BOOKS.
THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA"
THE reason why Mr. Shuster, for a short time Treasurer- General of Persia, failed to reform the Persian finances will be quite clear to readers of this book, although it is a very different reason from that which Mr. Shuster himself offers. He failed because he refused to recognize the fundamental fact of the situation—the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907--, and because he would never lend himself to smooth away any of the diplomatic difficulties of Britain in her association with Russia. The reason he himself gives is contained in the title of his book. He believes that Russia-and Britain were deter- mined to strangle the life out of Persia, and he discovers in this policy a long succession of acts of brutality and moral cowardice. It may be that all his actual opposition to the fundamental fact of the situation can be fairly summed up in the one word " tactlessness." He tells us good-humouredly that he was accused of tactlessness, and, though it is a vague word to apply to an intricate development of cause and effect, we really cannot think of one that is more appropriate to his proceedings.
Let us say at once that Mr. Shuster has written a most entertaining book, and that we have no doubt whatever that he is a very capable administrator
of finance. If he had been left to himself as we, for our part, wish be could have been—we believe that he would have been as likely as anyone to defeat Persian intrigue • The Strangling of Persia : a Record of European Diplonutog and Oriental Intrigue. By W. Morgan Shuster, Ex-Treasurer-General of Persia. With 85 Illustrations, a Map, and Appendices. London: T. Fisher Unwin. [lb. 8c1., net.] and corruption (of which he gives many extraordinary instances) and to show a good balance in the Persian Treasury. He might have been in Persia still if it had not been for the Stokes affair; but in that affair he surpassed himself in his obstinate refusal to see that to consult the difficulties of Britain was the shortest way to soothe the suspicions of Russia. In appointing an Englishman to command the Treasury gendarmerie he seemed to Russia—or, at all events, Russia chose to say so—to be favouring British interests as opposed to those of Russia wherever the gendarmerie operated in the Russian sphere. If British motives had been rapacious, as Mr. Shuster believes, the British Foreign Office would not have been averse from having an Englishman in such an authoritative position as that of head of the gendarmerie for collecting taxes. But on learning that Russia disliked the appointment the British Foreign Office begged Mr. Shuster to choose for his chief of gendarmerie an officer of any other nationality. Ninety-nine men out of a hundred in Mr. Shuster's position would have admitted the force of the appeal. But Mr. Shuster's prepossession that every act of Britain or Russia was designed to strangle Persia was expulsive of all ability to treat reasonably with the Legations at Teheran. The retention of Major Stokes led on to the Russian ultimatums to Persia and to Mr. Shuster's compulsory abandonment of his work. It is a pity. But we have seldom read a narrative in which the very end which the principal actor wished to avoid was reached by such a logical sequence of events for which he himself was largely responsible.
Of course if Russia had not been harsh and unsympathetic even the Stokes affair would not have mattered very much. We readily admit that. We wish to make it clear that we have never defended, and do not now defend, the treatment of Persia by Russia. Some of the things we most regret have been ordered from St. Petersburg, but it is also to be remem- bered that Russian agents are independent of central control to a degree which we Englishmen can scarcely understand. We trust that some of the deplorable events at Tabriz were not sanctioned from St. Petersburg. But, however that may be, our point holds good. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 simply stereotyped the existing facts. Russia was already swallowing up Northern Persia. In recognizing that part of Persia as a Russian sphere, Britain did no more than bow to the facts, while she got in return for her compliance the right, as co-signatory of the Convention, to act as a restraining influence on Persia in the future. Otherwise she would have had no basis of argument whatever. According to the Convention the "inte- grity and independence of Persia" was to be maintained. "Ah," says Mr. Shuster in so many words, "but Russia and Britain have themselves wrecked the integrity and independence of Persia. They have thus broken their word !" Let us be rational. One does not guarantee the independence of a country which is "independent" in the sense in which Germany is independent. The thing would be a con- tradiction in terms. Great Britain has honestly used the Convention to restrain Russia. If the Convention had not been used in this sense Northern Persia would probably have been absorbed by Russia at least three years ago. Mr. Shuster knows so very little of the conditions of modern Britain that he supposes all through his book that the old- fashioned Jingoes still flourish, and that the British Govern. ment run round seeking whom they may devour. We do not recognize such a picture of ourselves. If it be true that the comparatively small strip of Persia which is defined by the Anglo-Russian Convention as the British sphere was marked out by Lord Kitchener as the utmost we ought to concern our- selves with, surely that is alone a proof of what we say. One of the first of British soldiers urging his Government not to make themselves responsible for new territory I
When Mr. Shuster offered the appointment to Major Stokes the British Government, as we all remember, at first merely said that Major Stokes must resign his commission in the British Army before taking service under the Persian Government. In other words, the British Government by implication sanctioned the appointment. Later Sir Edward Grey changed his mind. The reason is clear—Russia in the meantime had objected. In this change of mind, however, Mr. Shuster discovers a strong proof of the preconceived determina- tion of Britain to tamper with the independence of Persia. If Mr. Shuster had recognized the reality of the British difficulty, and had appointed an officer of another nationality, he would have been in a very strong position indeed, and we do not see how the British Foreign Office could have failed to argue strongly with Russia in order to get the compromise accepted. But this was not Mr. Shuster's way. Persia suffered, and, of course, Mr. Shuster to the end of his days will not admit the possibility that he himself was largely the cause of her dis- comfiture.
