The Unadvertised Army
It is really astonishing that the mistake of understatement about the Part taken by British troops in 1940 and i94x, severely criticised at the time, should have been repeated in an even more extreme form in 1944. In the earlier period of the campaign in Egypt so little publicity was given to the achievements of British units that the world had some excuse for supposing that we were ready to t\,\I(‘;o\-Ithe last A at.'R;‘In the batt alkkkie batt np.tckiWIT General explcrinl. the vital imp apVe that the Briti part in the vic
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, was some time before the general public were
an that some British as well as Polish units were serving Canadian First Army ; and indeed it was only during the st week that it was officially disclosed that there was at least a whole British army corps there. This kind of mistaken reticence about the quantity and quality of the British contribution to victory in Europe is unfair to our troops, misleading to the British public, and likely to cause an impression most damaging to our prestige abroad. It is quite pointless. It is of the essence of this campaign that the United Nations are pooling their efforts both in resources and in hard fighting.. No one will doubt that British soldiers are proud to be serving as a part of the splendidly efficient Canadian First Army, or that the British Second Army is working in perfect co- operation with the Americans under the supreme command If General Eisenhower. The whole Expeditionary Force is an Allied Force. But in estimating the achievements of the Allies as a whole it is both foolish and unjust that our authorities should maintain a sort of " hush-hush " about the British contribution. Fortunately Montgomery and Dempsey are doing things today that no authority can hide.
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