HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES.*

Sons six months ago, we noticed the first four volumes of Mr. Henry Adams's work. A second instalment, consisting of Vols. V. and VI., is now before us. The able handling of documents and State papers, the dignified yet easy style, and the well-bred irony which distinguished the earlier portions of the History, are again apparent. Though the subject chiefly dealt with—the foreign relations of America from 1809 to 1813—is one of the most complicated and diffi- cult in the whole range of diplomatic history, Mr. Adams has contrived to tell his story without wearying the reader. It is true that the human intelligence occasionally reels under the burden of the attempt to understand the gigantic game of cross-purposes that was being played by England, France, and the United States during the period when the Berlin and Milan Decrees and the Orders in Council controlled, or attempted to control, the commerce of the world. That, however, is not Mr. Adams's fault, but the fault of the subject. No doubt he might have been clearer by being less accurate, but that he rightly did not care to be. Most historians have preferred to cut the knot by a general description of the issues at stake. Mr. Henry Adams unravels piece by piece the tangled web of diplomatic knavery and Cisatlantic and Trans- atlantic stupidity which ended in the war of 1912. Before, however, discussing Mr. Adams's work in detail, we must notice his perfect fairness, and the kindly as well as comprehen- sive spirit in which he treats the English side to the quarrel. He writes of the acts of our statesmen, even when most hostile and overbearing to America, with the same good sense and tolerance that he does of the doings of his own country- men. This is as it should be. Men should write and think of the war of 1812 as what in fact it was,—a civil war in which both sides fought with bravery, but in which no national humiliation was suffered by either combatant. In only one respect do we find ground for quarrelling with Mr. Adams's treatment of his subject. He should have given in an appendix the text of the Berlin and Milan Decrees, and of the most important of the Orders in Council. Had he done this, he would have greatly helped the general reader to understand the exact situation. "Every schoolboy" may know that the Decrees and Orders created a sort of reciprocal blockade of England and of all ports held by the French—that is, of nearly all Europe—but a knowledge of the exact conditions under which the diplomatists negotiated would be a great help.

People often talk as if the war of 1812 were in some way due to the desire of a party in America to support Napoleon against England. Nothing could be further from the truth. As a matter of fact, the Americans were, on the whole, far more inclined to go to war with France than with us, and but for the extraordinary want of foresight—nay, of ordinary common-sense—displayed by our statesmen, they might have been our allies instead of our enemies. The Americans at the beginning of the century held a considerable share of the carrying-trade of the world. When, then, the Berlin and Milan Decrees and the Orders in Council attempted to put an end to ocean commerce, the Americans were naturally in a great difficulty. The French seized American merchantmen if they were going to or coming from England, or if they had touched at England on their way to any foreign ports. Since, too, the French Treasury gained by the seizures, it was generally concluded that an American ship had put herself out of bounds by coming into any sort of contact with England ; and accordingly American shipping was as often as not seized and sold when found in French ports, or encountered on the high seas by French vessels of war. England did not act quite so callously ; but besides maintaining a strict blockade of most of the European ports, it harassed American ships by stopping them and impressing sailors believed to be English subjects. But though nominally our interference with American trade was as serious as that exercised by Napoleon, it was not so in practice. Our • Government, at any rate, did not seize American ships with the direct intention of selling them to increase the Treasury balances. Hence it happened that the Americans soon grew inclined to be more angry with Napoleon than with us. By the exercise of a little good manage- ment, and a few concessions which would not have in the least • History of the United States of America during the First Administration of Janus Madison. By Henry Adams. Tole. V. and VI. London : G. P. Putnam 's Sous. 1901. interfered with our blockade, we might have attached the Americans to our side, and have induced them to break with Napoleon, whose rapacity, concealed by promises and fair words, soon became evident to the American Government. Unfortunately, however, during the period of five years in which, in spite of the wishes of the two nations, and in spite of the fact that all external influences set the other way, we were drifting into war, we did not possess a single statesman able to see the facts in their true light.

There was no special animus shown against the Americans, we admit, but there was great thoughtlessness and a signal absence of any attempt at conciliation ; and throughout the negotiations it is the old story of that bumptious, bullying thickheadedness which has so repeatedly disgraced the

management of our foreign affairs. The Americans will never fight us. They have too much to lose. Besides, there is no need for hurry, and even in regard to things which we intend to give in on at last, we must not act too quickly, or they will think they can get anything they like out of us.' That was

the sort of temper in which our Foreign Office conducted the negotiations with America. They had been warned at the beginning of the century by their Minister at Washington, that the greater part of the States was naturally very pro- English ; yet they made not the slightest attempt to enter into alliance with the Union. That the Americans could regard their "you go and be damned" manner as unfriendly when it was not intended to be, seemed to our Government not worth considering. The attitude we have described was bad enough when assumed by men of moderate talents. It was ten times worse when salted with flouts and jeers by Canning.

