The New Arab Triangle
By DESMOND STEWART UMMER, 1963, marks a new phase in the de- velopment of the Middle East. The struggle for the future is no longer one between Nasser and the feudal kings, but a triangular tussle be- tween three forces: Egypt with its State planning and monolithic political unit; the Beath Party in Iraq, Syria and elsewhere; and, to use a vague pejorative to describe the rest, the reactionaries.
That this triangular division of the Arab world now exists was shown by Nasser's statement during his speech on the occasion of the eleventh anniversary of the Egyptian Revolution: '1 be- lieve in unity with Syria; I do not believe in unity with the Beath Party.' It was shown by the arrest of Ba'athis in Amman by the govern- ment of King Hussein. At the same time the Syrian Ba'athis were dishonouring the tradition that Damascus coups were bloodless by execut- ing, in panic, at least thirty Nasserists. In Iraq, the bloodshed has so far been reserved for Kurds and Communists, but those who wanted imple- mentation of the agreement to form a tripartite United Arab Republic have been given pause by the increased Ba'athi control over the Iraqi State. President Arif's visit to Cairo is unlikely to paper over the abyss.
The emergence of the Ba'ath Party, its ap- parent control of the levers of power in Damascus and Baghdad, has delighted those who, sophisticated enough to know that neither Saud nor Hussein could be a counterweight to Nasser, yet opposed Nasser in the struggle for the Arab future. Unfortunately, hope is a blind- ing emotion; enthusiasts for the Beath have hardly analysed at all the Ba'athis ideology or its popular support.
The Ba'athi advertisement hardly differs from Nasser's: Unity-Socialism-Democracy. These Ba'athi abstractions accord with the six points on which the Egyptian officers agreed in those dawn days of July, 1952. Arab unity was ex- plicitly affirmed in the first Egyptian constitution after the Revolution which proclaimed that Egypt formed part of the Great Arab Nation. Socialism has been an increasingly important part in Nasser's policy; the socialist laws of July, 1961, were the immediate cause of Syria's secession from the UAR. As for democracy, Nasser has never ceased to affirm that what he wants is the fullest and completest democracy for Egypt and all the Arabs. He insists that the parliamentary government which Egypt enjoyed before the Revolution was only apparent de- 'In my heart our national sport will still always be seal hunting.' mocracy; he hopes to achieve an overall de- mocracy, from a basis of village councils up to the pyramid's apex in a legislative assembly. The elections to coincide with Khrushchev's visit this autumn will be a major step towards show- ing whether such an assembly can be created in a no-party State, and whether, when created, it can function effectively.
The disagreement between the Ba'ath and Nasser is not ideological. The Beathis share his enthusiasm for Arab unity; they profess to be Socialists; they claim to support democracy, though in their discussions with Nasser in Cairo this spring they wanted no elections for five years; it is unlikely that they would submit their regimes to the rigours of anything approaching a genuine election at the moment. Nor is the disagreement any more logical than the Beath itself, whose manifestoes and published state- ments show what vagueness results when Parisian formula; are married to Arab loquacity. Nor is the Beath united. There are at least three separ- ate factions. Michel Aflaq may seem dominant to some journalists, but whether he controls the Ba'ath is as doubtful as whether he was given a warmer reception in Algiers than Nasser. Christian, sincerely ambiguous, this French-edu- cated intellectual has little appeal for the Arabs, whose preference has always been for the affir- mative Muslim hero. Aflaq has long feuded to the point of total divorce with Akram Hourani, the strong man of the Beath. Hourani is the opportunist par excellence, having been in his time a member of the Fascist PPS, a Socialist, UAR vice-president and finally arch-secessionist. If Aflaq has long broken with Hourani, it is doubtful if he has much influence over the ruthless Amin Hafiz, who temporarily controls the military machine and its execution squads.
As this important battle is joined, it is worth considering Nasser's disadvantages and advan- tages. For, unlike the new-risen and unproved Ba'ath, Nasser has shown over eleven years the power to keep the largest Arab State on a con- sistent tack.
His first disadvantage in Iraq and Syria can be briefly stated: despite the Daily Telegraph myth of Nasser's omnipresence, be is not there. Egyptian intelligence about Iraq and Syria has often been faulty; the intricacies of Iraqi politics are better understood in London than in Cairo. Secondly, Nasser's fellow-Egyptians are less popular than he is. I find myself remember- ing Egyptian doctors of philosophy who worked alongside me in Iraq. Charming, often com- petent people, they yet made little effort to appre- ciate Baghdad, but would exclaim how backward it was compared with Cairo. In this they were dead right. But the mud-coloured capital of Feisal II was also backward compared with Oxford or London. Yet many English employees in ITN, of whatever political spectrum, en- deavoured to find reasons other than financial for staying. Endeavouring, they found; finding, they stayed. During the Egyptian union with Syria, Egyptian teachers, doctors and land re- formers took their talents to villages disregarded by Syria's Levantine rulers. But the few who were carpet-baggers undermined the popularity of the rest.
