The Rhineland Negotiations .A ND whispering 'I will ne'er consent,' consented,"
sums up the decision of Germany to discuss the possibility of making a cash payment to France in return for the withdrawal of the Allied troops from the Rhineland. It is true that there has been much trimming of words, and that Herr Muller has been able to return to Berlin with the convenient assurance that he is not giving way at all, as the withdrawal of the troops and the speeding up of reparation payments are to be discussed as parallel, and not as interdependent questions. That is a meta- physical nicety which we need not examine. Enough to say that the German Government have saved their face, or at all events have arranged to act as though it were saved, and that in France it is assumed by Government and people alike that the withdrawal of the troops will, in fact, depend upon France being satisfied by earlier or larger payments.
In a sense it may be said that good has come out of the apparent evil of M. Briand's fierce speech last week. Observers at Geneva say that the speech did good by "clearing the air." We cannot for that reason applaud the speech. We thought, and still think, that it was a very unhappy sequel to the signing of the Peace Pact. It came at a moment when the creation of an atmosphere of confidence was essential. Nevertheless, a thing which M. Briand could not possibly have reckoned upon, though he may possibly have gambled for it, has happened— the unexpected consent of Germany to give France a quid pro quo for withdrawal. Taking things as they are at the moment we cannot but express our relief. It seems that a large measure of the credit is due to Lord Cushendun, who as unofficial chairman of the meetings at which the Rhineland negotiations were decided upon conciliated the conflicting interests and brought together the rival personalities with a geniality and a businesslike skill which in combination were irresistible.
Those who are counting upon a very speedy settlement, however, are bound to be disappointed, for a mere list of the questions which arc immediately involved in the bargain, and of those others which are dimly contingent upon it, opens up a long vista of difficulties. The most consoling fact is that Frenchmen are talking much less than before about security. If they really are at last content to believe that Locarno and the Pact of Paris give them all the security that they are ever likely to get in an ill-managed world, much is gained. The negotia- tions ought to be financial and not at all political or military. Unfortunately, what they ought to be does not give us any guarantee of what they will be. But we must hope for the best and turn for the moment to the problems which cannot in any case be evaded.
This month Germany entered upon the fifth year of her reparation payments. It is the first year in which she will make the full payments in accordance with the Dawes Scheme—payments that must hencefisrth be maintained. In the past four years she has paid every pfennig which she promised, and has paid it punctually. Herr Mfiller's ease, therefore, is that as Locamo and the Pact of Paris have greatly increased the security provided by the Treaty of Versailles, and as the Treaty of Versailles itself in an article which is frequently forgotten says that the Allied troops in the Rhineland may be withdrawn before the end of the contemplated period of fifteen years if Germany has discharged all her obligations, Germany is entitled to ask for withdrawal now on the merits of her record alone. We agree with that argument. We intensely dislike the mixing up of a question of profit with a matter of justice. On the other hand, the fact remains that the total capital obligation of Germany under the Dawes Scheme has never been determined, and it is this fact which has given France an opening for connecting the two strictly unrelated questions of the withdrawal and the payment of reparations.
What is proposed is that the place of the occupying troops should be taken by a Committee—of civilians we presume—which is to be called the Committee of Obser- vation and Conciliation. The word translated " observa- tion " by some and " verification " by others is constatation, and it might have been better translated " investigation " or (as in the case of the task assigned to Mr. Churchill's rating committees) "ascertainment." So far as we can make out, the French think that this Committee will act in perpetuity or (in order not to exaggerate) let us say indefinitely. We should have thought that its existence ought to be limited strictly by the time Germany takes to discharge her total obligation. It is also very desirable that at least one German representative should be ap- pointed to the Committee, otherwise its operations will almost certainly be misrepresented. Yet another point to be decided is whether the creation of the Com- mittee will precede or follow the withdrawal of the troops. If withdrawal is to be delayed until all the questions which are surging through the mind of France are settled the delay-may be very long indeed. We could hardly hope that the evacuation of the second zone would be accelerated at all, and the evacuation of even the third zone might not occur very long, after all, before the Treaty date of 1985. Really the whole subject of evacua- tion—which we repeat is an act of justice—is being jeopar- dized by this linking with it of a series of financial puzzles.
• No doubt an unobtrusive and un-uniformed Committee of Observation, however long it might stay, would be much more acceptable to Germany than the presence of 67,000 troops. But even so it is not likely to be the means of confidence and mutual respect. Surely the right course is for the total sum due from Germany to be fixed as soon as possible and for the progress of the payments to be reported regularly to the League of Nations. Payment in advance of the stipulated dates should entitle Germany to the discounts which are custo- mary in trade.
France evidently desires to introduce into the negotia- tions the whole issue of the War debts. We fear that this may lead to something capable of being interpreted as concerted criticism of America. This would be resented, as America admits no connexion between the debts and the occupation of the zones. It would be still worse if there should be an appeal to America for debt remission. Lord Cushendun did well to point out at once that, though Great Britain was very willing to help to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion, it must be under- stood that she abided unalterably by the Balfour Note. That is to say, she asks no more from her debtors than she has to pass on to America, but, having disposed of the matter finally, as she supposed, she will not take less. In no sense will she beg America to "let her off." She incurred the debt, she acknowledged the debt in 1923, and she means to pay the debt.
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