If Englishmen here and over-sea ever come to understand the true story of the negotiations which he conducted in regard to the disputes with America, they will execrate the name of that pernicious Minister, instead of venerating it as they do at present. But for his fatuous system of bullying, the war which did more than anything else to embitter American, feeling towards the Mother-country might never have taken place. It is true Canning was not in office when the war took place, but he prepared the ground for it by his treatment of the United States. Mr. Adams, who, it is to be remarked, treats Canning very leniently, gives the following description of Canning's way of treating the Powers with whom he was negotiating :-

" For two years Canning hat lost no opportunity of charging the American Government with subservience to Napoleon ; even in these instructions he alleged Jefferson's manifest partiality' to France as a reason why England could entertain no propositions coming from him. He had in his hands Madison's emphatic threats of war ; how then could he conceive of obtaining from Madison an express recognition of the British Rule of 1756, which Madison had moat deeply pledged himself to resist ? On the other hand, Canning showed forbearance and a wish for peace, by leaving Erskine Minister at Washington as well as by passing unnoticed Madison's threats of war; and he betrayed a singular incapacity to understand the bearing of his own demands when he directed Erskine to communicate his instructions in extenso to the American Government Had he intelligently acted in bad faith, he would not have given the President, whose attachment to France he suspected, the advantage of seeing these instructions, which required that America should become a subject State of England. Perhaps a partial clue to these seeming contradictions might be found in the peculiar traits of Canning's character. He belonged to a class of men denied the faculty of realising the sensibilities of others. At the moment when he took this tone of authority toward America, he gave mortal offence to his own colleague, Lord Castlereagh, by assuming a like attitude toward him. He could not understand, and he could never train himself to regard, the rule that such an attitude between States as between gentlemen was not admitted among equals. Whatever was the reason of Canning's conduct, its effect was that of creating the impression of bad faith by offering terms intended to be refused."

In another passage, Mr. Adams attempts to find an excuse for Canning's want of good feeling. No doubt there is a certain truth in the historian's comment, but it offers no justification for Canning's stupidity. A diplomatist has no business to be accidentally insulting :— " The arrogance of Canning's demands did not necessarily ex- clude further concessions. The great Governments of Europe from time immemorial had used a tone of authority insufferable to weaker Powers, and not agreeable to one another ; yet their tone did not always imply the wish to quarrel, and England her- self seldom resented manners as unpleasant as her own. Used to the rough exchange of blows, and hardened by centurie of toil and fighting, England was not sensitive when her interests were at stake. Her surliness was a trick rather than a design."

The account of the shameless duplicity of Napoleon in his dealings with America in regard to the Decrees, given by Mr.

Adams, is of extraordinary interest. But it would be impos-

sible to give any intelligible description of these transactions in the space at our command. Since, however, we appear to be again entering upon an epoch of war by tariffs, it may interest our readers to quote some remarks made by Napoleon in explanation of the policy of his famous Decrees. At the Tuileries, he addressed some deputies of the Hanseatic League

in the following terms :—

" The Decrees of Berlin and Milan are the fundamental laws of my Empire. They cease to have effect only for nations that defend their sovereignty and maintain the religion of their flag. England is in a state of blockade for nations that submit to the decrees of 1806, because the flags so subjected to English laws are denationalised ; they are English. Nations, on the contrary, that are sensible of their dignity, and that find resources enough in their courage and strength for disregarding the blockades by notice, commonly called paper blockades, and enter the ports of my Empire, other than those really blockaded,—following the recognised usage and the stipulations of the Treaty of Utrecht,— may communicate with England; for them England is not blockaded. The Decrees of Berlin and Milan, founded on the nature of things, will form the constant public law of my Empire during the whole time that England shall maintain her Orders in Council of 1806 and 1807, and shall violate the stipulations of the Treaty of Utrecht in that matter."

A. week after, he harangued the bankers and merchants of Paris in a more unconventional matter :—

" When I issued my Decrees of Berlin and Milan, England laughed ; you made fun of me ; yet I know my business. I had maturely weighed my situation with England; but people pre- tended that I did not know what I was about,—that I was ill- advised. Yet see where England stands to-dayl Within ten years I shall subject England. I want only a maritime force. Is not the French Empire brilliant enough for me P I have taken Holland, Hamburg, &c., only to make my flag respected. I consider the flag of a nation as a part of herself ; she must be able to carry it everywhere, or she is not free. That nation which does not make her flag respected is not a nation in my eyes. The Americans—we are going to see what they will do. No Power in Europe shall trade with England. Six months sooner or later I shall catch up with it (je l'attendrai),—my sword is long enough for that. I made peace at Tilsit only because Russia undertook to make war on England. I was then victorious. I might have gone to Wilna ; nothing could stop me but this en- gagement of Russia At present I am only moderately desirous of peace with England. I have the means of making a navy ; I have all the products of the Rhine; I have timber, dock- yards, &c.; I have already said that I have sailors. The English stop everything on the ocean ; I will stop everything I find of theirs on the Continent. Their Miladies, their Milords,—we shall be quit ! (Leers Miladies, leers Milords--vous serails a deux de jeu ! ) "

Yet, in spite of all his efforts, Napoleon failed, and by his system of licences, which latterly he issued in thousands, he himself was the most flagrant violator of the fundamental law of the Empire. Experience will, we believe, show that much the same results will follow any new attempt to adopt a system of war by tariff.