CONSPIRACY RUN MAD
By DARSIE GILLIE WHEN M. Mollet told the French Assembly of the ultimatum that Britain and France had jointly sent to rel-Aviv and Cairo he paid a warm tribute to Israel's demo- cratic practice and denounced the dictatorial government of Egypt. He hastened to add that in the stage of the dispute marked by the Israeli invasion of Egyptian territory, it was not Yet possible to formulate an opinion; but Britain and France were acting to preserve the free passage of the Canal before It was too late. The tone of his words (no less than the pro- nasals contained in the ultimatum) belied the spirit of neutrality In the dispute which was supposed to inspire Franco-British action.
This was scarcely surprising. Nasser had been assisting the Algerian rebels with a great many broadcast words and a certain number of deeds long before he seized the Suez Canal. There has been strong sympathy with Israel on the French Left from the start. A strong party has grown up on the centre and right to proclaim that Israel was the only sure ally that trance (or indeed Britain) possessed in the Middle East.
For this reason perhaps the allegations in the weekly C Express on Friday, November 3. did not make on French .IPinion the same effect that they would have done in Great Britain where opinion was more divided. L'Express declared hat Israeli staff officers had been in Paris discussing technical problems with the Ministry of National Defence until a day )efore the Israeli assault was launched. M. Mollet's surprise, C'Express alleged, was not that the Israelis had attacked but tat they had attacked earlier than was expected. L'Express also drew attention to reports that had circulated in Paris a week earlier of Egyptian pounds bought by the French Govern- lient and supplied to certain military units; and of some fare- well parties given in Paris at about the same time by officers Leaving for unknown destinations.
This picture of a vast military machine set in motion for about November 6 is curiously confirmed by an article in the ''vening paper Paris-Presse of last Monday by its special correspondent with the French forces in Cyprus and Egypt. M. Merry Bromberger. The article set out to explain why Franco-British military action lagged so long after the ulti- matum. The Franco-British command, says M. Bromberger, was asked by the two Governments to launch its offensive on u-Day minus six. The immensely complicated machinery for which Cyprus was only the rather inconvenient defence base had to be set in motion with accelerated speed. By a miracle of Meanwhile, six days' preparations were crowded into five. wleanwhile, says M. Bromberger, the troop carriers that were on the spot ahead of the troops filled in time by dropping supplies of water over Sinai—in case they might come in useful for passers-by. The British HQ in Nicosia swore it had no contact with Israel. M. Bromberger's story, it will be noted, describes the military consequences that might be expected from M. Mollet's surprise at the early date of the Israeli offensive. Incidentally by implication the British military authorities were acting on exactly the same suppositions as the French. The 'expedition has been criticised for 'inadequate military and diplomatic' preparations. The military preparations seem to have been only too complete. The diplomatic could scarcely have been begun, since the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs was with the fewest possible exceptions (not chosen, it would seem, hierarchically) left out of the planning. Officials knew nothing and in many cases notoriously disapproved of what they guessed.
But how much of the French Government knew? A few days before the Israeli offensive the five Algerian rebel leaders had been captured by the French. They were flying from Rabat to Tunis via the Balearics on an aircraft belonging to a Moroccan company which is French managed and French staffed. The pilot was invited from Paris to fly his passengers to Algiers instead of Tunis. He informed his Moroccan employer of the change of route and set out to hand over his passengers to the French police. Undoubtedly the plot to capture them originated in Algiers, but someone highly placed approved of it and lent his authority to persuade the pilot to do what he asked. It was certainly not the Prime Minister, who only learned of what was being done shortly before the prisoners were being landed. Approval seems to have come from the Ministry of National Defence in Paris and from the Minister Resident in Algiers who could only be consulted about an hour before the rebel leaders arrived on the aerodrome. In this case a decision had clearly been forced on the Government (which weakly accepted it except for one junior Minister) by a group of three men, M. Bourges-Maunoury, Minister of National Defence, M. Max Lejeune, Vice-Minister for the Army, and M. Lacoste, Minister Resident for Algeria.
As far as Egyptian policy is concerned M. Mollet and M. Pineau bear full responsibility. The reports which came from Israel of the participation of a French air unit in the Israeli offensive must be considered against this background of secrecy within the Government and as between Ministers and their Ministries. Was it part of the policy approved by Mollet to send this unit to Israel or was it a decision of the leading member of the 'tough' group within the Cabinet, M. Bourges- Ma uno ury ?
It is conceivable that it was a last-minute measure to provide a substitute for Franco-British action which, in view of the early Israeli offensive, could no longer be co-ordinated. Con- spiracy has evidently run mad in the entire preparation of the expedition and a heavy penalty for conspiracy is now to be paid. In the abstract the idea of French help to Israel would not necessarily be disliked by at least a large section of French opinion. But the increasing evidence of Franco-British irre- sponsibility is disquieting many Frenchmen who did not origin- ally disapprove of the Egyptian expedition. At the time of writing there is a minority group of Socialist deputies already in rebellion against their party leader M. Mollet. M. Mendes- France is already moving into sharper opposition to the Government. MRP voices in favour of a real attempt at settle- ment in Algeria are growing louder. In the more conservative sections of the Government the totally unexpected and grave economic consequences of the Egyptian expedition are causing anxiety which the expedition itself did not arouse. The new allegation will come as an additional explosive into the already fissured block of the Mollet Government supporters, but that block is so large that even when it is cracked the Government will not necessarily collapse.
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