JAPAN AND THE WORLD-VI : HER AIMS ON THE MAINLAND
By A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT Tokyo, November.
THERE- are many highly cultured Japanese with no political interests, who are aware of the debt of gratitude their country owes to the early achievements of China, and who are deeply and sincerely distressed at the continued chaos in that huge country. There are many Japanese of decidedly modern tendencies, who, Whilst appreciating the modern achievements of Western civilization and the great assistance rendered by it in the reconstruction of Japan, arc yet profoundly and honestly perplexed at the havoc wrought in China by its impact with the West. Both these types of Japanese, at least, regard China not only as a useful medium for strengthen- ing the inadequate economic structure of their own country, but also as the sphere of an historic mission of reconstruction which Japan is destined to fulfil.
While it would be a mistake to call them simply " imperialists," they may be, or may become, the strongest force behind those whose wish to reform, advise and guide China to the exclusion of every other influence springs from more egotistic and materialistic reasons. All these elements find themselves on common ground in having very little confidence in China's ability to work out her own salvation, and in the firm belief that any assistance coming from Europe or America or the League of Nations will only be detrimental to the well- being of China.
That' is-the real meaning of the formula, " it must he left to Japan to maintain the peace in the Far East." That -formula does not mean that peace in the Far East is necessarily bound up with the status quo, but rather that, in the opinion of Japan, this part of the world will only feel assured of real peace when Bolshevist Russia as well as the Anglo-Saxon Powers are faced with and checked by a reconstructed China, living not only in harmony but in virtual unity too with Japan.
Sinee the beginning of the century it is beyond doubt that Japan has made ever greater advances towards this distant goal, to much the same extent as she has succeeded in strengthening herself to meet the growing problems which face her at home. A recent advance on this path was the separation of Manchuria from a China in chaos, a China " permeated with Western influences " ; the most recent of all, the virtual recog- nition of this achievement on the part of Russia by the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway.
Manchukuo may become, at any rate theoretically, what Korea could never be : the " crystallization- point " of a new China, whether centralized or federal, in conformity with Japanese ideas ; and at the same time an organic link between Japan proper and her continually increasing zones of influence on the conti- nent of Asia. Already. contiguous Northern China has changed from an openly hostile territory into a zone in which, despite emnplaints and ::ttempts to gain time, the foundations are being effectively laid at various points for an assimilation to Manchukuo-Japan. In spite of all ups and downs. in spite of all loud denials and dumb resistance. in spite of the necessity of taking into account time irreconcilable foes of Japan in Southern China, the Nanking district already appears to be in the way of becoming a broad second zone of potential orientation towards Japan. It was only in the South that the ancient passionate hatred of Japan persisted almost unremittingly. And Japan today takes the view that; Nanking is already rcoricntating itself', and would quietly accept the challenge of the South and employ the friendship of Japan as a weapon against the incom- parably more dangerous Red districts of China, if the attitude of the Great Powers, especially the sympathy of America, did not strengthen Chiang Kai-shek more and more in a new intransigence and a new duplicity.
The Naval Conference, therefore, that great under- standing of Japan with the West, becomes the next and most important stage on Japan's way to her goal in China. The pamphlet which the Japanese War Office recently promulgated, with the intention of explaining the necessities of "national defence" direct to the masses over the head of the Cabinet, contains the following
statement on the subject : The degree of Chinese activity in the future will be determined by whether or not the Japanese naval strength is outdistanced by America's naval strength. This is apparent from the fact that Japan was forced to. send her army to China to cope with the anti-Japanese movement in that country every time Japan was made to concede to the British and American demands. at naval conferences in the . past. From this consideration, it is . apparent that Japan's attitude at the coming Naval Conference will determine the Chinese attitude towards Japan in the future. It may be said that the peace of the Far East . depends upon the result of the. coming Naval Conference.
Japan is entering this Naval Conference with more fears than hopes ; for no one. in responsible circles desires a break-up of the conference, which would leave Japan free to arm herself at will, and possibly free also to embark on more perilous enterprises; But for all that many Japanese boggle at the prospect of a partial sur, render of their claims as the price which they may have to pay for an agreement.
