Second Thoughts on Spain
By VERNON BARTLETT E all know all about Spain, but it is odd how our know- ledge varies. The Spanish tragedy is that the civil war began so shortly after Hitler had reinforced Mussolini in rejecting the Western interpretation of democracy that a national struggle also became an international war of ideologies.
To Some people General Franco was a gallant knight, defending Christianity from the Communist Anti-Christ. To others the Spanish Republicans were fighting against appalling odds to free a backward and down-trodden people from a feudal tyranny. And most of us are as sure of our interpretations today as we were fifteen years ago.
I was a passionate supporter of the Republicans, although I have to admit that neither the Anarchists nor the Communists among them had ideas of democracy which resembled my own. I still believe that the defeat of the Republic was an international tragedy which would not have occurred but for Hitler's and Mussolini's weapons and troops. But I know _people who are just as passionate in support of Franco, and who believe that the foreign aid to the Republicans was as great as that which he received. There has never been—as there should be—a genuine and impartial enquiry into foreign intervention in the Spanish civil war. • That war, of course, has now passed into history. But the memory of it has not, with the result that the supporters of either side make the mistake of thinking of Spain as it was then, and not as it is now. In fact, the civil war influenced the Spaniards greatly; and I do not believe that the sacrifices it demanded have been entirely in vain. Had Franco been a big enough man to show magnanimity after his victory, its few advantages would be as obvious as its evils. Unfortunately, in a ,country of such intense light and shade there are no greys ; compromise and con- ciliation are taken to denote weakness and fear, so that far too many Republicans who have been pardoned are nevertheless penalised when it comes to finding work. Nevertheless, Franco is probably more sure of his power today than at any previous moment. The Republic could not be re-established (even if its leaders had been able to remain united in exile and in touch with public opinion inside the country) without recourse to fighting. And nothing is more certain than that nobody in Spain wants another civil war. In the last one a million Spaniards lost their lives.
Then why not a monarchy? Don Juan, waiting in Portugal for the summons to the throne, is a pleasant young man with moderately progressive ideas. He even has the support of a good many Republicans who see no immediate hope for their own cause and who look upon him as a much lesser evil than General -Franco. But the Pretender has said fairly plainly Oat he would have no dealings with Franco, and Franco apparently sees no reason to have dealings with him. The fact that he served for some years in the Royal Navy may be an additional handicap, since Great Britain is temporarily under a very large and dark cloud. In any case Franco is believed to have an ingenious scheme whereby Don Juan's eldest son, the thirteen-year-old. Infante Juan Carlos, would be proclaimed king. Since the suc- cession law has recently been changed so that the age at which the Infante could come to the throne has been postponed from 25 to 30, Franco would be able to carry on as Regent for some seventeen years. This scheme does not appeal to Don Juan, but it might appeal to the increasing number of Spaniards who are Monarchists by inclination but collaborationists " in order to gets jobs under Franco.
So the Monarchists were not very optimistic even before the Americans came along with talk of a military agreement which has already tremendously flattered the Spaniards (despite its implication , that their country could not remain neutral in a third world war) and which should be the prelude to a fine flow of dollars. Add to this the fact that this year's harvest is as good as last year's was bad, and one understands why the quiet-spoken little dictator in his palace near Madrid must be thanking his lucky stars. His opposite number in the Kretnlin has prevented any serious revival of Republicanism ; President Truman is likely to prevent an early and irresistible swing towards the monarchy.'
But Spain is changing, even though her ruler remains. We have made the mistake of forgetting that where there is life there must be growth. There is still great poverty, which we have accentuated in the hope that discontent might lead to Franco's overthrow. There is also a shocking and criminal disregard among many of the rich for the miseries of the poor. But the Government has retained most of the social reforms introduced during the Republic, and has introduced some new ones on its own, with the result that the Spanish industrialist says much the same things about the alleged pampering of the worker as the British industrialist says here at home. One government may make concessions because it represents the working masses, and another may make concessions because it fears them, but there is .a marked similarity in the results.
The Army officers no longer represent, as they used to do, the families of aristocratic absentee landlords ; many of them are middle-class men who enlisted during the civil war and stayed on in the Army when it was over. The Government itself con- tains a larger proportion of technicians than would have been the case in the old days. But it is, above all, in the Church that the change seems to be most remarkable. Six thousand priests lost their lives in the civil war, and it is not therefore surprising if a good many of the survivors worry too much about their own skins and too little about the souls under their care. But there are also very many priests—some of whom were successful pro- fessional men when the civil war broke out—who have been deeply and lastingly affected by the hatreds and horrors of that period. These men now have a following among the poor such as had been unknown in Spain for many generations. It is from the Church that there now comes the most persistent demand for greater freedom of speech.
Spain is still, of course, a dictatorship, with Franco in absolute control. Nobody—except him and the advisers themselves—is sure to whom he turns for advice. No Minister when he goes to bed at night is sure that he will still be a Minister when he gets up in the morning. As in every other dictatorship, there is a posse of yes-men and a thick wad of sycophantic newspapers between the Caudillo and the people, with the inevitable growth of incompetence and corruption. There is therefore a lot of dis- content, which the Spaniards, being strong individualists, express with a frankness amazing to anybody familiar with the dictator- ships of the Cominform.
But even before the Americans arrived with their proposals to end Spain's isolation, there were small signs of a growing freedom. For example, the Labour Unions (which contain a good many Radical members who in other circumstances might have become Communists) had suggested that there would have been no Barcelona strike last spring if they themselves had the right to elect all their officials instead of having the upper ranks of the hierarchy imposed upon them from above. And deputies in the Cortes had ventured timidly to ask for a larger say in the government of the country. Such tendencies will increase now that it has become so important for General Franco to prove to the Americans that he is rather a benevolent autocrat than a brutal tyrant. A new Press law is under consideration which may possibly allow a little healthy criticism. American advisers and experts will be much more interested in a man's capabilities than his sycophantic loyalty to the regime. And the lessening dis- content resulting from greater prosperity may encourage the Government to show more tolerance towards those Spaniards whose only crime was to have been on the losing side in the civil war. These developments call for a reconsideration of our own policy towards Spain. I believe that we have made the mistake CA overlooking the extent to which the people of any country are likely in the long. run to identify themselves with their government (whatever the methods by which it obtained' power), and to modify it by broadening the basis of its support. The Falange Party, for example, plays an astonishingly small part in Spanish politics today, whereas former Republicans, Monarchists and other opponents of Franco have correspondingly increased their influence. As far as I am concerned, I loathe as much as ever the methods which gave Franco his victory, but I no longer believe that the satisfaction one may gain from feeling righteously indignant about it justifies the continuance of a policy which brings hardship to the Spanish people but strength to their. dicta tor.
Previous page
