CIVIL WAR IN CHINA—A GUIDE TO THE LABYRINTH.

[FROM A' CORRESPONDENT.]

THE civil war which has recently flared up in China has excited unusual interest in the West and for two reasons. In the first place the campaign has opened in the vicinity of Shanghai ; the Paris of the East, the nerve centre of Far Eastern trade, the home of thousands of Europeans and the site of the longest bar in the world.

In the second place, this local war may be the first raindrops of a storm which would drench all China.

But before considering this possibility, a consideration which really involves an attempt- to explain the whole condition of the body politic in China, it is necessary to know something of the leading personalities in the country and the so-called parties which revolve around these prominent men.

First, a definition, that of the " Tuchun." A Tuchun is a military governor of a province. He normally retains his position by virtue of his army, which he pays with the fruit of some legal and many illegal taxes. When he does not pay his troops they become bandits and pay themselves until some more affluent Tuchun acquires merit by " suppressing banditry " and simultaneously increases his own army by the enrolment of the bandits. So much for Tuchuns as a class. They deserve a couple of volumes.

A glance at the map of China is recommended.

In the North, in the three great provinces outside the Great Wall, an area loosely termed Manchuria, Marshal Chang Tso-lin rules despotically but efficiently as a Tuchun of Tuchuns. He is invariably in a delicate position vis-a-vis Japan, whose national ambitions are centred in the area which he governs. , He was once a swine-herd, then a leader of irregular troops in the Russo-Japanese War. He is sometimes referred to as the leader of the Fengtien party. Inside, that is to the south of the Great Wall, lies Peking, the seat of the would-be Central Government. The Presidential chair is now graced by Tsao Kun, who shares (some say he disputes) the leadership of the Chih-li party with the super-Tuchun, General Wu Pei-fu, whose military headquarters are at Loyang in central China. The Chili-li party originated as follows. The great satrap Li Hung-chang was, in Imperial days, the centre of gravity of an association of northern militarists. Yuan Shih-kai succeeded to the leadership of this group, but after his death in 1916 it split into two sections. One became known as the Chili-li party, the other was called the Anfu clique or club. The latter were in power in Peking in 1920. They were openly supported by Japanese money, and the scandal became so shameless that the Chih-li party, acting in conjunction with the independent Chang Tso-lin, ejected the Anfu clique. Trouble ensued between the victors, and in 1922 Wu Pei-fu, on behalf of the Chih-li party, attacked Chang Tso-lin and drove him" back-to the north of the Great Wall. With typical Chinese caution, Wu took no steps to exploit his victory. Since 1922 the Chih-li party have controlled Peking, and the outward and visible sign that proved that this control was complete was the purchase by Tsao Kun of the Presidential office. It was commonly reported that only eleven legislators disdained to accept cheques. The previous President, Li Yuang-hung, had retired to Tientsin. His retreat caused unusual confusion, since his concubine saw fit to include in her personal luggage four important seals of State, which were not recovered for some days.

The patient reader will now be gratified to learn that the tortuous path leading towards the existing civil war is near its goal. The province of Chekiang is ruled by a Tuchun called Lu Yung-hsiang. Although Shanghai is geographically in the province of Kiangsu it is con- trolled politically by Lu. By the term Shanghai is meant, of course, the Chinese part of that great city. Lu of Chekiang is an adherent of the'Anfu Club, whose overthrow at Peking has already been described.

Adjoining the province of Chekiang is that of Kiangsu, ruled by a Tuchun named Chi Hsien-yuan. He is a supporter of the Chih-li party. He has not hitherto had the reputation of being a very warm adherent of the Chih-li group, as there is said to be jealousy between him and Wu Pei-fu. However this may be, in 1923 there was much talk of war between Kiangsu and Chekiang provinces, but largely owing to the protests of the commercial classes, nothing came of it save asser- tions from Chi and Lu that neither wanted war, .provided he was left in undisturbed enjoyment of his office. This year shows a less happy result. Wu Pei-fu and Tsao Kim of the Chih-li party have persuaded Chi of Kiangsu to attack Lu in Chekiang. This move on the part of the Chih-Ii party is in harmony with -Wu Pei-fuls adver- tised policy of unifying China by force ; unification, be it understood, beneath the Chili-li umbrella.

