Commonwealth and Foreign

THE FRENCH CRISIS

FRENcii politics are slowly emerging from an almost oriental twilight of face-saving into the light of day. In these shadows a fierce conflict has been going on between the forces of reac- tionary or revolutionary sectarianism and the strong under- ground current which is flowing towards what M. Paul Reynaud early in December called " national unanimity." This he then declared must be the mark of the democratic regimes, no less than of the dictatorships, if they were to survive.

The Socialists and Communists both include elements which clearly recognise that the most important form of resistance to Fascism is not to carry on ruthless labour disputes, but to put France in a position to say " no " quietly and firmly to Germany and Italy. M. Leon Blum himself obviously thinks that the international situation ought to be the primary consideration. So do many of those about him. The interest of Moscow in the French Communist Party is certainly due at least as much to the possibility it may afford of influencing French foreign policy, as to hopes of a revolution in France.

The attitude of the rank and file in both parties is necessarily different. Local issues usually predominate over international issues, and the revolutionary propaganda of past years cannot be repudiated. It has been heard in good faith. The structure of the Socialist Party is such that in the intervals between the annual party congresses, vital decisions (such as participation in a government) have to be taken by the National Council, a body in which the party organisation of each French department is represented by two delegates. This is much as if the affairs of the Church of England were decided by an assembly with an overwhelming predominance of country clergy. On the night of Monday to Tuesday it was before this jury of local party- secretaries, aflame with the party's " doctrine," but with very little experience of political responsibility, that the leaders of the party had to debate the question of participation in the Cabinet that M. Chautemps was trying to form.

The whole strength of the Socialist Party rests on the faith of the voter (whereas that of the Radical Party might almost be said to rest on his scepticism). It is extremely difficult for leading Socialists ever to criticise the activities of the labour side in any dispute without coming into dangerous conflict with this religious faith. Further, there is the danger of Communist rivalry to be considered. The Communists are considered by the Socialists as errant brothers, and they resent bitterly any attempt of other parties to make use of Socialist-Communist differences. The French Socialists, it must be remembered, include elements as moderate as any in the British Labour Party and such firebrands as M. Marceau Pivert, who declared at the Socialist National Council in the small hours of Tuesday morning, " It is dan- gerous to pursue a policy of social peace."

• The Communist Party is now following a policy of well- disciplined and perfectly unscrupulous opportunism. It desires only enough revolutionary ferment to maintain the party's enthusiasm,-but it never hesitates to associate itself with the revolutionary elements at work outside the party, in order to prevent a new left-wing revolutionary party from coming into being, or else to do harm to the Socialists. One of the Socialists' principal motives for keeping the Communists inside the majority and for wishing to introduce them into the Government itself is the fear of what the Communists may do, if they are entirely untrammelled by responsibility. While many Socialists and Radicals have worked together with complete confidence in each others' loyalty, it is doubtful if any of the leading Socialists or Radicals have had real confidence at any moment in the loyalty of any but perhaps one of the leading Communists.

The Chautemps Cabinet which fell when parliament met in January was nominally the exponent of the same creed as that presided over by M. Blum. Its members, however, ranged from M. Bonnet, the representative of conservative business interests and championed by the right Press (of which he made considerable use for his own purposes), to Socialists, whose iuGlinations had at least a revolutionary tinge. It claimed the support of the Communist party.

M. Bonnet had to masquerade as a sympathiser with left- - wing democracy. Communist and Socialist back-benchers were asked to look as nearly as possible like supporters of • conservative interests. Outside the chamber the extremer trade union elements which had disliked M. Blunes mixed team were scornful and disrespectful. The strain on every- one's tempers was naturally very great.

M. Chautemps long before Christmas was notoriously dis- satisfied with the amount of support he was getting from the left wing of his Government in dealing with illegal strike tactics. On his right wing he had to fear the ambitions of his own colleague M. Bonnet, who saw himself in the role of a Poincare restoring the franc and bringing back prosperity to a conser- vative France.

Throughout the last weeks of 1937 M. Chautemps found himself called upon to devote most of his energies to settling labour disputes which broke out often on very petty issues, but were conducted in such a manner as to raise questions of prin- ciple between employer and employed. On more than one occasion France seemed on the brink of very widespread labour troubles, although the element anxious for a renewal of the strike-waves of 1936 was not a very large proportion of the working class. The steady rise in prices, however, main- tained a state of general discontent in many industries.

This trouble appeared to have died down, at least momen- tarily, shortly after the New Year, but it left a feeling of fatigue and anxiety, above all a feeling that there was still too much mutual distrust, even too little desire to reach an agreement between important elements in the employers' and in the labour organisations, for the necessary adaptation of the .country's economic organisation to pressing requirements. The authority of the State was still insufficient to compel agreement between the rival elements. The new Italian naval programme, which must almost inevitably be followed by increased expenditure on the French navy, helped to under- mine the rather artificial optimism about French finances that M. Bonnet's Ministry had been cultivating at the end of December.

M. Bonnet had told the nation that the Treasury would still have eight milliards at its disposal for the New Year ; this plgasant-sounding statement in fact meant that the Treasury was about to borrow substantially from the Bank of France, reducing still further the margin of the interest-free overdraft allowed to the State under M. Bonnet's agreement with the Bank of last July.

It was in this atmosphere that M. Chautemps, obviously a very tired man, attempted last week the difficult operation of shifting the majority in the Chamber (with or without a change of Government) further to the Right, so as to release himself or his successors from dependence on the Communist vote. The wisdom of this move may be doubted. Its 'execu- tion was certainly poor, far below M. Chautemps's usual level of parliamentary skill.

So far the consequence has been to embitter to such a degree relations between the parties of the Front Poputaire that it is in danger of becoming an out-of-date label before the country has become ripe for the political coalition on a larger scale that M. Blum attempted to bring about on Sunday. Reasonable opinion on the Left has been rendered very suspicious by the refusal of the employers to take part in M. Chautemps's proposed round-table conference on social legislation, and the apparent indifference of a large section of conservative France to the very grave charges made against Fascist conspirators by M. Maru Dormoy, the Socialist

Minister of the Interior. M. Chautemps has not criticised the employers for their attitude. The suspicion is widespread on the Left that the crisis was .engineered on the Right to get M. Dormoy out of his Ministry before he had made further revelations.

The situation has become clearer at the cost of more strained tempers and jagged edges, but the French parliamentarians

with all their shortcomings have at least produced a pro-

visional Cabinet for the difficult transition period before the country. M. Herriot's speech on taking office as re-elected

Speaker and its passionately enthusiastic reception (on the day on which the crisis broke out) is proof how strong is the desire of Frenchmen .of all parties, in spite of sectarian bitterness, to find again a basis for nation-wide co-operation.