REACTIONS IN AMERICA
By ERWIN D. CANHAM
By Air Mail.
THE upsurge of American public opinion urging the sale or transfer of 5o or 6o American destroyers to Great Britain has been most striking. Thus far it has beaten fruitlessly against two obstacles: the fact that isolationists, possibly only a minority in national opinion, are strongly organised in Congress; and the unwillingness of President Roosevelt, running zealously for re- election, to take the initiative.
For a month now, the dead hand of presidential politics has stifled new action in aid of Britain. But the time had come when the urgency of public opinion seemed to overbalance the cautions of politics. It would not be surprising if before this article sees print the Administration took action looking toward the transfer of the destroyers, or some similarly useful step. For informed officials in Washington, as well as private citizens, are well aware that more assistance is necessary. For a time, as these dispatches have already reported to Spectator readers, the Administration took the rather defeatist view that Britain's chances of victory were less than 50-5o, and that in these circumstances the transfer of any substantial amount of American fighting tools would be dangerous to this nation.
Such viewpoints have been largely driven out here by the firmness of British resistance, the vigour of her home defence action, and the failure—to this date—of the invasion to materialise. So it is that a great many leaders of opinion are now emphatically urging that the 6o destroyers be transferred. These leaders,-it must once again be recalled, are ahead of the vast body of opinion—or so it seems. At any rate, they are far ahead of a well-organised isolationist opposition with in- ordinate power in Congress. And at such a time as this Mr. Roosevelt, preoccupied with re-election strategy, is not so bold as he once was.
Moreover, there are severe legal impediments blocking the destroyer transfer. A few months ago a law was passed which prohibited the sale or transfer of any vessels, weapons, or muni- tions to any foreign Government unless the Chief of Naval Operations or the Chief of Staff certifies that they are not essential to the national defence. An old 1917 law forbids the release from the United States jurisdiction of " any vessel built as a vessel of war with any intent or under any agreement that such vessel shall be delivered to a belligerent nation." There are some ingenious ways around these laws, but it may well be unwise to employ such evasive tactics. And to ask repeal of the statutory impediments would provoke a severe battle in Congress.
Yet individual leaders, newspapers, and organisations clamour for aid to Britain through the destroyer fleet. If the pressure gets much greater, it might even be possible to get straight- forward action through Congress. In any case, the struggle has brought to the fore again all the arguments for aid to Britain. They are hammering away at the public consciousness, and, taking their greatest impetus from Britain's own effective methods of self-defence, they seem bound to lead to some sort of tangible action.
As time goes on, the isolationist cause here—which is the body of opinion constantly blocking more forthright American action in the cause of world freedom—gets more hysteric threadbare, and discreditable in its logic and emotions, but does not seem particularly to get weaker. There are a g many different elements in the isolationist group, they deserve profound study. First, and most attractive, honest citizens who feel a long way from Europe and who be lieve this nation can work out its destiny on this contincn Their motives are simple and sincere, however misguided. T day may come when their eyes will be opened. They are quit capable of conversion.
Second come those with racial reasons for their views: German-Americans, anti-British Irish, Italians, anti-Semi &c. These people are often fully endoctrinated with corrup sympathy for Nazism. They are the potential Fifth Coln for in the event of war their loyalties would be under a str whereas the first group are genuine and honourable Amen There are also some traditionally anti-British American Their views are entirely possible of change; indeed, many them have already seen the light.
An enormously important aspect of the problem, and on about which generalisations need to be avoided, is the positic of the Roman Catholic Church. Now that the Pope is virtual a prisoner in a Nazi-Fascist dominated continent, and Vatica policy—however reluctantly it may be—seems to have becorn somewhat co-operative with the conquerors at least for the tim being, the importance of the Catholic group among America isolationists seems very striking. Of course, Father Cough!, has long been the most prominent pro-Nazi American. He di not have the favour of his church leaders during the interi after the Spanish war when the Vatican was quite positive? anti-Nazi, but he always had a rather substantial rank-and-fl following within the Church. Now it would appear that warn Catholic influences here are being exerted in the isolation? interest. Of course there are also many influential forces with the Church which are far from isolationist. But a trend see apparent.
Of equal importance is the question of Vatican influent in Latin America, which is all-Catholic. If pressur is being exerted in Rome to persuade the Vatican to assist swinging Latin America into the Fascist orbit, or to stimulat the isolationist cause in the United States, then this situatio is very grave indeed. For the Catholic influence in the Ne World can be substantial. Possibly, again, one is over-generali ing. And it is true that many leaders of the Roman Catholi Church have been loyal, outspoken patriots, following the! own nationalist policies and claimin each to be accord with the Vatican. The safest conclusion seems rail to be that the Church offers an effective channel for pr Nazi pressure in this hemisphere, and there seems to be son evidence that the pressure is already being applied on Rome.
Up to the present, with the satisfactory conclusion of th Havana Conference, Latin American resistance to the N threat is firm and even reassuring. Secretary Cordell Hull's fea of achieving—even on paper—the unification of the Amen. Republics against totalitarian political and economic penetrauo would have been a major diplomatic triumph at any nine' Brought about in July, it was a miracle. The Convention 0 Havana, by setting up the machinery to seize and administer an European possessions in this hemisphere which are threatened with transfer of sovereignty, is of prime value to Britain. But the Havana Conference also gave Pan-American sanction if the United States finds it necessary to occupy a colony or two before the Convention goes into effect. And the United States, lik all Latin America, stands committed to a great responsibilnY: " Any attempt on the part of a non-American State a the integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty the political independence of any American State shall be c sidered an act of aggression against the States which sign uu declaration." Among the Havana achievements only ." Convention requires ratification. It is not necessary guthbl to confuse the word for the deed in order to realise that Unit States diplomacy in the Americas has done very well. indirectly the cause of freedom in Europe has been helped thereby.
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