THE PALESTINE DEADLOCK
THE Palestine Conference appears to have reached the deadlock which all except the most confirmed optimists foretold when it opened. The Jews and the Arabs have stated their cases. They are seen to be hopelessly incompatible, and it is now for the greatest of all the optimists, Mr. MacDonald, to break the deadlock. One of his hopes has already been disappointed. The delegates of the Arab States have as yet had no moderating influence on the Palestinian Arabs ; despite internal disunity, the Arab delegation as a whole stands firm on demands which the British Government cannot conceivably grant. The fundamental demand is for Arab independence, with full sovereignty, in Palestine; and with this goes the right to prohibit Jewish immigra- tion and sales of land to Jews and to end the attempt to establish a Jewish National Home. Such a solution cannot even be considered ; the Government must now produce proposals of its own. It has made certain difficulties for itself by its acceptance and approval of the Woodhead Report, thereby apparently excluding the possibility of partition ; but that decision is after all no more sacrosanct than the previous acceptance of the Peel Commission's report, and it must be considered capable of revision in case of need.
For if even the roughest justice is to be done, the case for partition in some form is strong. Whatever interpretation is placed on the Balfour Declaration, it implies that, within a given area, if not all Palestine then a part of Palestine, the Jews shall have control of their own future, and any solution which stops short of this will be regarded in Europe and, even more, in America as a betrayal of the promise made to world Jewry during the War. Yet it is clear that within a unitary Palestinian State the Arabs would never consent that the Jews should control the development of the National Home ; they have pledged themselves to fight rather than allow it. The problem for the British Government is to dis- cover whether the Arabs cannot be given such compensation as they themselves would regard as sufficient for recognising the National Home, with all the rights and powers it implies.
There seems to be only one way of providing such a ui I pro quo. The part which is played by the idea of the National Home in the minds of the Jews is played by the idea of Arab unity in the minds of the Arabs. A solution of the Palestinian problem which harmonised with that idea must at least receive very favourable consideration from the Arabs. Any other solution must be looked on as a national loss for which they can show no corresponding gain. What is needed is, firstly, an unequivocal declaration by the Government that the unity of the Arab world is an objective which Great Britain views with complete sympathy ; and, secondly, that the British Government should take immediate steps to remove such obstacles as it has itself raised to the achievement of this objective.
In making the post-War settlement by which Syria was partitioned, the British and French Governments were actuated by both interested and disinterested motives. Serious consideration should be given, in spite of obvious difficulties, to the idea of revising that settlement and restoring the unity of the pre-War Syria, including Syria as it is today, the Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan, and to accept that this area is marked out for independ- ence, either immediately or in the near future, as a federated State, allied to Great Britain and France by treaty. The new Arab State would contain the Jewish National Home as an autonomous territory with a status guaranteed by treaty ; its extent and its boundaries no doubt provide difficult problems, yet they are not insoluble in principle, as the present problem is, and its existence would not involve creating two hostile States in a country rather smaller than Wales.
It is not in the power of the British Government alone to make such proposals ; they can be made only with the agreement and consent of the French Govern- ment. That consent is the more likely to be given as France is now faced with unrest in Syria, just as Great Britain is in Palestine. Neither in French Syria nor in Palestine has separation worked ; France is now faced with the dilemma either of granting Syria an independence for which French policy has unfitted her, politically and economically, or of provoking rebellion by refusing to fulfil her obligations. A revolt in Syria following the revolt in Palestine would provide a sinis- ter commentary at the present time on the efficiency of democracy ; it would be far better that the British and French Governments should co-operate to remove the conditions of which rebellion is the result. It should not be beyond the powers of the British Government to persuade France, firstly, that the co-operation of the two democracies at the present time is essential if they are to survive ; secondly, that the present unrest in Palestine and Syria is morally and strategically a grave danger to the democracies ; thirdly, that concerted action by the two Powers could secure the loyal co- operation of the Arab world and turn the danger into a source of strength. A loyal Arab federation could undertake many of the strategic responsibilities which will weigh heavily on France and Britain in time of war, and that federation itself would only be strengthened by including as one of its constituent elements a Jewish State which, though small, would be strong and efficient, in war as in peace.
It seems unlikely that the British Government has given much attention to such proposals as these. More probably, from the suggestions that the Government has already made, it is thinking in terms of delimiting areas in some of which immigration and land sales will be restricted but permitted, in others of which they will be prohibited. It is perfectly clear that agreement will not be secured for such a solution and it will have to be imposed by force, in the hope that one day it will be accepted. Such a hope is, we believe, doomed to disappointment. The post-War history of Palestine -shows it ; the temper of Jews and Arabs alike shows it. A combination of faith and force will not rescue the Government from its difficulties ; they can be solved only if it realises that while the aspirations of both Jew and Arab are justified, and indeed have been solemnly approved by this country, they can be solved without conflict only on a larger and less constricted stage than can be provided by Palestine in its present form.
Previous page
