TOPICS OF THE DAY.
PEACE AND THE REFERENDUM.
lk /R. BOMAR LAW, on behalf of the Unionist Party, _al has made an offer to Mr. Asquith which, if accepted, would not only save us from the immediate peril of civil war, but would provide a temporary Battlement, and perhaps the only settlement possible, of the Home Rule problem. If Mr. Asquith and the Liberals finally reject that offer, then they will have told us in unmistakable terms that they prefer civil war to ascertaining the will of the nation by a direct vote. Happily it is just possible to say that Mr. Asquith has not absolutely and finally rejected the offer. He has, however, gone so near rejection that, unless the moderate men in his party use their influence in the cause of peace, final rejection of the Referendum proposal is, we fear, certain. A great responsibility remains upon those Liberals, and we are sure they are many, who in their hearts regard the proposal to refer the matter to the final arbitrament of the electors as sound and reasonable and offering the only prospect of peace still open. Every way out but a Poll of the People has been rejected. That still remains. To the Liberal moderates, the men who, if Mr. Asquith had closed with Mr. Boner Law's offer, would have felt an intense sense of relief, we appeal. No doubt they are a minority, but they are a minority powerful enough to make their influence prevail if they will only rouse themselves to action. We admit we are asking much. It is always a painful and thankless task for men to differ from their leaders and from the majority of their party, and to exercise pressure against the will of that majority. It exposes those who, for other reasons, may be extremely anxious to be regarded as good party men, and who are in fact good party men, to the charge of having lost faith and heart, of having gone over to the enemy, of cowardice, and of want of stability. Again, the moderate minority are always inclined to think that they are too weak and, impotent to take action, and that nothing they can do will affect the issue. Yet, as a matter of fact, these pleas of impotence are ill-founded. In moments like the present the moderate minority, instead of being impotent, are all-powerful. If they will only have the courage and the patriotism to exercise their influence, it will prevail. If the Referendum proposal fails, it is agreed on all hands that there is nothing before the country but bloodshed and civil war, which may very easily spread—perhaps we may say will be certain to spread—from Ireland to this country. But the Government can only face the coercion of Ulster if they have behind them an absolutely united party. This means that the refusal to consult the people by a Referendum could not be sustained if a dozen Liberal Members of Parliament, backed by a group of prominent Liberals outside, were to tell the Prime Minister that he must use the coercion of the popular vote before he uses the coercion of the rifle, the machine-gun, and the 18-pounder. For that is the real issue. Whatever the Ulstermen may say now in hot blood, it is absolutely certain that, if the Bill were referred to the country and adopted by the country, all risk of serious resistance in Ulster would cease. If they can show that they have the people behind them, the Government have an instrument for coercing Ulster infinitely more potent than a million of soldiers. The moderates in the Liberal Party have only to tell Mr. Asquith : "You must use this instrument. If you do not, we cannot support you," and that instrument will be used. Up till now it might have been urged by Mr. Asquith that it was useless to appeal to the country because, even if the decision were favourable to Home Rule, there would still be civil war. That cannot be said now. The Unionist Party have not merely agreed to withdraw all active opposition should the people decide against the Union, but have agreed that the Government would then be justified in using coercion. Further, it is plain from Sir Edward Carson's demand for "a firm offer" that, if the Government expressed their willingness to abide by the will of the people, so would the Ulstermen. Once again, then, let us make our appeal to the moderate Liberals. If a dozen Liberal Members of Parliament would get together and insist upon the Referendum, or, if they prefer it, upon the acceptance of Mr. Pirie's plan, which has also had the approval of Sir Edward Carson, there would be no civil war. Again, if in every constituency represented by a Liberal a dozen moderate men would meet and sign a letter to their Member asking for the Referendum, there would be peace. All that is needed is for one or two moderate Liberals to take action and give a lead. We are certain that if they were to do so their example would instantly be followed, and the situation would be saved. Those who at heart agree with us, but who do not take action, will have a terrible respon- sibility upon them. When we appeal thus to Liberals we are not advising action which has not been taken in the Unionist Party. Let noone suppose that the Unionists adopted the line of policy set forth by Mr. Boma. Law on Thursday night without the influence of the moderates being exercised. It is not too much to say that the Unionist Party has in the last few days been controlled by the action of the moderates, though such action exposed them to many risks. Why cannot the moderates in the Liberal Party do their part also? Are they afraid of being called trimmers ? No doubt they will be so described by men of narrow minds and cold hearts, and yet, in truth, honest men may glory in the name. After all, when a. boat is in peril of upsetting, who is the wise man—the man who throws his weight to the other side and trims the boat, or be who is too full of folly or of passion to care for a true balance ?
Lest those Liberals to whom we are appealing should have failed to realize how great and far-reaching is Mr. Boner Law's offer, we may set it forth in plain language. It means, in the first place, that the Unionist Party is prepared for absolute and complete abandonment of opposition to the Homo Rule Bill if a bare majority of the electors at a Referendum are in favour of that Bill. In that case, they will be pledged in honour not merely to "sombre acquiescence," but to do their best to get the Protestants of the North of Ireland not to oppose the Bill by force. Remember, too, that if the question is decided in this way, the Government will lose none of their other measures. It will be perfectly competent for them to remain in office and to pass under the Parliament Act not only the Welsh Bill but the Plural Voting Bill, and to carry out their scheme of House of Lords reform. Again, we must remember that the Opposition have made no attempt to get the Bill before the country in the way most favourable to themselves—that is, in its present form and without the Exclusion clauses. The Bill will be sent to the country with the safety-valve added, and therefore in a shape far more likely to be accepted than if it offered no compromise to the Ulstermen. [What no doubt would happen if a Referendum were agreed to would be that the present Bill, pins the clauses embodying the Government suggestions, would be passed by both Houses exactly in the form desired by the Government, and a clause would be added declaring that the Bill should not be presented for the Royal Assent till a Poll of the People had been taken in favour of the Bill.] Thus the Opposition have placed themselves unreservedly in the hands of the electors. If the vote goes against them, they have parted with the tremendous opportunities for turning out the Government which admittedly would occur if the Government were to enter upon the task of coercing Ulster, with not a unanimous but a divided nation behind them. The Opposition by agreeing to a Referendum in this particular form have, in fact, thrown away the weapon which might have proved fatal to the Government—the weapon of resisting the coercion in Ulster in detail. Does anyone suppose that an Opposi- tion fiercely keen to turn out the Government, as are the present Opposition on grounds which have nothing to do with Ireland, would lightly hare agreed to run the risk of an unfavourable decision ? "Why, then, did they agree ? " it will be asked. They agreed because they are willing to make a great sacrifice of party advantage in order to prevent bloodshed. That is the simple truth. Why should not Liberals be willing to make a similar sacrifice ? Once more, how can they refuse to use the coercion of the ballot-paper rather than the coercion of the bayonet ? That is the question which ie before the country, the question which clamour's for an answer—the question which, if it is not answered, will haunt the Government and the Liberal Party for all time.
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