WHY HOLLAND IS NEUTRAL.
ero TIM EDITOR or TION " SrECTATOLn Stn,—A certain amount of attention has been attracted in this country by an article published in the August Fortnightly under the title of " Holland's Opportunity." It is an anony- mous appeal to our country to join in the fray, partly from motives of self-interest, partly on broad humanitarian grounds, and partly also out of regard for our traditions as a demoeratio and liberty-loving people. We may, says the writer, help to save Belgium. from a second martyrdom and the world from Prussian domination by now joining the Allies, who through our country could thrust at Germany's undefended flank.
I do not exactly wish to reply to this article, but with your permission I should like to use it as a peg on which to hang a few observations concerning the attitude of Holland and of the average Dutchman towards the war. This may help to prevent misunderstandings and, perhaps, also disappoint. ments. As for the article itself, I only wish to state that some of its principal arguments are not acceptable to us. The writer argues from premisses which he cannot possibly substantiate. To give an instance, he states that in the event of a German victory " Belgium and Holland would be wiped out." He cannot prove that, and, in any case, we do not believe that here. We feel that Germany likes to hold Belgium as a valuable object against the time of the Peace Conference—to get her colonies back, for example. We also feel that thirteen million five hundred thousand of the most stubborn, recalcitrant, democratic, and fiercely liberty-loving people in Europe—Dutch and Belgians—are not wanted in the German system. Personally, I doubt whether Germany would admit this democratic leaven, even if Holland and Belgium wished to enter the German dough of their own free will. Germany has more than its fill in the shape of its Poles, Danes, Guelphs, and Alsatians, politically at any rate. To add to them and to its four million Socialist voters seven and a half million Belgians and six million Dutchmen would kill the ascendancy of the classes who rule it now ; and Germany knows it.
But lot me come to my subject—the Dutch attitude of mind towards the belligerents. There can be no doubt that our sympathies, including our political sympathies, are prepon- deratingly with the Allies. But there can be no doubt that
we feel no kind of hostility towards the Germane. We regard them in a detached sort of way. We admire their good qualities—their industry, sobriety, thoroughness, frugality. We dislike their bad or unpleasant characteristics—their egotism and brusqueness, their lack of charm, graces, truth- fulness, and "character," their somewhat gross materialism. We detest the special Prussian traits, which years of close association are, alas I instilling into the Rhenish, South German, Saxon, and Austrian races. But all these unpleasant peculiarities inspire only dislike, not animosity. We look on them very much as "not our business, thank goodness." Our political feelings towards Germany remain dominated by the consideration that, to us at any rate, Germany has ever been a good and loyal neighbour—one might even say a considerate neighbour. Some say, " Wait; when the time is ripe you will be annexed." But there is no tangible reason to suspect this, apart from some Pan-Germanic rant. On the other band, there are many grounds for the view that Germany does not want to anuex Holland, and might even decline to admit us to its political system in the unlikely event of our wishing to enter it voluntarily. Germany knows, better than any one else, that the Dutch could not be assimilated; from the German point of view we are far too democratic to be a desirable infusion. But some people say Germany may desire us for the sake of our magnificent colonies. Germany, however, knows that England would never consent to this, and, besides, it has noted, in the first weeks of the war, when our fate also trembled in the balance, the touching demonstrations of native loyalty throughout our colonies, very much like those you bad in India ; the reward of just rule.
Next, there is the strategic position of our country. But Holland covers Germany's flank, and, except with German command of the seas—i.e., world domination—Germany'e possession of our harbours would be a weakness instead of an element of strength in time of war. And in times of peace our independent existence is no hindrance to Germany ; our ports are free. For all these reasons, and without considering our Army, there seems no tangible reason to fear German designs upon our country. They would be altogether illogical, except in case the doctrine of German designs upon world domination is correct. But, the Pan.Germanists notwithstand- ing, opinions may still differ as to the existence of such designs. If they exist, and if they could be carried out, the resistance of this small country would in any ease hardly turn time scales.
This last view may, I admit, be reasonably objected to ; and it might be said, as the writer in the Fortnightly does, that it is our duty to intervene now to prevent the rise of German world power. The answer to that is, first, that. we in Flollaed do not credit Germany with such designs, which she must know to be incapable of realization. Our view here is rather that Germany, which undoubtedly started the war and prepared for it, acted under the influence of a kind of prosecution mania, a mental affliction probably originating in the percep. tion of open or silent but real opposition. In any case, we feel that Germania contra MUndlinTh has a hopeless case. We feel that Germany has absolutely no chance to win this war; she may be badly beaten in the end, and the best issue she can hope for is a stalemate. We, who try to keep an courant with what goes on around us, have, ever since the battle of the Marne, had the firm conviction that Germany is fighting for terms, not for victory.
Why, then, should we intervene P As long as our country is not attacked and our nation not insulted, we have no reason to join the fray. We do not believe the world runs a serious risk of German domination, and we see therefore no great cause big enough to lead us to" cut our dykes and fight like furies." On the other hand, we have many reasons for not joining. We cannot very well plunge our land into war simply because we dislike Germans; nor would the mere sus. picion of German designs upon our independence be a good and valid reason. So long as we keep to facts we must admit Germany to have been a good neighbour ; and it would be treacherous to fell such a one in the flank when he is already very hard pressed. But, over and above these considerations, there is the consciousness that we can serve the world and the cause of liberty beat by remaining strictly and honestly neutral. Tho world will presently need trusted peacemakers, and Holland hopes to be among them. The best and nobleeL among us are
ever busy to pave the way, even at this early hour, for a just and lasting settlement. This requires careful preparation if we do not wish to be surprised by a had peace, just as we have been surprised by a bad war. We want to make a repeti- tion of 1914-15 impossible, and we believe only a union of its States can end the long era of strife in Europe. To you, full as you rightly are of the war fever and the lust of battle, the idea of entering into a union with your present enemies will no doubt at this moment seem preposterous. Well, they might even be left out, at any rate for the sake of saving argument at this juncture. But in a strong union lies the only solution, and, what especially concerns Holland, lies the only strong guarantee for the permanent existence and the rights of the numerically small peoples. That is why our best men, with those of the States, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries, are quietly but steadily working towards this goal. It is more useful work than joining a fight which really is already decided, though not yet ended.— [We gladly publish the above letter from a valued Dutch correspondent, but must not be held to agree with the writer's conclusions. No doubt, if things go as well as he believes they will, Holland, whose duty it is to do her best for her own people, will he wise to keep her neutral position, in spite of a strong balance of sympathy with the Allies. If, how- ever, things go the other way, or, rather, if an inconclusive peace ends the war, Holland's position will be one of imminent danger—a fact which it would be absurd for us to ignore, even though we do not wish to push Holland into war. A half-beaten or, as she would represent herself, a half- victorious Germany would be certain to attempt to regain her position by the absorption of the rich colonies of Holland. We fear, also, that Germany, in desperate financial straits after the war, but with plenty of iron, if no gold, would trouble very little about the democratic views of the Dutch people. We do not, however, wish to argue the matter, as if we do we may seem to be pressing Holland, which is the last thing we desire. "Batavier " deserves our thanks for his frank and manly sympathy with us and our allies.—ED. Spectator.]
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