THE LORDS AND THEIR SO-CALLED VETO.
THEMILE Government and the Gladstonian party are in a taking over the question of the Upper House. Their earnest desire is to find a short way with the Lords, but they are at a complete loss to know what to do. Their object is to obtain a state of things under which Bills that have received the assent of the House of Commons shall become law without any further reference either to the people or to any Second House. Their desire, in fact, is to have a single, supreme, unchecked. House, whose votes shall at once and without tiresome delay have the force of law. Now there are two ways of getting their wish. Either they may abolish the House of Lords altogether, and leave only a single House in name as in fact, or they may take away from the Lords the right of taking part in legislation, and may leave them as a picturesque but powerless body,—a House with merely nominal functions. Let us for a. moment look at these two ways of bringing about the desired object,—the absolute supremacy of the House of Commons.
The entire abolition of the House of Lords is in theory a perfectly easy operation, provided always that you have the great majority of the people of the United Kingdom at your back,—a majoiity which is a, majority in England as well as in Great Britain and Ireland. Suppose the country really determined, and by a large majority, to abolish the House of Lords, it is easy to trace the steps that must inevitably lead. to that result. To begin with, the people would send up a House of Commons pledged. to support a Bill abolishing the Lords. That Bill would be introduced, passed by large majorities, and sent up to the Upper House. Let us suppose that the Peers would refuse to abolish themselves. The next step of a, confident and determined Ministry would be to advise the Queen to make enough Peers to pass the Bill. The Queen would probably refuse to adopt so revolutionary a course at a moment's notice. The Ministry would re- sign. Their opponents would then come in, and as they could not carry on the Government, would dissolve in the hope of affecting a change in the demand of the electors for abolition. But as we are supposing the electors deter- mined, the Dissolution would only result in the return of a House of Commons more bent on abolition than the last.
The Dissolution Ministry would, of course, have to resign at once. But the Queen would be unable to form a new Government unless she pledged herself to consent to the creation of enough Peers to pass the Bill. That consent would have to be given to prevent a, revolution, and the Bill to abolish the 'Upper House would pass the Lords. As we have seen, then, all that is wanted to get rid of the House of Lords is an electorate strongly and steadily in favour of abolition. But the Gladstonians can note these steps in the path of abolition as well as we can. What, then, is the reason that prevents them carrying out the plan we have sketched ? They want abolition, and they know how they can certainly obtain it, and yet they do not propose to take that course. The reason is very simple. They are aware that they have not got the essential condition,—an electorate strongly and steadily in favour of a, single Legislative Chamber. They dare not see the question of abolition through to the end, because they know that the country does not want, and would not tolerate, abolition. The Gladstonian party is then thrown back upon the second alternative,—that of abolishing the powers of the Lords, but leaving an apparent Second House. This is the plan which it is now under- stood has been finally adopted by the Cabinet. They are not going to ask for the abolition of the House of Lords, but only for the abolition of the so-called Veto. This was the Platonic demand of the one-day Conference at Leeds, and this is the demand which will be made at the demonstrations 'which are being organised 'by the party managers throughout the country. It is true that at the first of these carefully engineered examples of "a spontaneous outburst of enthusiasm," that held at Peckham Rye last Sunday, the resolutions were a little more strenuous in character, but that makes little or no difference. It is clear that the word has gone round that what the party is to ask for is the abolition of the Veto. But what is meant by the abolition of the Veto ? Here is the real crux of the situation. Upon the answer to this question depends the reality or unreality of the whole movement. If by the veto of the Lords is meant the right to veto or prohibit legislation peremptorily and. entirely, as does the President of the United States when he exercises the prerogative entrusted to him by the Constitution, there is no sort of need for action. The veto of the Lords has already been abolished by the operation of time. No one now claims for the Lords the right to veto legislation absolutely and permanently. The very highest claim put forward by the Lords is the right to ascertain, by means of a Dissolution, whether the House of Commons accurately represents the opinion of the country on this or that subject. For example, the House• of Lords does not claim the right to forbid Home-rule in perpetuity and. in spite of the clearly expressed will of the people. It merely claimed, a year and a half ago, the right to have the people consulted on the Home-rule Bill. The House of Lords may or may not be justified in claiming this power to demand. that certain Bills be referred to the people at a Dissolution. That is another question. No good, however, can be done by pretending that the Lords claim a right which they have long ago given up. They claim no veto on the legislation of the Commons, and hence it is absurd. and misleading to talk about the abolition of the veto of the Lords. You cannot abolish what does not exist. What, then, the Glad- stouian party is asking for, is the abolition of the right of the House of Lords to see that in matters of great moment the country is consulted,—a right enforced by means of what, at the most, is no more than a suspensive veto.
It will be curious to see by what means the Glad- stonians will attempt to get rid of this right of insisting that the people shall be consulted. It is possible that they may attempt to introduce a Bill into the House of Commons, making it unnecessary to send back to the Lords Bills sent down with their amendments—i.e., allowing the Commons to strike out the Peers' amend- ments and then at once send up the Bill to receive the Royal assent. If they do, we do not think the country will be slow to notice the true effect on the Constitution. Such a Bill will make the House of Commons absolutely omnipotent. At present the right of suspending legisla- tion pending an appeal to the people, gives the electors a. certain amount of power over the Commons even in the intervals between two Dissolutions. If that were gone, the Commons could make themselves immortal by a snap vote. But unless we are very much mistaken, this is the last thing the people want. We are not among those who profess to hate or despise the House of Commons. We believe that at present it is sound at heart, and as an institution, still has the confidence of the country. But unlimited power is good for no institution. Take away• all checks from the House of Commons, and the sympathies of the people would soon leave the tyrant. Mr. Gladstone, in a profound and melancholy letter written by him on leaving office, noted how he had. seen the aristocracy and the middle class in possession of supreme power, how each in turn had become demoralised and corrupted by its possession, and how he dreaded that the same thing might happen in the case of the working class. The, thought that underlies this foreboding will apply to the great functions of the Constitution. We see in history how supreme power corrupted the King and. the Lords. Depend upon it, unchecked power would equally ruin the Commons. If we want to keep the House of Commons in the future what it has been in the past, the greatest instrument for human freedom the world has ever seen, we must withhold from it that unchecked supremacy which corrupts and demoralises. Some check there must be on its authority,—that is certain. At present we have got the slight check of the 'Upper House's suspen- sive powers. Till we can find a better ina systematic Referendum, let us hold firm to this barrier against a, single despotic House.
Previous page
