THE APPOINTMENT OF BAKER PASHA.
UNLESS we mistake the symptoms greatly, her Majesty's Government have made a muddle of their recent effort at Constantinople. They certainly exerted great pressure there, and they certainly have obtained very little result. All these assertions and denials about the Fleet, and the orders given to it, or the hints Bent out to it to be ready, and its destina- tion, matter in reality exceedingly little, though they, of course, make effective debate in Parliament very difficult in- deed. It remains clear that Sir Henry Layard, who has hitherto endeavoured to conciliate the Sultan, and so secure to his side the only permanent authority in Constantinople, recently turned round and tried to frighten that "Prince of excellent intentions" into parting with a portion of his power. He asked that Asia Minor should be organised on European ideas, and hinted that the new Ministry had better go. Whether he summoned the Fleet, or whether he only intimated that the Fleet might be summoned, or whether he smiled at a report that the Fleet was comin g, does not greatly matter, for obviously the result was that the Sultan was alarmed, and that, after one of the usual complicated intrigues, in which the representatives of the "Powers" appear, disappear, and reappear in incomprehensible attitudes, he retained his Ministry, but promised to give way about the "reforms." There should be reforms in European Turkey, or at least the Governors should be asked to consider a plan forwarded to them from Constantinople ; and when they had reported, which will be the day after the Greek Kalends, then the Sultan would most laboriously consider their report. Moreover, a decree should be issued by-and-by rearranging the "responsibility of Ministers," a delightful phrase which, as the Sultan only exists by the support of armed Mussulmans' and they take their views from the Ulema, and the Ulema have only just decided, and rightly decided, that under the Sacred Law the Vicegerent of the Prophet must be absolute, will be interpreted to mean their responsibility to the Sultan, a re- sponsibility more than sufficient already. And finally, as to Asia Minor, as something real must appear to be done, Baker Pasha should be appointed "representative of the Sultan" in regard to reforms. He has accordingly been appointed, and has started at once to go somewhere.
Now, what does all this mean ? We believe it means that the British Government, alarmed by all they hear from Constantinople, have made, after their method, another feebly showy effort to amend matters. They do not wish that an explosion should occur, the result of which no one can foresee' and they believe an explosion to be very near at hand. Within the last few months, matters have gone from bad to worse in Turkey, till it is hardly possible to exaggerate the blackness of the situation. The cash revenue, a very different thing from the nominal revenue, has been anticipated and pledged and intercepted on its way, till the sum forthcoming for the daily wants of the central Adminis- tration is not sufficient for the most ordinary expenses. Nobody is paid, except a few Pashas strong enough, like Osman Pasha, to issue orders of their own, and execute them if they are defied. Even the Palace feels bitterly the pinch of the times. The story of one correspondent about the Sultan's butcher having struck for cash would be incredible, but that local bankers tell stories indicating yet deeper straits within the Imperial household. It has come to this,—that the Khalif himself is borrowing in hundreds, and can hardly get them. The civil servants, a few foreigners excepted, are unpaid. The officers and men, outside a small body who act as the Sultan's bodyguard, are unpaid. Even the contractors for supplies are unpaid, till the garrison of Constantinople has insufficient food and no new clothes, and till nothing but the wonderful patience which Mahommedan soldiers sometimes display under pressure, when it does not affront their pride, prevents a revolution. This patience may give way at any moment, and consequences may follow—such, for instance, as the supersession of the dynasty, or its flight from Constantinople—which many Governments, especially that of Great Britain, regard with acute dread. It might be neces- sary at any moment to settle the central "Eastern Question " —that is, the ownership of Constantinople—without 50,000 English troops to send there, or anywhere else,to give effect to British policy. If a catastrophe is to be staved off, money must be found, and it cannot be found if the Sultan will do
nothing to restore his own credit, and keep the growing anarchy within bounds. He must, therefore, in his own interest, be compelled to yield ; and the British Government has therefore sanctioned pressure, the nature of which is still indefinite, but which it, at all events, hoped would prove sufficient to extort one definite thing, the direct application of European energy to restore order in the revenue-yielding section of Asiatic Turkey. So far, the action of the Government, though, in our judg- ment, most unwise, the only hope for Turkey being revolution, is at least intelligible, and from Lord Beaconsfield's point of view defensible by argument. He is trying to prevent anarchy, which is always a bad thing ; and to secure the fulfilment of promises, which is usually a good thing. There is no objec- tion to that, except in the minds of those who, like our- selves, think that the condition of improvement in Eastern Europe is that the Sultanet should disappear ; but then comes the question of the means. And here the British Government and Sir Henry Layard seem to us to have been unusually weak. They are not prepared for radical measures —such, for example, as the astounding decree just issued in Cairo, making two foreign employs virtually sovereigns of Egypt—or for nominating a Sultan, or for insisting, under penalty of shells, that Abdul Hanyid shall appoint a Grand Vizier, limit himself to an allowance, and leave his Minister to restore order, if he can. Nor are they prepared to place each province under a competent "-Khedive," a Prince who, though nominally subordinate, shall really be independent in internal affairs. They are obliged, or think themselves obliged, to adopt some milder expedient, and naturally, not being original men, they fall back on expedients suggested by their experience of India. Sir Henry Layard, if he is sincere, which in this matter he very well may be, is obviously trying to get some Englishman placed in a position in which he can manage or drive the Pashas in Asia, as a Resident in an Indian protected State manages or drives his Prince and the native administration. He cannot be Resident himself, because there are so many Ambassadors in Constantinople, and the Palace is so difficult to manage ; but a great European in the interior, once trusted by the Sultan, might assume very nearly that position, and produce, by advice, worry, and threats to the executive Pashas, some endurable sort of order.
