THE OATHS BILL.
[To THE EDITOR OF THS "SPECTATOR."]
SIR,—Your kind appreciation of my speech in defence of the utility and sanctity of oaths, encourages me to ask you to allow me to make a short statement in reply to your criticism upon my remarks concerning the general duty of truthfulness, and
the exceptional lawfulness of withholding the truth from those who have no right to it ; who, if they obtained it, would use it to the moral or physical injury of the unwary person simple enough to allow his own property to be stolen,—namely, his own knowledge about his own affairs and conduct. I will endeavour not to lay myself open to the charge of being jesuitical or a casuist, in the sense in which these words are generally under- stood in England; and I will confess that, as a rule, to have a right to withhold the truth involves, more or less directly or indirectly, the right to tell a lie. Neither will I shield myself behind the theological distinction between a material and a formal lie, for I hold the essence of a lie to consist rather in the purpose of deceiving, than in the exact words used to accomplish that purpose. You say,—" That state of mind is totally perverted which might think it a positive duty to make a false affirmation in cases where it would think it a mortal sin to swear a false oath." That is so ; and I have been misunder- stood if I have been thought to deny your proposition. But my proposition was a different one. I held that Religion never allowed, perjury, for this would be to sin against the command- ment,—" Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain." But I also held that the law of honour, which obtains amongst men of the world, as well as the law of self- preservation, which is the only ethical law of the atheist, would certainly compel a man under certain circumstances to tell a falsehood ; and I went further, and declared that the law of charity would compel a Christian, under the same circum- stances, to tell a falsehood if the person who was acting the inquisitor had no right to the knowledge he sought. Now, the State, when it puts witnesses upon oath, I believe has the right to acquire the knowledge it seeks ; and it insists upon that right by the imposition of the legal and eternal penalties of perjury. But if the State, having become godless in its jurisprudence, refrains from insisting upon this right, and thereby gives up the eternal distinction between right and wrong, I question whether the duty of confessing the whole truth remains. For the commandment, "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour," surely prohibits a falsehood that will injure him. Are you prepared to maintain the i roposition, "Thou shalt bear absolutely true witness against thy neighbour, to the ruin of his honour, happiness, and life, always and under all circumstances, especially when the object sought is to enable him or some one else to enter into a state of legalised adultery," which is the frequent object and result of actions in an English Divorce Court I am not. I certainly deny to private and irresponsible individuals the right to make me either affirm or swear to the whole truth to my own or my neighbours' moral or physical injury. But I speak under correction, and I hope my readers will take pains not to misunderstand me.—I am, Sir,
Carlton Club, March 19th. EDWIN DE LISLE.
[We count the obligation of telling the truth much higher than Mr. De Lisle; but even on his assumption, we should say that the State to which we trust for justice and protection has the first claim on our veracity, apart even from the question whether it is "godless in its jurisprudence" or otherwise. At all events, there is nothing godless in facing facts, and refusing to put an atheist through the mockery of an oath. Yet the believer who should affirm falsely because he was not sworn,—though we quite agree that it would be very foolish not to swear him, unless, like the Quaker, he thought it forbidden by Christ,— would surely be even more guilty than the unbeliever who acted in the same way.—En. Spectator.]
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