Speaking of the Agreement generally, we find little or nothing
to object to in principle. We must repeat, however, what we have just said in regard to the specially drastio precautions recommended for the transition period. Everything depends upon how they are carried out. It must not be forgotten that one of the results of a partial boycott of Germany will be to force the Germans to make every possible effort to obtain the American and South American markets, which indeed will be the only markets left entirely open to them. With Vie Turkish and Asiatic markets, upon which Germany is now counting, we can deal effectively ; but it would be foolish to imagine that there will not be tremendous economic consequences from even a partial closing of the markets of Russia, France, and Britain to Germany—consequences which at present it is very difficult to foresee. At any rate, we must remember that commerce is like a tide. You can to some extent utilize it and control it but you can never prevent its "eternal motion."