TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE ARMIES IN THE CRIMEA.
TICE position of the belligerents in the Crimea is one of peculiar in- terest, big with results even more considerable than the taking of the South side of the harbour of Sebastopol ; critical for the Allies, more critical for the enemy, involving the fate of large armies, and possibly the conquest of the peninsula. It is not, perhaps, in the power of any writer at a distance from the scene of war, and of few near at hand, to estimate exactly the advantages and disad- vantages of either side. If he possesses the requisite capacity to form a reasonable judgment, it is most likely that he does not possess the requisite information. And then, war is so supremely the sport of Fortune—there are always so many elements which cannot be foreseen, so many influences at work whose strength cannot be calculated—that the best-informed and greatest capaci- ties are sure sometimes to err. Nothing, therefore, is now or can be offered to our readers, beyond some elucidation of those broad facts which are known to all.
The effect of the campaign of 1855 has been to circumscribe, not only the area open to Russian operations, but to reduce and cut off the very sources whence the army derived a large portion of its supplies. By occupying the line of the Tchernaya, and holding the Beide!. Valley as a foraging-ground, the Allies de- prived the enemy of a galling position on their flank ; and what the enemy thereby lost in fodder for his cattle and free scope for his troops we gained. By the seizure of the Straits of Kertch, by the hostilities in the Sea of Azoff, including the destruction of the bridges connecting the Spit of Arabat with Southern Russia, the enemy was deprived of the nearest and best route by which he -received all kinds of provisions and even munitions of war. At the end of June, instead of four lines of communication with the -resources of Southern Russia there only remained two in the hands of the enemy—the road by Perekop, and the road by the 'Tchongar Bridge over the Putrid Sea. For the last three months, every man, every ounce of food, and every grain of gunpowder, brought into the Crimea, must have reached Sebastopol by one of these roads. By the reduction of the South side, the Russians have been deprived of the strongest position in the Crimea, and have been driven to rely for defence upon such resources as may be availabla in the open field. And what the enemy lost the Allies gained. Every month enabled them to give freer play to their great forces ; every day developed instead of contracting their resources ; and finally, on the 9th September, the whole army was set at liberty from a deadly strife, and it 'gained not only a vast relief from an exhausting toil but a great victory.
Yesterday the conflict was for Sebastopol ; today it is for the Crimea. Although deprived of the former, the foe has not yet yielded up the latter. The grand Russian position in the Crimea has lost its distinctive characteristic—that of being a position comprising a fortified town astride of an arm of the sea, whereon, • until the 12th September, floated ships of war. It has now be- collie an ordinary strong position, intrenched, containing forts, mid occupied by an army ; but having this peculiarity, that it is only strong in front, not also in the rear; having this disadvan- tage, that it requires a whole army to defend it, so long is the line, so extensive are the works. Yet this strong front is posi- tively all that stands between the Allies and the conquest of the Crimea.
While the enemy held the town of Sebastopol and its suburb, the Allies were compelled to divide their attention between watch- ing the external army and prosecuting the siege. How different • is the situation now ! The sea is free to them, and they are free to move a great part of their force by sea to any point of the coast of the peninsula. They may choose either the South or the West coast—either Kaffa or Old Fort—for from both it would be pos- sible to threaten Simpheropol; and that power which can securely hold Simpheropol and keep up its communication with the sea is master of the Crimea. Assuming, therefore, that the Russian po- sition is impregnable from the South, it is indefensible if threat- ened from the North. An intrenched camp, be it ever so strong, from which there are only two outlets, and both those outlets blocked up by the enemy, is virtually captured.
Looking on the surface of the game, and as far beneath it as possible it seems to follow from what we have stated, that the Allies have it in their power to terminate the campaign, and com- pel the Russians to quit or surrender, by taking measures to threaten, and if there be time, occupy the centre of the two re- maining lines of communication between the army on the North side of Sebastopol and Southern Russia. If these views are just, it is certainly possible that the departure of an expeditionary force from Kamiescla or Balaklava, either Aastward or Northward, might really be the signal for theanstant retreat of the enemy.
So there is not any absolute improbability in the Viennese re-
port, that the Russian battalions at Simpheropol and Bakshiserai have begun to retire upon Perekop. It is pretty certain that Prince Gortschakoff took the first honourable opportunity of cross- ing the harbour in pursuance of a prearranged plan of operations. The ostentatious rumours of an intended attack on our right flank, just before the renewal of the bombardment, seem to have formed part of the plan which may have been to make-believe that the Russian army was strong enough to resume aggressive operations. It is also of a piece with this policy that a great show of strength should be made on the North side. The question of supplies is, for the present, only a subordinate element in the game. Russia will not peril an army to prove that she can keep it well supplied by the Perekop route alone. If supplies, from various reasons, are likely to fall short, that will aid the operations of the Allies in the field ; if supplies are plentiful, there still remains the policy of compulsion by strategy alone.
In any case, it is satisfactory to know that the Allies are firmly planted on an unassailable base; that they are strong in numbers, well supplied with cavalry and cannon, and sustained by re- sources that are practically infinite; and that if the reduction of the South side do not inevitably lead to the retreat of the enemy from the Crimea, as some sanguine commentators believe, it will at least place the Allies in the best position to bring about that desirable consummation.
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