Need to Attack Italy
The very successful British naval bombardment of Bardia and Fort Capuzzo was probably designed in part to counter the impression created by our evacuation of British Somaliland. The man in the street had expected, when Italy came into the fighting, that this sort of chastisement would be meted out to the coast of the Italian mainland; and anyone who has dis- cussed war with Italians in the past knows that they expected it too. " Our vulnerable coast-line " was their regular lament. Why, then, does the vulnerable thing remain so long un- wounded? The answer is aircraft. The British Fleet bom- barding Bardia was protected by British fighter 'planes, which took off from their Egyptian bases and by good timing reached the ships exactly when they were wanted. No similar protec- tion could be arranged for ships operating off Italy itself, though their need for it would be even greater. Whether this will be the last word in the rivalry between ships and aeroplanes, only time can show; but a ship costs so much more to build than an aeroplane—is, in fact, such an unequal stake—that naval commands are naturally loath to hazard it. Meantime the man in the street is surely right in his notion that we ought to be attacking Italy, not Italy us. Our aim should be so to utilise our Mediterranean sea-power as first to isolate her positions in Africa, and then to drive her clean off that Continent. After which we should be in a much better position than at present to attack the Italian peninsula. Our recent long-range bombing- raids from England are magnificent tours-de-force, but by themselves can scarcely ever be more.
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