In the undeveloped and outlying parts of the Arab world there are, naturally, provincial loyalties; there are genuine complexes of in- feriority; there are the usual desires of local cocks to remain lordlings of their own stack- yards. The transformation of Egypt from a slothful corrupt monarchy to a Socialist de- mocracy has been jerky at times, at times in- justices have got past Nasser's own awareness; personal, as opposed to political liberty, has seemed restricted. That the vast majority of fellahin and workers are better off than ever before is a major truth; the minor truth that people have been prevented from taking money abroad has been exploited by th6se with a vested or emotional interest in local separateness. Such have worked up fears of Egyptian hegemony.
But in his struggle against these new Arab adversaries Nasser's advantages are great.
The first and most obvious is the position and power of Egypt in the Arab world. Nasser has a commanding geographical position, able to speak to Morocco and Iraq as the heart speaks to the wings. Egypt is by far the most populous Arab State. There are more Christians in Egypt than there are people in Syria; there are more people in Cairo than in Jordan and Lebanon together. Egyptian development goes back to the lifetime of Byron. Cairo was a complex capital with girls' schools, literary magazines and an opera when Baghdad was an Ottoman back- water. At a recent conference on technology for underdeveloped countries Egyptian scientists pre- sented more than a thousand papers. Criticising Nasser, Salah al-Bitar, the Syrian Prime Minis- ter, bitterly referred to Egypt's `media.' By this vague nightmare phrase he meant the whole apparatus of information directed by Dr. Abdel Kader Hatem: a TV network from. Aswan to Alexandria (whose pictures can be picked up in Lebanon), a cinema industry producing in some years more films than England, and what is said to be the second largest broadcasting network in the world. Transistors can bring Nasser's colloquial, graphic, humorous account of his dis- cussions with Aflaq to every village in the Near East.
If Nasser has behind him the resources of the most articulate and, developed Arab State, he is himself the most convincing persona the Arabs have produced since the Middle Ages. The British, who have so greatly succeeded, like failure heroes: Queen Victoria was typical of her successful race 'in having a cult, not for Cromwell, the greatest English statesman, but for Bonnie Prince Charlie. Arabs admire the strong and the successful. Just as their religion emphasises the power of God, so- their school- boys admire 'their great generals, men like Khalid Ibn Walid. After centuries of failure, their need for a powerful leader is now compelling, and in Nasser they find him. They gape at rockets; they are thrilled by the image of a People Armed. The greatest Arab wound has been the loss of Palestine, and Nasser seems a more convincing champion of Arab rights than Ba`athi in- tellectuals.
These are the emotional factors working for Nasser; these inspire hairdressers in Benghazi or kebab-sellers in Latakya to nail Nasser's ikon to their walls. But Nasser has one more great asset which works with opinion-leaders, on the more rational level. For the last eleven years he has led Egypt on a coherent path of develop- ment. The fruits of his revolution were first of all intoxicating; they are now increasingly edible. A plan which has satisfied the heart (making unruly demonstrations needless) and which promises to satisfy the stomach, appeals in the more disorderly States of the Arab East.
The tragedy of Iraq—to mention one such country—started when Nuri Said, belatedly con- verted to an intelligent scheme of development, needlessly involved in the pro-Western Baghdad Pact, was overthrown for political, not eco- nomic, reasons. Nuri's successor, Kassem, left Iraq in economic and political chaos. Ideology no longer moves most Iraqis. Stability is what they most want, and this the Ba'ath can hardly give them. They have a war with the Kurds on their hands which, as rivals for the Arabist ticket, they cannot afford to lose. They are stained with the blood of massacred Communists, who, per- secuted but not annihilated, can profit from every Ba'athi mistake. Their split with the Nasserists leaves them with no allies outside their clique. They will soon collectively enjoy the unpopu- larity which Kassem the Unique enjoyed alone. Baghdad will become more shabby, knives will become more sharp; and the short-wave radio will bring reports of new achievements in Egypt, including, before long, the next stage in the High Dam.
The purely practical appeal of Nasserism will thus grow as the Beath, switched from the politics of the salon to the desperate fight for power, will follow more and more the methods of Robespierre. For Iraq and Syria a federation with Egypt (such 'as was promised after three- party discussions earlier this year) would be the best thing, if such a federation were tactful and at the same time strong. Whether it would benefit Egypt is another question. The mess that the Beath has inherited and will probably bequeath would tax a Hercules with no other tasks to worry him. In Cairo there is little enthusiasm for Arab unity, after the many deceptions of the last years. Should there be a Nasserist victory in Damascus, it would please : in the way that everyone is pleased when he wins a battle. But deep involvement in the Levant is seen as wear- ing and unprofitable.
This almost marital struggle, in which all parties have the power to wound, will be ex- hausting. Millions of words and much blood may be shed before its issue is decided. A Cairo rumour predicts that a Pan-Arab Nasserist Party will soon be established to fight the Ba'ath with its own guns. The faction-ridden Ba'ath may re- unite, temporarily at least, as it senses its isola- tion. But despite the turmoil and the fret, the Arab man-in-the-street is for unity, democracy and Socialism. Those with vested interests in provincial separateness are a small minority. Somehow, some time, over the dead leucocytes of doctrinaires and the phagocytes of bureau- crats, Arab unity will be achieved. Any forces which stand against this tidal flood are likely to be dwindling footnotes in the textbooks of the future. Nuri Said and Kassem are only the most recent in a long list of such bypassed men.
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