THE RUSSIAN BLUNDERS.
IT is obvious by this time that the Russian Commander-in- Chief is not up to his work. The double failure at Plevna, first at the end of July, and next on the 11th of eptember, even if it had not been accompanied by other serious mistakes, like the attempt to occupy Bulgaria south of the Balkans in the presence of a very superior Turkish force, and the apparent aimlessness of the military authorities com- manding in the Dobrudscha, would alone betray the incom- petence of the military chief. And it is not only strategical incompetence which is discoverable. In both the failures there is distinct evidence of very inadequate co-opera- tion on the part of the subordinate officers, and in the latter case of something which looks extremely like the disloyalty of jealousy. It would be premature of course to assume that General Skobeleff was purposely left unsupported in the positions which at so great a cost he took from the Turks on the 11th September, but whether the failure to support him, as the Roumanians and Russians in the Gravitza redoubt were supported, was due to deliberate envy, or to the shiftlessness of a Staff which did not know where the reserves were or how to send. them, the result is much the same. It is perfectly clear that both at the end of July and in the middle of September a very great and difficult military operation was attempted without any adequate pro- 'vision for its proper execution, and that the most frightful loss of life without the gain of any compensating advantage was the result. Now these are serious proofs of incapacity to which the Czar, if his presence in the field of war is to have any but s positively mischievous effect, ought to be keenly alive. His people, no doubt, are grateful to him for the great efforts he is making to relieve a kindred race. They will not harshly judge the blunders of the first tentatives at so great an enterprise as this. But if the blunders when visible are not corrected, if thousands of gallant soldiers are sacrificed to no purpose, simply that a Grand Duke who is not up to his work may be allowed to keep the nominal command, and appear to rule ever a multitude of advisers, who sway him, now this way and now that, a deep feeling of dissatisfaction will arise in the Russian Army,—and if in the Russian army, then in the Russian people,—the results of which no one can now foresee. 'Twenty thousand men,—Russians and Roumanians,—have 'been lost through the great failure of the 11th of September, and according to the correspondent of the Daily News, a wit- ness not merely unprejudiced, but probably prejudiced on the 'Russian side, the courage of the Russian soldier has itself been perceptibly cooled by this slovenly as well as awful waste of life in grand operations for which no adequate preparation had been made. And it is no wonder if it is cooled. The Russian soldier knew from the first that if taken prisoner, or wounded and left in the enemy's power, the chances were that he should not only be killed, but tortured before he was killed, and yet he showed the most unhesitating 'valour, and even dash. But it is one thing to risk all for a winning cause, and quite another to risk it for a losing tense, especially for a cause so sure to be lost that even when a great advantage has been gained by the sacrifice of many thousand soldiers, it is tamely sacrificed again out of pure maladministration, or worse. If the Czar is up to his work, he will see that this goes en no longer. Already the war has done something to- wards sifting out the able men from the incapable, and it is of the very first importance, not only to the courage of his army, but to the loyalty of his people, that at any sacrifice of personal feeling, he should put the able men at the top, and the incapable where their incapa- bility is properly exerted, namely, in failing to do mischief. By
far the best military news we have yet had from the field of battle is that of the promotion of young General 'Skobeleff, it the age of thirty-three, to be commander of a division before Plevna. That shows that his conduct on the 11th of 'September, as well as on the 31st of July, has been properly appreciated at head-quarters, and that what in these age- ridden armies they call his youth,—at thirty-three, Napoleon was made Consul, and had already fought many of the most brilliant of his battles,—will not tell against his rapid promotion.
But the willingness to recognise merit in subordinates is not enough. What is really wanted, not only to secure ultimate success, but to put heart into the Russian soldier, is an intelligence at head-quarters which has certainly not hitherto been shown. If the Ozer had the real qualities of a ruler, he would remove
the Grand Duke Nicholaii, and put a tried General in his place. We do not in the least ignore the value of having a Prince at the head of the Army, if the Prince be a man of strong mili- tary capacity. Birth and station count for something, and no doubt an able Grand Duke might well be a better Com- mander-in-Chief than even a somewhat abler General not allied to the Royal blood. But such rank and position are positive mischiefs without the requisite military ability. They prevent those who do understand war from speaking their mind plainly to the chief who does not. A connec- tion with the throne multiplies every motive for throw- ing the blame where the blame should not be, and attenu- ating the mistakes attributable to the Commander-in-Chief. It is certain at least that if the Grand Duke Nicholas is to remain where he is, he ought to be provided with a Chief of the Staff who has not only the requisite knowledge and military skill, but the requisite tact and personal firmness to rule over him, and not allow his indecision and vaila- tion to be any longer a fatal calamity to the army under his command. But that compromise, as Baron de Jomini plainly said, and tried to teach the present Czar to see, is but a poor equivalent indeed for putting a thoroughly capable Com- mander at the head of affairs. If the Czar does not do this, his army will in all probability lose temper and courage with every new month. Nothing takes away the heart of the soldier like the knowledge that he is being handled by clumsy, careless, and inefficient hands. The best army in the world would soon become the worst under such conditions. It is not in human nature to sacrifice your life for a martinet who does not know what to do with the blood with which he plays, and cannot even keep what he buys with it, for want of forethought or presence of mind. The Czar, in accompanying his armies to the field,—always a questionable thing to do, —virtually assumed the responsibility of forming such judgment as a civilian can form on the conduct of operations ; and if he has not by this time satisfied himself that the conduct of operations is gravely inefficient, he will soon be wakened up by such a growl from the army, and such agitation amongst his people, as it would be far pleasanter for him to anticipate than to appease.
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