THE FUTURE OF SWITZERLAND.

(To TH2 EDITOR OF TIM .SPZOn.701t."] Sin,—When the French under Napoleon endeavoured to outflank Central Europe, from 1798 to 1813, yid Switzerland and the Alps, they signally failed in the end because they used brute force and roused the Swiss to such resentment that their historical hostility to the Holy Roman Empire was transformed into hostility to France.

The modern German Empire, under the Prussian eagle, has followed a very different policy. It is well known that when war broke out in 1870 between the third Napoleon and Prussia the sympathies of the French-speaking and Protestant cantons along the French border were not with the French colours. The King of Prussia had previously yielded an important political point to the Swiss in 1857. On the other hand, Napoleon III. had broken faith with them in 1860 when he annexed Northern Savoy to his Empire—a direct menace to the independence of Geneva, very sensitive on that point, as it had been annexed to France by force from 1798 to 1814. On the contrary, the first step of the present German Emperor in foreign polities was to " kick " Bismarck for threatening Switzerland in the Wohlgemuth affair. He has been consistent ever since in his friendliness towards the Swiss, sided with them in the Silvestrelli affair against Italy, visited their army, won golden opinions among its officers, subscribed freely to the international monument to the Reformation heroes now in course of erection at Geneva, and by the use of correct diplomacy and economic policy brought the Swiss Parliament to ratify a Convention for a sort of joint Germano-Swiss tariff on the Swiss State railways. The situation is one that should be attended to. The Swiss have much to gain economically and politically by an associa- tion with Germany that respects their independence at home. The German Emperor, too, knows that an Empire with one of its poles in Prussia and the other resting on the Alps would be =challengeable elsewhere than on the open sea.

It thus appears that Britain should be watchful. She alone can do so with the full concurrence of the Swiss, as her insular position puts out of the question any wish on her part to encroach territorially or economically upon Switzerland, while Germany, Italy, and France undoubtedly press upon the Swiss border by the influx of their subjects into a country in many ways more attractive than their own. The trend of history may be consulted here. In 1782 the people of Geneva called out for help from Britain against France and the kings of the House of Savoy. Fox let it be known that the English Ministry could no more assist the little Republic than if it had been in the moon. It in true that at that time the failure of the American War was humbling England before France. But the sympathies of both Whigs and Tories went to the Swiss, not only then, but throughout their struggle to protect their independence against Revolu- tionary and Napoleonic France.

It was the time when Shelburne and Rockingham had no more faithful advisers in the shaping of the modern Whig policy than the Genevese. Prevost, who held a command in the American War, and Haldimand, a Governor-General in Canada, were Swiss; and how many minor officers might not be mentioned who fought England's battles in the Peninsula, in the Mediterranean, and at Waterloo? Napoleon used to say that Geneva was the rallying-point of the English on the Continent, and indeed, till long after his disappearance from the scene, Geneva served as an intellectual and literary centre for the diffusion of English ideas through the medium of the French language.

At that time, and till the days of Napoleon III, it was England that stood as a political link between the Swiss democracies and the reactionary monarchies of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, with which the island kingdom and the Alpine Confederation had paradoxically, but from sheer necessity, stood shoulder to shoulder, in order to rescue national liberty from the clutches of Napoleon.

In 1814. 1815, at Paris and at Vienna, the Powers felt that they must ensure against one another the independence of Switzerland, as a guarantee of peace among themselves. The temptation to outflank one another must be removed from all. And so Britain, though it then appeared only morally interested in the declaration of Switzerland's neutrality, became a party to the agreement of the Great Powers.

When we say " morally " we understate the case. Even England had learnt by 1815 that she must cease taking no more interest in the fortunes of Switzerland than in the moon. Had Napoleon been able to depend on an Italian fleet when he controlled that peninsula from the top of the St. Bernard and Simplon passes, both on the Swiss Alps, well ... what about the Mediterranean?

