MARGINAL COMMENT
By HAROLD NICOLSON
AMONG the many devices by which the Axis propaganda machines have sought to distract attention from their African disaster has been an attempt to represent the British public as surrendering to hysterical and undignified jubilation. " The English," they write, " have gone drunk with victory." This is an untruth. Our people have accepted our Carthaginian triumph with calm thankfulness ; their mood has been one of modesty, moderation and self-control. They have, of course, been astonished by the suddenness and magnitude of the German collapse ; they have dis- covered with surprise and pleasure that we possess two first-class armies, and that the Sixth Armoured Division has proved itself a worthy rival of the famous Seventh. They are relieved that the prestige of the British private soldier, the brilliance of our leadership, has been enhanced and confirmed by this fine feat of war. But if anything they have under-estimated rather than over-estimated the consequences of the Tunisian campaign. Their prudent attitude is dictated mainly by a wise expectation that there are even harder struggles to come. They know that at any moment our Russian Allies may be exposed to a strain even more terrible than those which they have withstood in the past. And they know that when we come to assail the fortress of Europe we shall have to face many ordeals and many disappointments. Yet the fact remains that the British public, while realising the strategic implications of this Punic war, have not fully grasped its immense political significance. They under-estimate the effect which it will have on public opinion in Germany, in Italy and in occupied Europe.
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It has been a delight to me to watch during these historic weeks the really remarkable incompetence with which Doctor Goebbels has handled his home front. Up to the very last second the German public were left under the impression that by superior strategic ability von Arnim had manoeuvred Alexander into a position of great difficulty. They were assured that, owing to the elasticity of the German defence, the American and British forces would be exposed to an unfavourable strategic position and faced with the formidable quadrilateral of Bizerta, Tunis, Zaehouan and Hammamet. The folly of Dr. Goebbels' method can be illustrated by quotation. On the day, for instance, when- the spear-heads of the Allied Nations had dislocated the whole Axis front, the German Information Service (the D.N.B.) asserted that, " thanks to their mobile tactics, the Axis troops succeeded in the course of yesterday's fighting in splitting up the total area of the battle into individual sectors." On the following day, when Tunis and Bizerta had already fallen, it was claimed that " the resistance of the Axis is unshaken." When the surrender of Tunis was eventually announced, German listeners were comforted by the assurance that " new defensive positions have, been built up, based upon the unshaken southern front." Even when the Sixth Armoured Division had fought and
won the amazing battle of Hamman Lif—at a moment, that is, when it must have been known in Berlin that all was over—the German public were informed that " Allied attempts to open the roads leading to the Cape Boa peninsula have ended in a bloody reverse." Even when the Sixth had reached Hammamet, and thus closed all chance of escape, the D.N.B. asserted blandly that " the Tunisian situation has not essentially changed." It was thus that the full magnitude of the disaster, the full horror of the surrender of adulated armies and famous generals, broke upon a public wholly unprepared. How are we to account for such ineptitude?
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It is evident that Dr. Goebbels had not foreseen that the collapse would be so sudden. He had been assured by the High Command that• the Hamman Lif position was unassailable, and that he would have a fortnight to three weeks in which to build up the saga of the heroes of Cape Bon. The break-through of the Sixth Armoured Division, as von Broich bas admitted, took the Germans completely by surprise. And the Ministry of Enlightenment and Propaganda were deprived of the days upon which they had counted to prepare
and soften the blow. The shock to German- opinion has been terribl They have to bemoan not'merely the discomfiture of such natio idols as the Afrika Korps and the Hermann Goering Division, b the ' destruction of a legend. Again and again had they be assured that the U-Boats would prevent all but a tiny trickle Americans and their equipment reaching the shores of Africa. Th had been assured that the Luftwaffe, from its bases in Sicily an Sardinia, was master of any situation which might arise. They ha been assured that British naval power was a myth dating from th nineteenth century. And within an .hour they learnt that all the; things were lies.
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-However disturbing will be the effect of the Tunisian catastroph on German opinion, the effect in Italy will be infinitely mo immediate and profound. The Germans feel that they have I an outer bastion in circumstances of some -humiliation ; they do n feel, however, that their inner fortress is directly menaced. Italians know that at any moment some frightful blow may dealt them from sea or sky. The Italian Senate, at its six-ho session last Friday, was not accorded any very comforting assuranc by the Service chiefs. The Italians know• that their air-force ha been outclassed, that their navy has lost command of the Itali seas, and that more than half of their army is either annihilated o dispersed away from home. They are aware that their German alli will have many other preoccupations to face during the comin months, and may well be unable to afford the assistance on whit in the last resort, they had counted with confidence. They kno that large sections of the Italian people are tired of the war, an that with the expected increase of aerial bombardment dissatisfactio will become wide and deep. Invariably in her hours of dange Italy turns to the Hbuse of Savoy ; and it is significant that a 1 Sunday last the Rome wireless reported that Tullio Ciane Minister of Corporations, had appealed to the Italian people to rall f2 not merely around the fasces, but around " the escutcheon of Savoy. LI It is, in fact, quite possible that King Victor Emmanuel, who is known to have from the first been bitterly opposed to the war may emerge from his retirement and resume control. It is qui possible that Mussolini may realise that it is in his country's interes that he should now retire from the scene. We may well be fac suddenly with the fall of the Fascist dictatorship and the creatio in Italy of a liberal Government under the aegis of the Royal Hou
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Mr. Walter Lippmann, I observe, foreseeing some such develo ment, suggests that the United Nations should now indicate to Ital if their readiness to discuss a separate peace. We may be certain tha the two great leaders now in conference in Washington are full aware of the present opportunity and its implications. But Ital cannot expect to slink out of the war as easily as she slunk into i The British people have no hostility towards the Italian people. Th British soldier knOws that the Italian, when rightly led, makes sturdy fighter. The First Italian Army in the last stages of th Tunisian campaign displayed a tenacity greater even than tha which the Afrika Korps can boast. Individual Italians during war have performed feats of heroism and skill worthy of the grea deed of Paulucci in the First War .when he sank the Austri Viribus Unitis' Yet although Italy has no cause to feel asham of her soldiers, she has every cause to feel ashamed of her politician There is no important treaty which Italy has signed since z88 which she has not sought either to repudiate or to evade. Th World has not forgotten Ouchy, or Corfu, or the Dodecanese, Albania, or Abyssinia. We have not forgotten the scavenger atta on France. Had Mussolini's fantastic gamble succeeded, the,Italia people would have gladly raked in the gains ; now that it has faile they also must share the loss. Italy entered this war gratuitously she cannot creep out of it without forfeits. To humiliate or t punish the Italian people would be ungenerous ; to appease the at this juncture would assuredly be unnecessary and unwise.
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