KOREAN TUG-OF-WAR
By ROBERT T. OLIVER
THE paramount question of whether we are to have one world or two will receive a partial answer in the negttiations by which Russia and the United States are attempting to solve the Korean question. Korea is the area where the Russian policy of achieving security through extension of her borders and the new American doctrine of erecting democratic bulwarks against the further spread of Communism will meet their first avowed and direct test. Great Britain is deeply involved because of her participation in the 1943 Cairo pledge of independence for Korea, and in the Moscow Decision of 1945, proposing a five-year period of four-Power trusteeship for the peninsular country. China, as the proposed fourth Power in the trusteeship plan, is also directly concerned.
But direct responsibility and administration in Korea are solely in American and Russian hands. By some unrevealed agreement, Korea was slashed in two along the line of the 38th parallel. The 56 per cent. of its territory north of that line, containing most of Korea's coal, mineral, timber and hydro-electric-power resources, all of its heavy industries and to,000,000 of its population, are ruled by the Russian army of 200,000 that poured into it during the last week before Japan's collapse. The southern agricultural portion, containing 20,000,000 of the population but little of the country's wealth, is occupied and ruled by an American army of 5o,000. Dur- ing the twenty months of division and joint occupation Korea has suffered more economically and politically than has any of the other occupied countries. Russia's iron wall across the middle of the country has completely prohibited the normal north-and-south flow of agricultural and industrial products. Shortage of goods and lack of an autonomous government have resulted in a hundredfold in- crease during the past twenty months in the paper money in circula- tion. The hopelessness of the situation and the jockeying for power between the occupying forces have encouraged political disruption and irresponsibility. Russia's ruthless policy of- implanting Com- munism and America's negative policy of merely maintaining order until some solution may be found have both contributed to the bitter disillusionment of the Korean people, who had confidently expected liberation and independence after the defeat of Japan.
When Bevin, Byrnes and Molotov met in Moscow in November and December, 1945, to consider what should be done with Korea, the division of the country and the Russian-American occupation were accomplished facts. The Ministers agreed that: (i) The country should immediately be reunited into one economic and administrative unit ; (2) a provisional Korean Government should be established ; and (3) a four-Power trusteeship should be set up "for a period not to exceed five years." A Russian-American con- ference held in Seoul last spring failed utterly to accomplish any of these objectives. Every Korean political party—ekcept the Com- munists—had protested vigorously against the trusteeship plan, and Secretary Byrnes announced in a radio address that trusteeship "might be suspended." However, the Russian delegation to the Seoul meeting took the position that no Koreans might be admitted to the proposed Government except those who approved of trustee- ship. The Russians argued that the trusteeship plan had been "democratically" agreed to in the Moscow discussions, and that consequently all who opposed it were, ipso facto, "undemocratic." The Americans, however, insisted on the right of Koreans to hold and express their own opinions, and refused to accept a point of view that would simply have made Korea a Communist puppet State.
Korean nationalists, meanwhile, have solidly opposed trusteeship upon the following grounds. One, it is an insult to a highly developed, cultured nation that ruled itself for forty centuries. Two, although trusteeship would theoretically be limited to five years, it is probable that Communist disruptive tactics would cause such disorder that charges would be made of Korean inability for self- government, and the period would be extended. Three, because of the strategical importance of the peninsula, there would be constant intrigue among the four Powers for special advantages and permanent special privileges. Four, nowhere in the world is there evidence that the four Powers would be able to co-ordinate their aims and methods sufficiently to achieve efficient and co-operative administra-
tion. Five, the record of the last twenty months is positive evidence that Korea's national welfare depends upon its being governed by its own elected representatives, responsible to its own people and dedicated to their own best interests.
At the time of Japan's defeat Korea had no Communist problem, for it had no Communist population. It is doubtful whether even now in a free election Communists could command as much as to per cent. of the vote in South Korea and 25 per cent. in the Russian zone. Nevertheless, the threat of Communist domination is now Korea's greatest fear. The Russians proceeded rapidly to establish a totalitarian State north of the 38th parallel. They prevented free- dom of speech, Press and organisation. They permitted the estab- lishment of only one political organisation—the North Korea Labour Party. They forbade anyone to listen to any radio programme originating outside the Russian zone. They brought back thousands of Koreans who had fled from Japanese domination to Siberia and Manchuria, many of whom had been indoctrinated with Communism. They instituted a vigorous pro-Communist propaganda campaign. They forbade any Korean to leave his own village without papers of identification, secured from Russian authorities. To these repres- sive measures they added a positive programme of economic, political and military action.
The Russians decided to punish Koreans who had collaborated with the Japanese. Since Korea was owned by Japan for forty years, the Americans in the south have felt it necessary to leave this delicate problem for a Korean Government to solve in its own way. But the Russians developed two precise yard-sticks for defining collaborators. First, any Korean is a collaborator who owns pro- perty—for if he did not collaborate with the Japanese how could he gain or retain wealth? Second, any who oppose Communism are collaborators—for obviously they prefer the old, reactionary landlord system to the new " people's order." On these bases, 125,000,000 acres of land were seized and their owners jailed or executed. Then the land was " redistributed " to farmers who would submit to the new regime. Over 800,000 Koreans have left everything behind and fled to the American zone rather than submit, and they are still stealing across the border at the rate of 2,000 a day.
Last November the Russians held an " election," with a single slate of candidates. Voting consisted of putting a pellet in a white box to vote for the slate or in a black box to oppose it. This was done in open town squares under the scrutiny of armed guards. Russian authorities claimed a vote of 99.2 per cent. for the slate, and hailed the election as an overwhelming expression of the people's will. Meanwhile, the Russians are conscripting all men in their zone between the ages of seventeen and twenty-five into a North Korean army. General John R. Hodge, commander of the American- occupied zone, has estimated the potential size of this army at 500,000, and says he can see no reason for it except for use in con- quering the south.
In South Korea the United States has followed a policy of drift, hoping that an early agreement with Russia would make a joint with- drawal possible. No long-term plans have been framed. The Korean currency is still not admitted to the international exchange (although Austria's is), and a complete economic blockade has been maintained. Full freedom of speech is allowed, but not self-government, for, in the American view, this would tend to create a permanent breach between north and south. With no imports permitted, and no self- government by which they can work at solving their own problems, South Koreans have suffered economic miseries and are developing acute political bitterness.
There is strong evidence that the international scandal posed by the Korean situation may soon be basically reformed. Russia may agree to a joint withdrawal because: (t) By keeping its army living upon the country it has brought North Korea to a state near to economic collapse ; (2) it may feel that Communist forces are suffi- ciently entrenched to dominate or at least strongly influence a new Korean Government ; and (3) after the withdrawal the United States doubtless would not return, while Russia always could. Meanwhile, Secretary Marshall has served strong notice that the United States is at last going to develop South Korea economically and to give the people an honest system of self-government.
. The position of Korean Nationalists is clear, and had been con-
sistent through all the tug-of-war of the past twenty months. They assert that the stability of Asia as well as the welfare of their own country both require an absolute independence for Korea. They are positive that the proposed four-Power trusteeship would intensify the problems rather than solve than. They do not fear Communist domination provided : (r) A fair election is held to set up an honestly- elected Korean Government before American security troops are withdrawn ; and (2) inviolable guarantees are provided against future unilateral intervention in Korea by Russia. They believe that Koreans are fully capable of governing themselves if they are left alone to do it according to their own traditions. They recognise the great value of having foreign capital invested in Korea and foreign technical and administrative advisers. However, they are certain there can be no real independence for their- country unless both investments and advisers are subject to a fully-independent Korean Government.
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