General Bourbaki has, hitherto at least, had the uniform ill-
fortune of French commanders, and we suppose from the usual cause, not being able to trust his troops to attack except when they had every advantage, both as to numbers and position, in their favour. Up to the 17th he had pressed Werder, chiefly by the use of artillery, and evidently without trusting his troops to do real hard fighting, to within some five miles of Belfort. On the 18th German reinforcements arrived, under General Zastrow, and Bourbaki fell back "to the positions he occupied before the battle,"—what battle not being very clear, but apparently the battle of the 17th. This retreat the Germans regard as a final retreat, and relinquishment of the attempt to raise the siege of Belfort, and talk of "pursuit." And probably Bourbaki has really failed, but it is too soon to judge. He himself assigns the bad state of the weather as the reason for not attempting an advance, and seems to be waiting for reinforcements. We fear, however, that he has as little succeeded in inspiring his army with personal confidence as the other French Generals. They all handle their armies as if the cohesion of their troops was of that feeble kind which a single vibration might explode.
