GREAT BRITAIN AND THE NICARAGUA CANAL.
WE see that yet another attempt is being made in America to stop the ratification of the modifica- tions of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty on the ground that Great Britain forbids the fortification of the Canal. In other words, certain over-vehement persons are trying to persuade the American people that Great Britain is forcing the clauses forbidding fortifications upon an unwilling Government. The whole thing is, we believe, a pure delusion. British interests are entirely on the side of the fortification of the Canal by the United States. Any one who takes the trouble to think the matter out will see this at once. What we want is the complete and absolute neutralisation of the Nicaragua Canal. We want our ships to be able to pass freely through the Canal in case of war with any of the Continental Powers, and we want to see our enemies prevented from converting the Canal and its entrances into hostile ports. But there is only one way to secure the absolute neutrality of the Canal,—to place it in the hands of a Power strong enough to enforce that neutrality against all comers. That America should be the Power is most fortunate for us, for barring the possibilities of civil war, which must exist in the Anglo- Saxon world just as they do elsewhere, we do not intend to go to war with America. But having helped to make America the guardian of the Canal we are not such idiots as to want to tie the guardian's hands behind his back. On the contrary, we want to see the guardian hold the Canal so strongly that no one will be able to challenge his right. A word may be said here to make people understand how useless is a mere paper neutrality, and how necessary it is to have force on the spot to en- force neutrality. Though theoretically the neutrality of the Suez Canal is a very doubtful point in International Law, in effect the Suez Canal is always treated by the Powers as neutral, and we by reason of our position in Egypt are the guardians of that neutrality. Now, during the Spanish-American war a portion of the Spanish Fleet desired to pass through the Canal in order to prosecute the war against America. They were, of course, perfectly free to do that as long as they observed the neutrality of the Canal. But it was not to the interests of Spain that the Spanish cruisers should observe that neutrality. They wanted very badly to use Port Said as a coaling station, and they, accordingly, began to take in not merely just enough coal to get them to the next port, but to replenish their bunkers. Had they suc- ceeded in doing this they might have gained a very con- siderable advantage. Lord Cromer, however, acting for Great Britain, at once took action, forbade this violation of neutrality, and insisted that, as the Spanish cruisers had when they reached Port Said enough coal to get through the Canal, every basket of the coal just put in must be taken out of their bunkers. If they still wanted coal they must retire outside the three mile limit, i.e., on to the high seas, and get it sent to them there. But the Spaniards were desperately anxious to get their bunkers filled up, and the Continental Powers being secretly friendly to Spain and hostile to America, made no protest against the violation of neutrality and privately indeed discouraged the enforcement of neutrality. Under such circumstances if Great Britain had not possessed a considerable military power in Egypt and had not (in fact if not in theory) been in strong military possession of the Canal, the Spaniards would have had their way, and the violation of neutrality would have passed practically unchallenged ? Fortunately, we had the military power necessary to enforce neutrality and the Spaniards and the rest of the Powers kne w that Lord Cromer was a man who backed his words by deeds. Accordingly the Spanish Squadron was forced to respect the neutrality of the Canal. When similar circumstances arise, as they very easily may, in the case of the Nicaragua Canal, it would clearly be to our advantage that America should be able to enforce neutrality. But if America is only allowed to police the canal and not to defend it, the so-called neutrality is very likely, or rather certain, to prove a farce on the first occasion that any great Power has a really strong temptation to violate the neutrality.
But it may be asked, and will be asked by Americans, if this is true, and if British interests are really on the side of fortification, how comes it that the anti-fortification clauses appear in the Treaty. Americans would realise the reason without explanation if they would give up their inveterate habit of talking and acting as if they were the only Power in the world except ourselves. The notion is very flattering to us, no doubt, but un. fortunately it is not true. Though we know that most of our American readers will regard the statement as an aberration of British prejudice, it is a fact that other Powers exist, and that they claim, and not less resolutely because quietly, the right to be consulted in such momentous questions as joining the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. It is also a fact, though one which Americans habitually ignore, that they are not loved by the Continental Powers. Many Americans think that the French and German and Russian Govern- ments must be willing to do any thing that America likes because their Ambassadors at Washington are always so friendly and sympathetic. Yet in reality there 18 a latent political dislike of the Government of the United States among all the Great Powers which some day will astonish America from New York to San Francisco. Be that as it may, the President and the State Department are not like the American public, and know very well that, friendly or not, the Continental Powers expect a certain consideration and give-and-take in all matters of great moment. While the American public is thinking and saying, "This is a matter which only concerns England and America, and is nobody else's business," the Govern- ment at Washington is being politely reminded that the conditions under which the linking of the two oceans is to be accomplished are not matters to be settled in a hole and corner. And after all, galling as it may be to Anglo- Saxon pride, it is not altogether unreasonable that the Great Powers should want to have some say in the matter. Take France, which, to judge only by the official communique issued by the French Foreign Office, has taken a leading part in the matter. France, after all, owns Martinique and Guadeloupe in the West Indies, besides French Guiana on the South American continent, and has great interests in the Pacific Islands and in the Far East. She also has, owing to the Panama Canal scheme, a very great sentimental and, in a sense, financial interest in the piercing of the Isthmus. It is, therefore, most unlikely that she would have been con- tent to sit with folded hands and make no comment on the new arrangement. Germany, again, with far more ocean-going shipping than the United States, and with her great aspirations in regard to South America as well as the Far East, would not be likely to consent to America having it all her own way in the matter of joining the two oceans. She no doubt refrained from any offensive or outspoken action, but it was doubtless well understood at Washington what Germany would "regard with ap- proval," and what she would "view with dismay and even alarm as a possible source of friction," &c.
But though we see very clearly Rood and sound reasons why President McKinley should have been anxious to see an anti-fortification clause in the Treaty in order to prevent foreign opposition, we admit that the question is one for America and not for us. If America likes to risk foreign friction by claiming the right to fortify, it is not for us to object. If, then, America asks us to give up the clause forbidding fortification we ought to, and most certainly should, at once agree. But unless we are greatly mistaken the United States will not care to stir up a hornets' nest. She will probably be content to remember that as guardian of the neutrality of the Canal she will have the right, nay, the duty, imposed on her to do what is needful effectively to enforce neutrality. But this must mean guns and men even if permanent fortifications are forbidden, and would, of course, allow the throwing up of temporary fortifications if they were required to safeguard the neutrality of the Canal. But, as the Boers have taught us, a very few days would enable the Americans, who would be in pos- session, to put the Canal in a posture of defence. Looked at from this point of view, the whole question, indeed, becomes somewhat academic. At any rate, Americans must remember this. Fortification is not forbidden in British interests. It is against those interests. If America did not ask that the new agreement should differ in this respect from the Suez Canal agreement it was because she had good reasons of her own,—reasons to be found in the determination of the Great Powers to be consulted in all matters of such magnitude as an Inter. oceanic Canal. Great Britain has, no doubt in effect, admitted and acknowledged the Monroe Doctrine, but remember that the rest of the world has done nothing of the kind.-
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