of the custom, since as far back as 1870 she accepted the British practice.
The incident brings into a very grave light the whole question of Chinese neutrality. Germany can declare herself neutral, and find her rulings obeyed ; the recognised neutrality of England is shown by the fact that no vessel sought shelter in Wei-hai-wei ; but can China hope for the same respect ? We have every reason to fear that the Russian vessels at Shanghai may find some means of setting the port authorities at defiance, while Japan at Chifu has been guilty of an act of violence towards neutral rights which it is difficult to defend on either legal or political grounds. It is true that the first offence may lie with the Russians, for we are told that they have had for some time a wireless telegraph apparatus in this very port, which they have found very serviceable. Neither Russia nor Japan, then, has shown that scrupulous care for Chinese neutrality which can alone keep the war clear of European complications. It is not to Russia's advantage, indeed, to show this care, for to compromise China hopelessly in Japanese interests would be, as she hopes, though it may be on insufficient grounds, to extend the area of the war, and so bring to her side the ally of which she stands in sore need. But this is certainly not Japan's game, and we trust that she will make full repa- ration for the unfortunate capture of the Reshitelni.' It is her interest to keep Russia clear of allies ; it is also her interest to have the full rigour of international practice applied to those Russian vessels which she chases into neutral ports. But she cannot expect to reap the benefits of a law with one hand while she is violating it with the other. It is the business of the British Government to see that the strictest interpretation possible is given to Chinese neutrality, and to prevent it from becoming the shuttlecock of the two Powers, to be flouted when con- venient. China can only make her views effective if it is known that the opinion of Europe is behind her. There is much force in Japan's contention that she cannot afford a repetition of the Mandjur ' incident, and spare ships to watch refugee Russian vessels in Chinese ports which China is herself incapable of controlling. But cracked and broken as Chinese neutrality undoubtedly is, it still remains the only defence in the Far East against an enormous extension of the hostile area. It is Japan's interest to support the fiction till it is accepted as a reality, and to do nothing to embarrass the Chinese Government in its attempts to enforce its status. We see no reason why Britain and France, as representing the interests of the two combatants, should not combine to guarantee on the part of China an effective neutrality.
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