Philosophy and Religion
TT may safely be said that in philosophical circles the' materialism which was somewhat confidently advo- cated in the third quarter of the nineteenth "century is completely dead, and there has perhaps been among religious people an undue measure of optimism in conse- quence of this. They have sometimes supposed that the only alternative to such materialism was Theism of such' philosophy, which has had many advocates in recent years, which provides a definitely spiritual interpretation of the universe, but leaves scarcely any room for religion as it has been understood by the adherents of the great historic religions of the world. It is a great thing, no doubt, that philosophy should now, with an almost united voice, affirm the'spiritual nature of reality, for the moment that this is done the 'scale of values, on which the moral side of religion depends, is at least capable of being set in relation- to a view of the whole world Which either justifies it, or at any rate makes ample room for it. Moreover, such a view at once makes reasonable the practice of religious' meditation, and makes room, in a certain rather attenuated sense, for worship. But in so far as religion is concerned with confident hope as well as with quiescent trust, such a scheme of thought supplies it with little foundation. Lord Balfour, in his Gifford Lectures—a masterpiece of subtle thinking expressed in ordinary human language—laid it down that the dis- tinctive element in any religion worth naming is the belief that " God takes sides." It is not enough to have an' intellectual assurance that in some highly tecluiieal sense the universe .as a whole, in all its extent Of space and time, and with all its particular evils, is somehow perfect. What is needed fOr most parts of the practice of a living religion is the conviction that the root-prin- ciple of this universe is something to which riot only the ' intellect but the will of man is the nearest analogy, and that we speak least inadequately of God when we speak of Him as willing certain reaults and fulfilling a pUrpoae, which itself, no doubt, is eternally .conatant, through all the changes and chances of the time-process.
In such a view there is at least nothing philosophically absurd : on the contrary, it supplies that rational ex- planation of existence, for which philosophy is always seeking, more completely than any other hypothesis. For we all recognize that Will, if it exists, and so far as it exists; is, in technical language, a true cause: When we have found that something 'owes its Present forth to the action of an intelligent will, and understand the motive on which that will acted, we do not ask for a further explanation. Here, and, in our experience, here only, we have a principle of explanation which demands no explanation of itself. Here then, and here only, we have a true First Mover. Now it is not possible to say that reason imperatively demands such an interpretation of ultimate reality. The universe might be a system which holds together in complete rational coherence, *herein every part is held in its plaCe by its relation to all the other parts, and in that sense is explained by the nature of the whole. And I do not think it can be said that reason absolutely claim's anything more than this. More- over, it must be admitted that, even if there are instances of purposive adaptation which can be traced in particular departments of the world, these are not sufficient to support a general theory' that the universe is grounded in purpose. It is not by any inductive reasoning that we can proceed from the general rationality of the- world to the view that it exists to fulfil some purpose. On the other hand, it is true that if all we can say is that the universe as a whole is rational in the. sense of being in., term:ally coherent, it remains a mere ' brute fact without any explanation at all. It is still possible to ask.,--Why - is there a-uniVerse ? And " no answer is forthcoming. Some philosophers have condemned the question itself as unmeaning, on the grOund that we cannot get outside - the universe and refer it to sOmething beyond itself, inasmuch as it is by definition " everything there is." But the impulse of the human mind to ask the question remains very strong, and many of the most poignant utterances of poets have been inspired by it. We cannot, certainly, get outside the -totality of things, but if we can find ground for believing that this totality is not a brute fact, but is self-explanatory, that will be a genuine ilief to the intellect, and, though not .demoriatrable; Will be perfectly legitimate as a hypothesis. - NoW Theism is precisely this hypothesis. It is the - belief that the universe is the expression of in active Will, which is the ground of reality, and the sphere of the fulfilnient of His purpose. Intellectually at first it is a hyPotlitaiS 'Only, and awaits verification.- In the nature of the case the verification can never be complete in any finite experience, so theists are undilmayed when they are told-that their case is not proved. They knoW that it never can he proved, and it is enough for them at this • stage" to knoW that, it 'is not disproved or in ank'serise irrational. The proeess of verification takes two forms. The first is, broadly speaking, theoretical. It is the continued working out in the sphere alike of thatight and practice' of what is involved in the initial hypotheais itself. If it is found, as it assuredly is found, 'that one problem after another yields to the treatment which this - procesS of thOughthrings to bear upon it, all this ten& to • confirm the initial hypothesis. Mit the' second great method Of verification is supplied by religion itself. There is the' experienee of SellOWship' with GOd : there is the long record of whit men haVe found in the activity of worship. If it were necessary on general philosophical groUndl-to explain all this away, no dciubt psychology " would seem equal to the task in the judgment of those whose own religious experience has been somewhat thin: But if the initial hypothesis itself " perfectly rational, and if there is a great volume of htiman experience which is intelligible on the basii of that hypothesis hut would have to be explained away as delusion on any other, then again the hypothesis appears. as that which most -ade- quately covers the facts of experience: It is still- not proVed, but it is on the way to appearing- the most probable Of all the possible theories. -- Nit if Theisni is once accepted, revelatiOn is .a natural consequence. The Being called God in Pantheistic systenis no doubt reveals Himself in all* things that exist, and it is possible so to conceive Him as to hold that He is more fully revealed in the beautiful than in the ugly, in the noble than in the base. But and such" a view it is not possible believe in particular and specifie acts of revelation. If, however, God is to be conceived first and foremost as creative will, then it follows that He can, if it pleases Him, give special acts. of revelation over and above that which is contained in creation itself. Human personality reveall itself in the decisiVe acts with which men meet emergencies, not in the ordinary day to .day conduct wherein there is scarcely any difference between one individual and another. The Christian religion rests on the belief that there does exist a series of acts of divine revelation leading up to, and culminating in, the self-disclosure of the DiVine Person and Character in Jesiis Christ. If this be accepted it at once reacts on the first hypOthesis, for it declares that the Creative Will is in its character perfect Love, and this again is progressiliely verified both in thought and in religious experience, and, while remaining like the first unproved, becomes per-7 petually more probable as thought widens and expe- rience deepens. Such a conviction still does not rest on proof. It belongs to faith and not to knowledge ; but it is a faith which is entirely rational on its own grounds, and perpetually approaches nearer to perfect certainty as it is adopted with thoroughness and followed with
Previous page