Why Sir Henry should think Baker Pasha competent to fill such a post, we have no means of discovering. It seems a very weak choice. That officer, wholly apart from the circum- stances under which he quitted England, has shown no politi- cal aptitude, knows nothing of finance, and has entirely failed in inducing Turkish Pashas to let him do his nominal work of organising a gendarmerie. He has no particular ability, except for organising cavalry, and none of the personal magic
which Gordon Pasha derives from his splendid disinterested-,
nese. With so many men available, such a choice seems in itself a fantasy or a job ; but, of course, it is conceivable that Sir Henry Layard bad a reason founded on some knowledge that Baker Pasha would be, of all men, least obnoxious to the Palace, or the governing influences at the Porte. At all events, he pressed him forward, and as a result, Baker Pasha is, according to Reuter, to occupy in Asia Minor the position that Safvet Pasha occupies in the Turkish Empire,
representative of the Sultan. as regards reforms. What
is the good of that If, indeed, Baker Pasha were to be in reality, irremovable Viceroy, then a precedent would have been set of great importance ; but we know that the Sultan in his decree has carefully guarded himself against giving direct executive power, and that the Porte will not surrender its higher patronage, and consequently the new reformer will be nothing but a new Reporter- General. Let us suppose him to try to do his duty as hard as he can, and still, in that vast region, what can he accomplish ? The Sultan will not sincerely help him, unless he sends in great sums, which he has no means of raising, for
the local Treasuries are drained, and Constantinople, we may be sure, has not parted with its right of seizing all cash that is obtainable. The Pashas will be so jealous of him, that he- will be thwarted in every possible way. The armed mob will- hate him, and probably rise on him as an interfering Infidel. The,
soldiery, who alone might accept his orders—and that is doubt- ful, no European not a renegade having long been obeyed.by Tur- kish officers—are unpaid, unprovicled, and living on the people. He will be mot at every turn by excuses, and if he removes the refractory, will be told that he is to control reforms, but not the executive Pashas. He will be able to do nothing, except, perhaps, keep some small district; which he can tra- verse himself with a personal guard of horsemen, decently quiet. The Resident succeeds sometimes in India—not by any means always, as witness Baroda—because he has no details to manage, because he has behind him irresistible force, and because — what is the forgotten feature in the system—he is usually on very good terms with the native Vizier, who may want a fortune, but does not want anarchy, is usually able, and is often delighted to use the dreaded European as the Mr. Jorkins of the governing establishment. Baker Pasha, Reformer-General of Asia Minor, will have a Sultan behind him instead of a Viceroy, no irresistible power in the background, and every official a determinet1. and unscru- pulous enemy. These officials are not all bad, but those among them who are good are Mussulmans of the class most impatient of European influence. Nothing will be accomplished, or even so far appear to be accomplished as to encourage financiers to "rescue Turkey," and the central danger will be left exactly as it was. Nothing valid will have been done even for a province, and nothing attempted at Con- stantinople, where lies the true seat of the mischief, and where, we believe, matters are passing rapidly beyond hope, even from the rise of a strong Sultan. Even he could now only enable his government to perish honourably. The forces assembled at Constantinople are too great, their rivalries are too keen, their interests are too vitally involved, for any modern Sultan to master them all, and his Pashas and his people and his soldiery all together. After all, he could only rely on a Mahommedan revival, and Europe would not bear that. There is, however, no chance of a strong Sultan of the race of .0thraan ; any Sultan outside that race would be a pretender ; and no European Vizier would be tolerated for an hour. 'There is no hope for Turkey, or in Turkey,—not even the -slightly grotesque and cynical one that Baker Pasha might ;possibly regenerate the Empire.
Previous page
