The Moscow Talks The delay in reaching any conclusion at
Moscow cannot but cause considerable concern. Many good authorities hold that Russia genuinely wants an agreement, and that even without one she would unquestionably support the Western democracies in any war precipitated by German aggression. It may be so. But what is needed is not Russia's support when war is begun, but so binding and immediate an assurance of her support as to prevent war from beginning. The Baltic States are apparently still the difficulty, and, as has been said here before, the difficulty is genuine, for those States have good reason to fear the consequences of being drawn into an anti-German defen- sive bloc. But the Anglo-Russian negotiations must not break on that. Russians are traditionally slow negotiators, and time presses less for them than for France and Britain. But if M. Molotoff's demand is that, as part of a general reciprocal guarantee, France and Britain shall undertake to defend Russia against any threat to her independence through the Baltic States, then we should not hesitate to do that. It would not in fact compromise the neutrality of those States, and it is likely enough that though their relations with Germany compel them to protest against anything like Russian protection, that safeguard would in fact be by no means distasteful to them.
