FROM THE PACIFIC TO EUROPE.
NEGOTIATIONS which may turn out to be the most important that have taken place between France and Britain since the Treaty of Versailles have been going on in London. Reports about the nature of these negotiations all tend in one direction, and they can hardly be wrong. Mr. Lloyd George has evidently recognized that compro- mises between France and Britain which meet ths 'needs of the moment but go no further—which, indeed, often sow the seed of fresh misunderstandings—tire useless. He is trying, therefore, to bring about a far-reaching arrangement which will make it possible for Europe to settle down at last and revive her trade, and which will modify in some respects the application of the Treaty of Versailles. If rumour is not false, Mr. Lloyd George, encouraged by the success at Washington in settling the problems of the Pacific, intends to try to pull off a corre- sponding success in Europe. He seems to aim at a general agreement between Britain, France, Germany and Italy. As things are, when one of the Allied countries makes friendly arrangements with Germany on its own account it is subject to suspicion. It is suspected of betraying the interests of the others. The chief benefit of an agreement embracing all the great Powers of Europe, including Germany, would be that no room would be left for jealousy. But that is not all. It is impossible to contrive any coherent plan for bringing Russia back into the world of business unless that plan is agreed upon by virtually the whole of Europe. What Mr. Lloyd George is aspiring to do is by no means easy. But in negotiation he always seems to thrive on difficulties. In bringing conflicting interests together he is always skilful and patient.. We sincerely hope that he will succeed.
What are the main obstacles ? The greatest of all, of course, is the profound mistrust which France displays towards Germany. She wants security ; - she is never tired of repeating the phrase ; she cannot wipe out the memory of forty years of terrible anxiety culminating in an unparalleled war. Why should she suffer such things again ? Why should she accept even a remote risk of it all happening once more ? Why should not Britain help her to be " secure," particularly when security for France means security for all civilized nations ? We have tried to explain many times that nobody wants France to be secure more than we do, and we are sure that the American people have exactly the same feeling. At the same time, it is impossible to get away from the fact that the French theory of security is different from the British and American theory. France believes in a physical security defined accurately in terms of soldiers and ships and treaties pledging to France the protection of her friends. Britain and America believe rather in what may be called healing principles—in depriving nations of obvious grievances, in trusting to the comity which will emerge from new associations and new relationships. But behind all this there is, of course, the accepted axiom that Britain and America could never look on unmoved if any great Power again disturbed the peace as Germany did in 1914. France, nevertheless, rather than accept such " vague " assurances, would prefer to keep Germany, if not crippled industrially, at all events so effectually confined and limited that she could not again become rich and strong. We have said on a previous occasion that as it is certain that we should have to rush to the help of France if she were attacked, we might just as well put that simple fact in writing. It might be a good move to complete the hitherto unratified Treaty promising France support in the event of " unprovoked aggression " by Germany. But even then there would be a difficulty. " Unprovoked aggres- sion " is very difficult to define. It is easy to imagine circumstances in which France might say that an attack was unprovoked, but in which Germany could produce pretty strong evidence that she was acting with reason. The moral is that even a revived Treaty of Guarantee would not give France all the security that she demand's. We should very much like, none the less, to see something put in writing, not because we ourselves think it necessary, but because we believe it would be a satisfaction to the French. We should only be promising to do what we should have to do in any case if there were really unprovoked aggression. If the Treaty of Guarantee were thought undesirable it would be quite possible to put our promise on record in some other way.
But such a device, though we think it would be very helpful, cannot cover all the ground. Mr. Lloyd George, we hope, will explain to M. Briand how earnest is the determination of Britain and America to start the world on a new way of life, and will try to convince him that ultimately by far the greatest degree of security which France can ever have will come from her standing in with her friends. Let us picture what has been happening during the last two years in a little allegory. A., B. and C. are farmers who live -in a country where neither life nor pro- perty is safe—a country whieh is overrun by marauders. A:, B. and C.: are near neighbours, and the obvious thing for them to do in order to make themselves secure is to draw up some concerted plan for their defence. They continually meet and discuss what would be best, but at each meeting A. and B. are in agreement; and C. makes various objections. It is quite natural in a way that C. should do this, for as a matter of fact his farm is a little nearer than the farms of A. and B. to the • edge of the doubtful country. It is natural, also, that A. and B. should nearly always agree as they are relations, and though they have often had furious tiffs, everybody knows that they think alike on most important questions, and that in a tight place they would be sure to keep together. Now, A. and B. during the discussions have come to the conclusion that their farming will never be really prosperous until the country is in a settled condition. They recognize that there would be a much better chance of the marauders settling down and becoming peaceful traders if some of their grievances —which A. and B. recognize to exist—could be removed. They point out, for instance, that all persons in the more unsettled parts of the country are required to work under such disadvantages and legal penalties that many of them hardly think it worth while to work seriously. They prefer to make trouble and steal from the few rich and established persons in the country, hoping that if they go on doing so long enough they will be offered better terms. But whenever A. and B. propose that positive encourage- ment should-be given to the marauders to mend their bad ways and settle down, C. remarks, " That does not meet my case at all. You seem to forget that when the next trouble comes I have got to bear the brunt of it owing to the position of my farm. Give me, first of all, the means of protection that I want—the barbed wire, the ammunition, and the labour for mining my ditches, and then I will talk about the other things." We need not explore the reasons why C. argues like that, because it is acknow- ledged that by nature he thinks differently from A. and B. But surely C. might admit this much—that he cannot possibly protect himself alone • that he is helpless without the support of A. and B. ; and that, therefore, he would be wise not to estrange A. and B., but to make sure of having their permanent goodwill, even though he may sometimes think their reasoning extremely foolish.
The tradition of Franco-American friendship is old and strong. The name of Lafayette has always been one to conjure with in America. We devoutly hope that France will not weaken this tradition by her own acts and words. It is of the greatest value to her. Whether the Washington Conference does or does not agree to the demands of France that she should have many submarines and cruisers, whether or not France is held to her pledge as a mandatory Power to protect the Christian populations in Cilicia, whether or not Britain insists upon treating Germany with patience in the matter of reparations—all these things in combination, whichever way the decisions may go, cannot be compared in importance with the need of France to retain the active friendship of Britain and America.
Some critics say that Mr. Lloyd George, in dreaming of a new quadruple agreement and in encouraging Germany to open up trade with Pussia, is falling into a trap. If we are on the look-out for traps, however, we need never fall into them. By all means let us examine the ground very carefully step by step. We have no doubt whatever that the proposed advance is in the right direction. Russia must be tamed as well as restored by trade. It is not too much to hope that, at last, the Supreme Council will draw up a scheme that will stand the heavy tests to which it is sure to be subjected, because it will be based upon reason.
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