In several passages Mr. Shuster, in a judgment which is slightly more lenient than usual to Britain, says that the British Government would have resisted Russia more strongly if their attention had not been wholly engaged elsewhere— namely, in watching Germany at the time of the Agadir dispute. This is probably true enough, but we cannot under- stand why it should be made a reproach to us. As to Mr. Shuster's critical faculty in politics generally, the reader will be able to judge for himself when we say that in Mr. Shuster's opinion the Anglo-Russian Convention has been quite eclipsed by the Potsdam understanding. We should think he must have regretted the expression of that opinion when, after the recent meeting of the Tsar and the German Emperor at Baltic Port, an announcement was issued to the effect that Germany at last recognized the value of the Triple Entente. To take another smaller but significant opinion of Mr. Shuster's : he calls the Times " the
well-known organ of the Foreign Office."
Although Mr. Shuster's behaviour seems to us to have been unhappily conceived and wrong-headed from beginning to end we wish heartily to recommend his book. We found it difficult to put it down. It is swift, and amusing, and terribly " candid." We shall be interested to see whether M. Mornard (the present Treasurer-General) will take any action to refute Mr. Shuster's charges. These charges are explicit and gross.
One word in conclusion. The ultimate cause of the decay of Persia is, of course, the inability of the Persians to rule themselves. Mr. Shuster never thinks of stating this very simple and obvious fact when he reviews the causes of the Persian decline. Yet we could quote many pages of his book to show how dreary is the prospect for constitutional govern- ment in Persia. We will make only one delightful extract :--
" In the meantime I had been attending the sessions of the Cabinet, in an endeavour to get the Ministers to realize the seriousness of the situation and cease demanding im- possible stuns of money. The loudest in his complaints and dire predictions of impending disaster was his Excellency Amir Azam, now rejoicing in the title and dignity of Acting Minister of War. The Amir Azam was a man whose general reputation would warrant a long sentence in any gaol. I had an agent look into some of the financial transactions of the War Office, and par- ticularly the private bank balances of the Acting Minister. When, therefore, in a council of the Ministers of June 19th, at which I was present, he proclaimed that a general rising of the 'Army of Teheran' would take place the following day, if a mere 42,000 tumans was not at once forthcoming for their pay and rations, I politely asked him what disposition had been made of the similar sum which I had given him for another month's arrears only ten days before. ` Gone,' said his Excellency ; 'all disbursed to the poor, starving troops of the army.' Have you none of that money left P ' I said. 'Not a kraal remains in the war-chest,' he replied. I thought it convenient at this point to pull out a private memo- randum which I had brought with me, showing that his Excellency had deposited the last month's pay and several other sums for military purposes, in all 83,000 tumans, with a native banker, with whom it rested at that moment while the predicted rising of the troops was being staged by the Amir's gallant officers of the line. Reading the dates and amounts of the deposits from my private memorandum, I asked him whether they were not correct. His Excellency Amir Azam, Vice and Acting Minister of War, lifted his two hundred and forty pounds of brain and adipose tissue to his full height of six feet five. Placing his hand upon his heart, and looking proudly at his distinguished colleagues of the Council, he demanded to know whether his honour was being aspersed. As there seemed to be some doubt on that point, he passed on in his discourse, concluding his remarks with the statement that if he had 83,000 tumans to his credit, he was the last to know it. This
latter statement apparently impressed the gentlemen of the Cabinet as the height of improbability, so that it was suggested that his Excellency summon his confidential accountant. This
was done, and we sat around, at my request, until the accountant arrived. The Amir arose, stepped out, held a hurried conversation with his faithful keeper of the war-chest, and returning, with a metallic smile of joy and friendship upon his countenance, assured the Council and myself that I was right—in fact, correct—since
he had just learned, to his intense surprise, that the preceding
month's payment had not been made to the troops (although his Excellency had so directed some time ago), and it was that sum for which the army had been clamouring. It was all a mauvaise intelligence. By this simple means the rising of the troops was successfully postponed."
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