Whose plutonium economy?

John Biffen

The British are an instinctively traditional nation; nowhere is that more evident than in our political institutions. Not, that is, in the pageantry of a Royal opening of a new session of Parliament : I rather refer to the deeply ingrained political concept of trusteeship. There is an assumption—widely felt even if not frequently asserted—that democracy goes beyond mere head counting. Indeed it extends to hold in respect previous generations and to pay regard for generations yet to come.

The concept of public trusteeship—influenced by past and future—encompasses the paradoxical art of tactical manoeuvre that was rendered memorable by the phrase 'a week is a long time in politics.' But politicians are also conscious of time spans that outlast the parliamentary cycle, particularly when they concern themselves with decisions concerning the ultimate loyalties and values which fashion society and the nation itself. It will be instinctive for many British politicians to want a calm and reflective discussion about the nuclear decisions that have to be undertaken by government during the next decade.

The political debate upon nucleai power will be substantially influenced by our collective sense of history, and particularly by how we regard the impact of the Industrial Revolution. That impact remains visible even after a century and a half. The industrialisation profoundly affected our physical environment, contributed to the social class structure that still persists, and accounted for the rapid rise in living standards as Britain was transformed from a pastoral society. There is a political appreciation that decisions on civil nuclear power are likely to be as profound as was the Industrial Revolution in their implications for economic and social change. This sense of scale will colour the British political debate. In a sense it will be insular. I doubt if our counsels will be much influenced by the recent nuclear-power referenda in various American states or by the much disputed impact of the nuclear controversy in the Swedish general election earlier this year.

The stage for our own debate has been set by the Royal Commission Report on 'Nuclear Power and the Environment' prepared by Sir Brian Flowers and his colleagues. No other Royal Commission publication has carried such portentous implications for domestic policy—certainly none since the publication of the Beveridge

Report a generation ago. The report contains much generous, and, no doubt, well merited praise for the performance, innovative skills, and safety record of the British nuclear industry. The report further makes some valuable suggestions concerning institutional reform for monitoring and controlling the risks that arise from radioactive wastes. I hope that the public debate will not ignore these factors. They are substantial in their own right. Even so the Flowers report has initiated a debate that will be largely dominated by the question of whether or not the government should sanction the manufacture of a commercial scale nuclear fast breeder reactor.

The matter can be simply put in the Commission's words: 'Our anxiety about the hazards of an economy based on plutonium leads us to the view that fast reactors should be introduced only if they are demonstrably essential.' In my view the whole tenor of the report indicates the danger of choosing an energy process so devastating in its implications that society itself would have to be remoulded to accommodate the fast breeder reactor. This challenging proposition of the Commission has come at a time when the British nuclear industry is already in some travail over present generation thermal reactors. In this context Lord Hinton has observed 'one wonders whether it is worthwhile to incur "launching costs" for a new type of reactor if it can be sold only in the home market.' I am, therefore, profoundly conscious of the anxiety of those who work in the British nuclear industry. They are heirs of a pioneering tradition in technology who are understandably anxious to contribute to a pattern of commercial success and bestow upon posterity the twin benefits of a protected environment and an access to energy that will sustain future living standards.

It is worth considering five aspects of the Flowers Report and its implications.

In the first instance I am profoundly sceptical about economic futurology. There is a current superstition that economists, and above all politicians with the appropriate economic soothsayers, can tolerably divine the future. Business spokesmen, particularly in the field of energy, are frequent devotees to this faith. The 'energy gap' is confidently asserted as a conclusive argument which should convince anyone save an illiterate or the chairman of British Gas. My own instincts stubbornly rest with those who doubt whether it is at all possible to predict the future woi ld and national demand for energy ten or twenty years hence, and correspondingly to predict the sources from which that energy will be

supplied. This scepticism rests on three observations.

Energy forecasting, even on a short term basis, has been a fateful enterprise. I cannot see how it is feasible to extrapolate what are likely to be British economic growth rates over the next twenty-five years--and Flowers speculates over even longer time spans.

There is surely at least some modest evidence suggesting a change in the pro-rata relationship between economic growth and energy consumption. The nuclear debate would be improved if it were not conducted in terms which asserted that patterns of demand and sources of supply could be reasonably determined a generation hence.

Next, one must underline the importance of the arguments that have been advanced by the Flowers Commission in respect of military security. I am not competent to dwell on the exact extent of the danger presented either by sabotage or by the theft of plutonium. In this respect it is irrelevant to attempt a consensus on the exact toxicity of plutonium. What is certain is that any government will wish to equip itself with sufficient powers to exclude beyond reasonable doubt the possibility of either sort of act. Even then, there would remain anxiety. 'Reasonable doubt' is a nebulous concept. At whatever level of security precaution, there would be a clamour for greater stringency. The politician, and the public whom he serves, are only beginning to catch a glimmer of the military and civil liberty implications of an energy source involving the widespread production, storage, and movement of plutonium. Earlier this year Parliament passed the Atomic Energy Authority (Special Constables) Act : and I chided and rebuked the Scottish National Party for dividing the House of Commons on the second reading. Nonetheless I am profoundly aware of the libertarian arguments there must be whenever commercial processes necessitate extending the use of armed forces. The debate, however tentatively expressed, is bound to turn upon the relative merits of economic activity and the price that may be paid in physical freedoms.