But Japan must not merely steal another march on the Naval Powers in order to be able gradually to take advantage of the chances which are clearly being offered her in China ; to attain that object, she must not only be more certain of peace with Russia than she is today ; she must not only be in a position to consolidate first her financial and economic situation, now so overstrained. Above all, if she wants lasting successes in China, she must give proof in Manchuria that she is temperamentally, tactically and administratively in a position to reform Chinese districts from within, as a friend and not as a master. If for all her good intentions she fails in that (and it is by no means proved that her pioneers possess the necessary gifts), her chances of success in China are smaller in the long run than they_ might otherwise have been. The Japanese, in contradistinction to the Chinese and the Russian Bolshevists, are no great masters of propaganda. All these considerations, however, lead one to conjecture that for some .considerable time Japan will not, make much progress towards the fulfilment of her mission in China, however favourable her position in that country appears to be at the moment. And a positive success for Japan at the Naval Conference might prove more advantageous to China than .a failure, which might have the effect of inducing Japan to look for compensations in that country.
Does Japan feel that she has a mission even beyond China ? If it is not a question of practical politics, but rather of considerations in the domain of political philosophy, this question must be answered in the affirmative. Three facts combine, in the mind of Japan, to form the wish that at some time in the future she may play the part of Asia's_ leader. The first is that numerous Asiatic peoples are in . a state of chronic conflict with Western domination. The second, that Japan, alone among the coloured peoples, has at the same time preserved her freedom by her own efforts and achieved the position of a great Power—a position .which, it is true, she well deserved. The third fact is that the Japanese at least consider it questionable whether the " advanced nations of the West " have really discovered the. political and social machinery capable of guaranteeing to the world, inclusive of Asia, the blessings of peace and progress.
From time to time such thoughts of a later Asiatic . hegemony come to the surface not • merely in private conversations or in 'pronouncements issued -in times of excitement, but also in practical politics. Such is the case when there is a question-of Great Britain or Holland wishing to limit, in the interest of their own industries in their - Indian possessions, 'the importation of cheap Japanese mass-produced goods, which in the view of Japan are the only goods of the kind accessible to the poor classes in those territories.
But, by and large, these trains of thought are merely academic today ; and to attach importance to Japanese plans for the conquest of Asia, even as regards the remote future, is not only to overestimate the strength of Japan and to take altogether too tragically the real significance of her political dreams, , but also - to do injustice to the actual leaders of Japanese foreign policy. At any late, the objective of Japanese export policy is determined far less by political designs than by the continued pressure of overpopulation and .lack of raw materials, or by the necessity of providing employment for her : people and of financing the import of raw materials. There is a great difference between today's expansion of , Japanese exports and that of -Germany before the War ; for the-former consists almost exclusively of consumption goods and is not accompanied by any kind of capital investment or acquisitions of vested interests in countries other than China, while the latter took on a politically dangerous aspect owing in par- ticular to the fact that it was essentially an affair of heavy industry and foreign, investment. Japan, it is true, is engaged in a, fight against the world. But we think that we have demonstrated in this series of articles that in the main this fight is a _defensive one, even if, as continually happens in defensive warfare, she has often to adopt the tactics of attack. The objects of Japan are not as black as they are often painted. IIer position, on the other hand, appears to be more. difficult than is usually realized. And her need to improve that position seems to be in fact .almost as cat-. egorical a necessity as it is presented, by many . activist Japanese in the military camp. On the other hand, it is not right to consider that the most evil consequences of this necessity—whether for the world, or Japan herself—arc the only possible outcome of the processes which are at work.
At this very moment, when the naval and. commercial issues are acute,_ certain opportunities are once more presented to render prudent assistance to Japan, without damaging the recognized interests of the world com- munity and its most important members. Japan deserves such assistance, and the preservation of world peace demands it. But just as Japan needs an almost superhuman degree of statesmanship to get through these next years, which will prove a difficult period from many points of view, so also the rest of the world needs an extraordinary degree of real understanding, ,goodwill and constructive statesmanship in order to help Japan solve her problems in a way which will improve, and not endanger, the chances of world peace and of increasing .world, prosperity. The world must be careful not to drive Japan to extremes, and Western statesmen must realize that Japan is a country which is not even frightened by risks that might seem suicidal to other nations.
Previous page