To the fruition of this policy there are three out- standing obstacles. There is first the independent and powerful Chang Tso-lin ; there is secondly the existence of a number of independent and quasi-independent Tuchuns of whom Lu in Chekiang is one example, though there are others in West China against whom Wu Pei-fu has been organizing expeditions with varying success. Thirdly, there is Dr. Sun Yat-sen. This veteran revolu- tionary is the head of an administration at Canton, the principal city of South China and the traditional home of advanced political thought. Sun Yat-sen claims that his Government is the only legitimate descendant of the Chinese republic proclaimed in 1911 and subsequently roughly handled by Yuan Shih-kai. WhenYuan dissolved Parliament and proclaimed the radical Kuo-min Tang party which had largely effected the revolution, Sun Yat-sen retired to Canton and established a rival Govern- ment in the south. Within the last few years he has been twice forced to flee for his life to Hong Kong, and twice has he returned in triumph. A long struggle between Sun Yat-sen and a former associate of his called Chen Chiung-ming has been smouldering for many months. Chen Chiung-ming ostensibly pays respect to Wu Pei-fu's desires.

It may be confidently stated that the reports that Sun Yat-sen will advance north to the assistance of the Anfu man now being attacked in Chekiang are ridiculous. The distances are enormous, and Sun's personal position is distinctly precarious.

With this historical outline for reference it is now possible to enlarge upon the particular aspects of the existing civil war which give it an international interest. So far as the safety of the international settlements at Shanghai are concerned, little apprehension need be felt. There are many warships in the port ; there is also a very efficient force of local volunteers, But the chief safeguard is the certainty that neither of the com- batants will desire to get on the wrong side of foreign opinion. As regards trade, the interruption of the Shang- hai-Nanking railway is an inconvenience, but the majority of Shanghai's great commerce is water-borne on the Yangtze River, and this will not be affected. The chief nuisance to Shanghai will come from the thousands of refugees who will seek the neutral ground 'of the Inter- national settlements. The more important and interest- ing aspect of the struggle is centred in the question as to whether Chang Tso-lin will take a hand in the game and attack the Chih-li party from the north. It is common knowledge that he would like to revenge himself upon Wu Pei-fu and Tsao Kun for the rebuff the former gave him in 1922. However, there are strategical difficulties of magnitude in front of Chang if he decides to come south. At the moment of writing he is indulging in the customary verbal warfare by telegram and edict which would in any case precede neutrality or actual operations. If Chang does embark on a considerable campaign, it would be the biggest upheaval in China since Yuan Shi-kai's coup d'etat, and to prophesy con- cerning the result would be merely to guess.

It was mentioned in the narrative of events that Wu Pei-fu has been engaged for some time in supporting campaigns in the west of China with the object of extending the influence of the Chih-li party. If the Chekiang-Kiangsu war develops, it will probably have its repercussions in the western provinces, some of whose Tuchuns might think it expedient to move against Wu Pei-fu.

In concluding this outline of the present situation in China certain reflections suggest themselves. It is obviously complicated and confused, and the reason for this fact is that the military struggle is one between personalities and not principles. None of the leaders represent or are responsible to any appreciable volume of public opinion, with the result that their policies change almost from month to month, and the allies of to-day are the enemies of yesterday. A second reflection is summed up in the question " What do this and similar civil wars stand for in relation to the develop- ment of modern China ? "

The answer is that in a direct sense they mean very little. .They are symptoms, not causation.

In English history of the nineteenth century the " Battle of Peterloo " is of negligible importance as a historical event, but the democratic movement of which it was a symptom has had great consequences. Viewed at close quarters China appears to Europeans as a Icountry torn by dissension and chaotic almost beyond reconstruction. Actually this picture is distorted and false, though limitations of space preclude an explanation of why Europe only hears of the chaos in China. Viewed in perspective, with a background of history extending into tens of centuries, the existing chaos in 'China (I repeat it is grossly exaggerated) shrinks at once to its true proportions. The confusion in China is the inevitable consequence of the impact of the West upon the Far East. Its first results were the two China ,wars and the Taiping rebellion in which upwards of 20 million men died ; its next visible result was the defeat of China by Westernized- Japan in 1895 ; then came the Boxer outbreak ; then the 1911 revolution, the downfall of the dynasty, and the beginning of the years of confusion of which this is the thirteenth. So much for the outward and visible events which have thus far marked the metamorphosis of China from a State believing itself the political, theological and cultural eentre of the civilized world, to a State which has pain- fully realized that it is but a part, and a materially feeble part, of that world. Little has been heard at present of the spiritual changes which have been taking place in China since about 1898, inward changes of greater ultimate importance . than spectacular historical 'events. There is now pulsating in China an intellectual (renaissance called by the Chinese " The New Tide of ;Thought," which is as significant a fact in world history 'as any intellectual renaissance of which Europe has been 'the home. It would require a separate article to outline !even what this movement is, what it has done, is doing, 'land is likely to- accomplish. Here one • can only say that unless all the teachings of history are false, it is from this movement that there will emerge in the fullness of time a force which China still almost entirely lacks, and that is a public opinion. When that is revealed, and of the nature of this revelation the West will do well to take heed, Tuchuns, local militarists and the like will stand exposed for what they are, the surface froth and passing bubbles on the deep and slowly moving flood of the national destiny of China.

K.H.