ENGLISH OPINION ON THE WAR.
MOLLIVIER and the Parisian public are right in believ- . ing that English sympathies in this war are against France, wrong in the causes they are disposed to assign for that "misdirection of sympathy." The connection existing between the Prussian and English Royal families, on which the French Press dwells so bitterly, has no influence whatever on the general public, which tends, indeed, towards an undue distrust of Germany because of the German relationships of the Court. That distrust is not as strong as it was, but it is still strong enough to give the majority of Englishmen a faint bias against any project attributed to a German King. Nor is the cause, as M. 011ivier seems to suspect, any revival of the traditional hatred which once existed between Great Britain and France. That hatred has entirely disappeared in almost every class, and has no effect whatever upon the judg- ment of Englishmen as to this war. The prima' facie prejudice of Englishmen in fact tells the other way. Before the war of 1866, Prussia, was decidedly unpopular in this country, and to this moment the individual Prussian is rather respected than liked, —his rigidity of demeanour, rigour in command, and habitual respect for learning, being all of them attributes uncongenial to the average British mind, which, however given to admire courage, patriotism, and success, sees something a little ridiculous in the character of the fighting Professor. Nor is it any dread of the aggrandizement of France which influences British feeling, still less any contempt for French military prowess. The great majority of Englishmen cannot as yet divest themselves of the idea that France is certain to win,— that, in fact, France can be resisted only by British troops ; but they believe she will win after a struggle which will reduce her strength much more than any accession of terri- tory obtainable from Prussia would increase it,—at all events in the present generation. The true causes of the remarkable unanimity of opinion against France are, we believe,—first, a conviction that Napoleon has plunged Europe into war for an unworthy motive ; and secondly, a suspicion that if success- ful the first use he will make of victory will be to absorb Belgium into his own dominion. As to the unworthiness of the motive, most Englishmen's notions are as immovable as they are just. They hold that the real reasons for the war are as inadequate as those which are pleaded in despatches ; that Napoleon has no more right to invade Germany because she is growing strong than to attack her because Spain chose to elect a Hohenzollern King. He might as well attack England because her increasing trade brings her new resources for war, or declare war on Holland because Princess Marie has been betrothed to a brother-in-law of the Roumanian Prince. In assigning such causes for war, in insulting the King of Prussia, in stimulating the excusable but unrighteous jealousy of his people against a neighbour strong enough to deprive France of her military supremacy, Napoleon, as they con- alder, betrayed an unscrupulousness which they had of late believed to be wholly foreign to his character. A fortnight since they held in public and private that Napoleon ought to be pardoned all blunders and all misdeeds, because he was ." the main bulwark of peace in Europe ;" and now they incline to believe, with the Emperor of Austria in 1859, that ." there is but one capable sovereign in Europe, and he unfor- tunately is capable of anything." This change of feeling about he Emperor has, however, made little or no change in their feeling about France. They wish her, no doubt, ill-success in her present enterprise, and desire that Germany should be constituted as a great, united, and peaceful empire ; bdt they have no hostility whatever to France, would receive intelli- gence of her serious defeat with no pleasure, and would regard any attempt to fulfil the Prussian threats of dismemberment in a spirit which might once more cement the entente cordiale. They wish, in fact, to speak frankly, that, if possible, the cost of war might be paid by the Empire, and not by either Germany or France.
The second reason for the want of sympathy, or, let us say, the unfriendliness with which Englishmen just now regard the policy of France, is the fear lest it should drag them into the enterprise which of all others they most abhor,—a Continental campaign. They fear that Belgian neutrality will not in the long run be respected, that the aggressor will be France, and that it may become their duty to stand up in defence of Belgian nationality. They do not seek that duty, they do not like it, they cannot bear even to think of it ; but once convinced that it exists, they will assuredly perform it, at any hazard and at any cost, hating the burden laid on them, but bearing it because it is theirs. A dim foreboding that this burden will have to be taken up, that England is attacked when Prussia is defeated, that they may yet be required, as the Times says, to form the "second line" of European defence, is at the bottom of much of the bitterness expressed in the Press, of the deep anxiety manifested by all politicians, and of the unparalleled reticence observed by Parliament, which allows a war to pass without a debate, quietly accepts nonsensica paragraphs about the time required to print despatches which could be printed in three hours—and would be if a daily news- paper got hold of them—as excuses for silence ; and does not even ask why the Government of an independent State prohibits an officer of marked prudence and skill as a military corre- spondent from accepting the offer of the King of Prussia to chronicle the war. If the French Government can remove that foreboding, can and will abstain from threatening Belgium, can assure us that the neutrality all Englishmen wish to maintain will not be subjected to that unendurable • strain, they will find much of the bitterness which frets them disappear, and find in England impartial, if unsympathizing critics, with opinions, as M. 011ivier sneeringly hinted to the correspondent of the Daily News, very much at the mercy of success. But if they cannot, if the secret design of the master of France is to destroy the freedom of Belgium, if in spite of all treaties and all remonstrances the law of tise strongest is to supersede international law, then, indeed, Eng- lish feeling may deepen and harden till the alliance now so cordially liked becomes hateful, till the Volunteers grow to a million, and England once more prepares, quietly and sullenly, but with a fixed resolve, for a struggle greater than any this generation has seen. Till then, Englishmen watch the war fairly impartial, and though they will not maintain, or attempt to maintain, the cowardly neutrality in speech and thought which the Emperor's mouthpiece in England demands, and. which Mr. Cardwell is not ashamed to enforce, they will wait the issue with a lingering hope that the winner, German or French, may be too moderate in victory to call into action Europe's second defensive line..—the British Fleet.
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