The third point is not contained in the Flowers report, but it flows inexorably from any decision to finance the construction of a commercial fast breeder reactor: that is the extent to which the cost of the decision will pre-empt resources which might otherwise be devoted to alternative forms of energy production. It is widely assumed—even safety and environmental matters apart-that the development of a fast breeder reactor could only be undertaken by the government. That may be so. The estimated costs of a reactor have varied between £600 million and £2,000 million. The public debate upon the fast breeder reactor must reveal some order of magnitude of the expected spending, and the implied concentration of resources in one centralised decision concerning energy production. One obvious question abides. Will the cost be so substantial that the venture once commenced cannot be allowed to falter—at least in public ?This will be recognised as a danger wherever inherently massive risk capital has been advanced by political agencies. There is an itch to use the full manipulative powers of government rather than to admit the original judgment was in error.

In this context I have been interested to note the meaning now being given to the concept of a crude oil minimum supply price (MSP). I had supposed originally it was a mechanism designed to insure North Sea oil investment against the vagaries of political or commercial action by OPEC. I was fascinated therefore to note recent remarks in a draft opinion for the European Assembly Committee on Energy and Research. The opinion has been prepared by Professor F. Burgbacher, a German Christian Democrat, and certainly makes a noteworthy general contribution to the debate on energy. One specific point especially deserves quotation: 'Your draftsman takes the view that the minimum price should be fixed high enough so that it matches the production costs of oil and natural gas from the Ekofisk area and the production costs of electricity from nuclear energy. As far as the latter are concerned, account should be taken not only of real production costs but also of the problem of siting [and] the cost of environmental protection . . .' These sentiments match with a report in the Guardian on 20 October when Tony Benn was credited with the comment that the 'MSP was not a device protecting North Sea oil alone but made sense for other countries with investments in nuclear, coal, or other energy sources.' The implications of such thinking deserve pondering. My final comment on this topic is a plea that the economics of the last breeder reactor should be quantified insofar as that is possible. Furthermore we should not contort and arrange all other energy research, development and production effort in order to justify any decision taken on the fast breeder reactor.

The problems that may arise on cost lead to the natural fourth consideration. It may be decided that the fast breeder reactor should be either a European Community or a joint European-American venture. I believe this consideration will play a lively part in the debate. It must be emphasised that many of the social and environmental factors which will determine the British attitude to a fast breeder reactor will apply with broadly equal force whether it is a development of the Dounreay prototype or whether partnership is sought with our Community neighbours. Meanwhile the present nature of the French, German and Italian backing for the 1200 megawatt Super Phenix makes it highly likely that a full scale Community commitment to a fast breeder reactor will be predominantly a continental rather than a British enterprise.

The fifth point concerns the need for a period when the plutonium option really can be fully canvassed without any conditional or partial commitments which then prove quite impossible to disavow. There is a curious biology about some government decisions. It seems as if a discreet and imperceptible process of seduction leads to the apparent miracle of virgin birth. MY own innocence on these matters was jolted by membership of the Public Accounts Committee, under the chairmanship of Lord Boyd-Carpenter, when we investigated the decisions to persist with the development of Concorde. The technique has also been admirably documented by Jock BruceGardyne and Nigel Lawson in their recent book The Power Game. I am sure that Tony Benn faithfully intends that there should be a proper and informed public debate before any decision is taken. I want to reinforce his stated intention. I acknowledge that there is always the danger that reflective debate can degenerate into procrastination and a craven fear of decision itself. I do not believe that danger is yet apparent.

Obviously, the debate arising from the Flowers Report will be of the most utmost significance for the political, economic and social future of this country. There are those who believe it implies the sombre prospect of the dark satanic mills of a plutonium society. There are those who believe that flinching from the decision is a cowardly way of committing successor generations to the attenuated living standards of a candlelight economy. The debate will encompass press, public and Parliament. It will not fall within the neatly prescribed lines of partY political affiliation. It will be none the worse for that. I know that within the Conservative Party there will be a variety of opinion. I could easily set a debate going between Tom Normanton and Nigel Forman. On the Government back benches Arthur Palmer and Norman Atkinson will emphasise their belief in the beneficial and indispensable role of nuclear power: Robin Cook and Frank Hooley will argue from an opposed standpoint.

In this controversy there is no apparent Left and obvious Right. Certainly we should exorcise from our political vocabulary the much prostituted terms 'extremist' and 'moderate,' and forswear the fatuous terms 'dove' and 'hawk.' I myself shall disappoint those who expect me to assail Tony Benn with the vigour of a Manchester United supporter. The radio, press and television have a profound obligation to ensure the fulfilment of the complementary obligations of public discourse and political action. We should all know our respective roles.

The debate belongs to the nation: but the decision rests inexorably with the politician• These comments have necessarily been tentative. I must, however, confirm the impression that I am powerfully influenced by the documentation and central conclusions of the report prepared by Sir Brian Flowers.