The interest of Britain in the neutrality of Switzerland could, however, remain quiescent as long as nothing happened on its borders to disturb the balance of power. But in 1860 Britain missed a grand opportunity of strengthening that neutrality compared with the risks it ran from the deal between Napoleon ilL and the new kingdom of Italy. The neutrality of Northern Savoy and its military occupation by the Swiss at their option were provided for in the Treaties of Vienna. But when Northern Savoy was incorporated as a French di3p. artenzent, the ability of Switzerland to enforce its treaty-right became most shadowy. It was quite within the power of the English Ministry to force upon the French Government a formal renunciation of Northern Savoy. This was not done, and now the rights of Switzerland upon Northern Savoy do not depend on herself so much as on the Powers which are most interested in upholding Switzerland against France for their own sake, principally Germany. It would have been wiser to provide for an independent exercise of Switzerland's treaty-right to the occupation of Northern Savoy on certain contingencies. Had Britain, as a signatory to the Treaties of Vienna, seen to this in 1860, a cause of mistrust would have been removed as between the French- speaking Cantons and France. There is now a Swiss fortress with its guns trained upon the passes leading from Savoy into Canton Valais.

At the other end of the Swiss line of defence against Franc% German guns and forts cover Basle. The Swiss would rather it was not so. They acknowledge that the letter of the Treaties of Vienna may be invoked against this too. But they know that to each of the Powers must be left the care of its own interest in the neutrality of Switzerland.

It is our purpose—and, we believe, our most timely purpose—to show that the importance of Swim indepeedeai neutrality has become greater to Britain in proportion to the development of Germany, Austria, and Italy as naval Powers. Should the neutrality of Switzerland be shown to depend on its geographical and economic relation

to those Powers, its military forces may have to be looked upon in the same light as those of Bavaria before the Franco- Prussian conflict in 1870-71. It is possible that, without its having been made very apparent to the world, and even without any particular consciousness in the Swiss, their country now stands in the same relation to the German Empire as the Southern German States did to Prussia. The more the Germans are able to show that their expansion is favourably received by, and useful to, Switzerland, the less confidence will the French have in the issue of a fresh conflict with Germany, and circumstances may be conceived in which Switzerland might be expected to make that point clear to the Preach. In that case the French would certainly not punish Switzerland, and from that moment it is diffieult to say that German preponderance would not be complete. A Switzer- land under German influence would make Italy's military position, as against Austria, quite hopeless, and would secure to the full for the two northern Powers the advantages of her naval position in and across the Mediterranean.

That is how things may stand in the next generation, and they seem to imply that the British key to the Mediterranean is gradually being transferred from Gibraltar to the St Gothard and Simplon region. Now how is Britain to meet the case P Does she possess, to impress the Swiss, any means comparable to those of Germany!' Now would be the time to bring them into play, for the Swiss do still prefer their inde- pendence to any political or economic prize they might be offered in exchange.

There are in Switzerland fifteen foreigners to every eighty- five native-born Switzers. The proportion is extraordinary, and before many years have passed thirty out of every hundred inhabitants are sure to be non-Swiss. Strange to say, the Germans alone are of some real account Should Canton Ticino be overrun by Italian immigrants, a cession of that Canton to Italy is out of the question, because contrary to German interests. Should Geneva count to-morrow more French than Swiss, for the same reason it must remain Swiss. Of those colonies, the German alone has real business, wealth, and influence. That of England is small, and consists almost exclusively of idlers on the banks of Lake Leman. The Italians are confined to the inferior branches of the building trade. The French are petits boutigaiers. There is a lot of French money invested in Swiss loans and in house property, but, as compared with German capital, it seems to carry no political weight.

The English are apt to overrate the importance to Switzer- buld of their patronage as tourists. They rank after the Germans, French, and Americans. Besides, tourists convey neither personal nor national magnetism.

Yet it is still quite within the bounds of posssibility for Britain to regain the position it held in the hearts and interests of the Swiss, after Waterloo, for some fifty years. The way to this would be—multiply the business connexions; invest English money in the Swiss railways; miss no oppor- tunity of joining the peasantry in friendly rivalry in rifle shooting at the butts ; and, most of all, let British diplomacy make it perfectly plain that, while Germany upholds the territoria/ integrity of Switzerland as excellent German policy, the independence of the Swiss is a permanent, perhaps the most essential, British interest on the Continent.

Should Switzerland ever go over to the Triple Alliance the balance of power may be so spoilt that no Western Power may care to go to war to restore it —I am, Sir, dec., F. F. ROOST.

[We publish Professor Roget's interesting letter, but we must not be held to adopt his conclusions—except in the matter of closer friendship with the Swiss. Happily, the feeling of admiration and sympathy for the Republic already goes very deep among Englishmen. How deep that feeling is would surprise the Continent were an attempt made to mutilate the Helvetian Confederation.—En. Spectator.]